











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 




Psychology of Reasoning 
John Richard Lee 
Ph.D. 
University of Edinburgh 
1987 
s' m 
( N W ^" t 
Abstract 
The central topic of the thesis is the relationship between logic and the cognitive 
psychology of reasoning. This topic is treated in large part through a detailed examination 
of the recent work of P. N. Johnson-Laird, who has elaborated a widely-read and 
influential theory in the field. The thesis is divided into two parts, of which the first is a 
more general and philosophical coverage of some of the most central issues to be faced in 
relating psychology to logic, while the second draws upon this as introductory material for 
a critique of Johnson-Laird's `Mental Model' theory, particularly as it applies to syllogistic 
reasoning. 
An approach similar to Johnson-Laird's is taken to cognitive psychology, which cen- 
trally involves the notion of computation. On this view, a cognitive model presupposes an 
algorithm which can be seen as specifying the behaviour of a system in ideal conditions. 
Such behaviour is closely related to the notion of `competence' in reasoning, and this in 
turn is often described in terms of logic. Insofar as a logic is taken to specify the com- 
petence of reasoners in some domain, it forms a set of conditions on the 'input-output' 
behaviour of the system, to be accounted for by the algorithm. Cognitive models, how- 
ever, must also be subjected to empirical test, and indeed are commonly built in a highly 
empirical manner. A strain can therefore develop between the empirical and the logical 
pressures on a theory of reasoning. 
Cognitive theories thus become entangled in a web of recently much-discussed issues 
concerning the rationality of human reasoners and the justification of a logic as a normative 
system. There has been an increased interest in the view that logic is subject to revision 
and development, in which there is a recognised place for the influence of psychological 
investigation. It is held, in this thesis, that logic and psychology are revealed by these con- 
siderations to be interdetermining in interesting ways, under the general a priori require- 
ment that people are in an important and particular sense rational. 
Johnson-Laird's theory is a paradigm case of the sort of cognitive theory dealt with 
here. It is especially significant in view of the strong claims he makes about its relation to 
logic, and the role the latter plays in its justification and in its interpretation. The theory is 
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claimed to be revealing about fundamental issues in semantics, and the nature of rational- 
ity. 
These claims are examined in detail, and several crucial ones refuted. Johnson- 
Laird's models are found to be wanting in the level of empirical support provided, and in 
their ability to found the considerable structure of explanation they are required to bear. 
They fail, most importantly, to be distinguishable from certain other kinds of models, at a 
level of theory where the putative differences are critical. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the difficulties in this field are not yet properly 
appreciated. Psychological explantion requires a complexity which is hard to reconcile 
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The nature of reasoning is one of the most profound questions to be faced by cogni- 
tive science. We are faced with a task, the description of which is evidently drawn from 
the field of logic, but yet the performance of which must be furnished with a psychological 
account. In the very notion of `inference', we find components, drawn from these two 
fields, which at times sit uneasily together. What has to be examined is the relationship 
between them. 
This is not a new problem. All approaches to the subject of psychology have had at 
some stage to grapple with it. Attempts have ranged in nature from the austerities of 
behaviourism to the epistemological convolutions of Piagetian theory. The temptation has 
often been, on the one hand, to emphasise the similarities between the reasoning task and 
any other, while neglecting all but entirely the relevance of its logical description, or on the 
other hand to fail in recognising the complexity and richness of the behaviour engendered 
by reasoning tasks, through overplaying the formal element. It is through the reconciliation 
of these two aspects that cognitive science will contribute to progress in this area, if indeed 
it will at all. We should therefore seek to evaluate the opportunities it offers. 
The idea of a cognitive model is what we must look at. In constructing such a 
model, the cognitive scientist is attempting to create a formal framework within which to 
produce an explanation of observed behavioural phenomena. If anything can unite the two 
apparently opposed approaches to the study of reasoning, then surely this is it. 
This is not, of course, something that is going to be accomplished all at once, or in a 
single work. However, there have already been some salient attempts to get to grips with 
the issues involved here. In the course of this thesis, we shall be devoting a major part of 
our attention to just one of these, viz. that presented by P N Johnson-Laird, in Mental 
Models (1983) and elsewhere, particularly as it applies to syllogistic reasoning. This par- 
ticular theory is chosen because it exhibits several important characteristics: it is expounded 
in considerable detail; it is explicitly directed at deductive reasoning; it makes very strong 
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and highly interesting claims, about just the topics we have mentioned; it is a widely-read 
and influential theory at present in the field. A detailed examination of Johnson-Laird's 
theory will lead us at the same time to examine the fundamental problems which any such 
theory is going to have to face, and will therefore be of considerable value. 
This thesis falls into two parts. In the first part, there is a relatively philosophical 
discussion of some of the more general issues involved in the field. The intention here is 
to provide an orientation and some introductory material for the more detailed aspects of 
the second part. There is some consideration of the ways in which reasoning tasks should 
be identified, for the purposes of theorising about them; the suggestion is that such 
identification has not always been done very appropriately in the past. A particular attitude 
towards the idea of a cognitive model is outlined, and questions then addressed about how 
this relates to matters such as competence, normativity and rationality. Throughout this 
part, reference is made to the work of Johnson-Laird, because this importantly connects it 
with the second part. The second part itself is a detailed examination of the theory offered 
by Johnson-Laird in 1983, attempting both to relate it back to the issues of the first part, 
and also to consider some of the problems it raises specifically, for instance in respect of 
the extent to which it shows a proper account of mental processing essentially to involve 
semantic notions, and the extent to which its claims are really susceptible to empirical test. 
We confine our detailed attention almost wholly to deductive reasoning, mainly because it 
has received the most detailed treatment at the hands of specifically cognitive theorisers. 
Inductive and probabilistic reasoning has been extensively studied by social psychologists 
interested in rationality, and consequently it does receive significant mention in Part I. 
The hope is that we can achieve three things: firstly, the philosophical examination of 
some very general and highly important issues about the relationship between logic and 
cognitive psychology; secondly, by treatment of a specific example, a demonstration of the 
ways in which these issues appear in the psychotheoretical practices, as it were, of actual 
cognitive psychologists; and thirdly, a detailed dissection of a current theory of consider- 
able interest and importance in the field, which would be worthwhile in its own right. 
Although an attitude to the topic is adopted and argued for, it will be clear that this is a 
thesis which takes more the form of a critique of certain current ideas than that of a propo- 
sal of some particular theory of its own. Its contribution to the field is accordingly to be 
sought chiefly in the improved understanding of the problems in the field, which it claims 
thereby to bring. 
An expositional strategy employed frequently throughout is the close and critical 
examination of a paper or similar text from the relevant literature. Such texts are carefully 
chosen to provide an interesting and significant treatment of the matters we are interested 
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in, so that they provide a natural starting point for consideration of wider issues. This stra- 
tegy is perhaps mostly the result of personal preference, but it is supposed also to anchor 
the discussion within the frame of reference provided by previous work. I have not 
included a separate and comprehensive literature survey, mainly because it seemed redun- 
dant in view of the excellent ones available elsewhere, and I felt that the space could be 
put to more interesting use. The interested reader can do no better than to look at the sur- 
veys provided:- on deductive reasoning, by Evans (1982), and Johnson-Laird (1983); on 
inductive and probabilistic reasoning, by Nisbett and Ross (1980); on inductive logic, by 
the monumental work of Kyburg (1983); on the general issues of rationality, by Elster 
(1982) and various of the contributors to Geraets (1979). 
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Introduction to Part I : 
Rationality and Reasoning 
The subject of the following discussion is the cognitive psychology of deductive rea- 
soning. The intention is to clarify certain issues about how this area in psychology is 
affected by logic, and (what may surprise some) how it affects logic, and what the 
relevance of this is to various problems which arise about rationality. My claim is basi- 
cally that one's theory of cognitive psychology, if it is done seriously, and one's views 
about logic, are strongly mutually determining. That is to say, the cognitive psychology of 
deductive reasoning is a point where logical issues have empirical consequences, and 
where empirical results bear most seriously on logical matters. 
1.1 Rationality and Logic 
A frequent starting point, among those who study reasoning, is that it is to be 
regarded as a process of drawing inferences. It is further supposed that these inferences 
can, at least in principle, be characterised by some normative system of logic (eg. the first- 
order predicate calculus). It is therefore concluded that certain inferences are correct - viz. 
the ones which are logically valid - and that ideal rationality consists in the drawing only 
of such inferences. 
The view is infected with certain difficulties, which stem from the philosophy of 
logic and from what some might insist is a slightly different subject, 'metalogic'. In many 
cases, this can be harmless; often, when one uses in one field some ideas or results derived 
from another, one can afford to overlook many niceties that would trouble experts in that 
other field - and this case is no exception. Sometimes, though, one can tread too closely to 
the interests of the field from which one poaches. The issues which one addresses become 
hard to separate from the issues addressed there, and then one has to take account of the 
arguments in that field, and what they may entail for one's own pursuit. This is what can 
happen when psychologists interested in reasoning proclaim results or theories which are 
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relevant to fundamental issues in the study of logic itself. 
This is not to suggest that such overlapping is necessarily bad, nor that it always (or 
even generally) goes unnoticed by its perpetrators. Sometimes psychologists insist that 
their results are relevant to the studies of philosophers and logicians, and that the latter 
cannot afford to ignore them; at other times, claims are simply made which, when brought 
to the attention of the philosopher or logician, cry out for close scrutiny. Whether deli- 
berately thrust before us or not, these are the kinds of claims that motivate the present 
attempt to uncover what the presuppositions of the psychology of reasoning actually are, 
with respect to logic and rationality, and contribute to the determination of their conse- 
quences. 
Rationality is a difficult thing to characterise. Many, indeed, have tried, and aban- 
doned the effort. I don't propose here to get involved in trying to define it in any sort of 
detail, or with any sort of clarity, although we shall examine it in some detail later. How- 
ever, I want to insist that it is an error to identify rationality with conformity to the norms 
of some canonical formal theory, eg. classical propositional logic, or mathematical proba- 
bility theory. We shall presently see some particularly clear cases of this error in action; 
cases where the perpetrators are quite open about what they are doing (although, of course, 
not regarding it as misguided). The idea that it really is an error depends on a certain 
approach to logic, and other formal theories, and the matter of how they get justification 
for their normative pronouncements. My belief here is that such justification in fact 
depends on the assumption that the theory captures a system of rational inference. This 
appears consistent enough with what I have just condemned, but the point is that the 
justification flows, as it were, from rationality to logic, and not vice versa. Insofar as a 
theory's characterisation of certain inferences as 'correct' has any normative force, this 
derives from the presumed universality of the injuction: Be rational! The fact that an 
inference is not sanctioned by a particular logic only shows that inference to be even a 
possible symptom of irrationality if it is granted that the logic adequately captures rational 
inference. 
This, however, is always something that may turn out not to be the case. Many, even 
some of those most guilty of the error just described, concede (nay, declare) that logic is 
open to revision and progress (cf. the discussion of Nisbett's work in chapter 5, below). 
But what could possibly lead to any such revision, save the realisation that some inferences 
previously sanctioned were not, after all, within the set of those warranted by considera- 
tions of the rationality of the system; or that some, formerly abrogated, ought now to be 
indulged. An inference's being outside a particular logic, therefore, may only show that it 
is, in a manner of speaking, ahead of its time; that its rationality is not yet recognised or 
formalised. 
-12- 
1.2 Rationality and Psychology 
A tendency has arisen among certain psychologists in recent years, most particularly 
social psychologists interested in inductive reasoning and statistical judgement, to make 
claims concerning human rationality. `Is man a rational animal after all?', they ask. 
Experiments are designed which purport to be able to answer this question empirically, by 
finding out, for instance, whether people's probability judgements are commonly, or even 
often, remotely correct, according to the canons of probability theory. Similar questions 
are addressed concerning deductive reasoning: can people correctly infer the conclusions to 
syllogisms, say, or even fairly simple propositional arguments? If it's the case that people 
are typically wrong in these sorts of tasks - if people are systematically irrational - there 
are consequences, it is claimed, for metalogical theories, especially those which address the 
justification of inferences. Goodman's ideas about `reflective equilibrium' are a case in 
point: if people are irrational, how can some judgement's being held by them to be correct 
go very far towards justifying it? 
There are two points to be investigated about this line of argument. One is the extent 
to which experiments of the sorts which are generally adduced (or indeed of any sort) can 
in fact establish such a conclusion as that people are irrational. (Does the fact that people 
persistently err actually show this?) The other is the size of the impact that whatever con- 
clusions can be thus established might have on various logical and philosophical issues. 
We have said that justification and rationality are very closely linked: the point of a logic is 
to capture the notion of rational inference. There are connections here with the claim often 
made, especially in the context of theories of radical translation, by such as Quine, David- 
son, Dennett, etc., that intentional descriptions of organisms - ie, descriptions in terms of 
beliefs, desires, and so forth - depend centrally on the assumption that the subject is 
rational. 
If we take it for granted that formal theories in general, and logics in particular, are 
revisable, the question naturally arises as to the circumstances in which this may come to 
be seen as necessary. The disposition is strong, to assume that one's logic actually does 
faithfully reflect the pattern of rational inference, and to repulse all attempts at refutation. 
People's intuitions about what is rational do not always coincide, but they seem to have a 
tendency to fall into discernible groupings, which then give rise to different systems of 
logic existing at the same time and, to some extent at least, in competition. This happens, 
for instance, with the classical and intuitionistic systems of propositional logic. These both 
seem quite stable, and both command a following, but they disagree on such fundamental 
points as whether the disjunctive syllogism (whereby it follows, from A or B and not A, 
that B) is a theorem. 
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One possibility is that two different systems may both be applicable in certain cir- 
cumstances, but not at the same time. Thus, it has been suggested that in quantum phy- 
sics, for instance, some non-classical logic may best handle the kinds of inferences that 
seem to have to be allowed. Still, a peculiar domain like that carries little compulsion to 
suggest that some non-classical logic may be appropriate in any perfectly ordinary, homely 
field of everyday inference - which is clearly what would be required for a serious contem- 
plation of revising standard reasoning norms. Nonetheless, there is interest in the idea that 
different logics may apply in different cases, and it will become significant later. 
What I want to suggest at the moment is that if there is a possibility that standard 
norms should be revised, the cognitive psychology of reasoning is a good place to look for 
an indication. It should be declared here that I am in this thesis assuming a particular view 
of cognitive psychology, laid out in some detail in chapter 3 below, which is very similar 
in spirit to the views of Johnson-Laird, as will emerge in Part II. This view, of which I 
am concerned to examine the consequences rather than construct a defence, entails that 
cognitive psychology depends on the construction of a cognitive model of processes - in 
this case, reasoning processes, the drawing of inferences - and such a model requires the 
postulation of rules (or at least rule-governed processes) constituting a central algorithm 
showing (mter alia) what conclusions will, in ideal cases, be given to which premises. 
This central algorithm constitutes an explication of the reasoning competence of the system 
it models. The common failure to follow these rules to the letter has to be explained in 
some relatively ad hoc, and (as it will appear) in a cetain sense non-cognitive fashion, as 
for example by the supposition that various unprincipled effects such as memory limita- 
tions disrupt the smooth workings of the system. 
An often overlooked consequence, here, is that the construction of a cognitive model 
implicitly involves the inclusion of a normative system. Statements are effectively made 
about what people are capable of, and the view is rarely contested that, since 'ought' 
implies 'can', this influences what one may say about how they should think or act. Given 
a set of data about people's actual performances on a particular task, there is always a 
decision to be made about which of these are competent performances, and which are not. 
This is something that depends entirely on the theory being developed to explain the per- 
formances, and cannot be divined from them in isolation; it is something which, in a cer- 
tain sense, has to be contributed by the theoriser in an a priori fashion. Or at least, partly 
a priori: the qualification appears advisable because, after all, it is plausible to suppose that 
the theory is constrained, for instance to account for the performances in a reasonably 
economical way, and that the fulfilment of these constraints is evaluated with respect to 
something empirical. The main theoretical crutch, eg. for the psychologist who holds that 
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he can demonstrate irrationality, has to be that he has a theory which explains the data, 
using the irrationality assumption, somehow in a better, perhaps in a simpler, way than one 
which avoids it. Supposing that people have rational competence, he argues, requires too 
many unprincipled complexities to `save the phenomena'; his theory is in some sense 
closer or truer to the performances. 
13 The Role of Competence 
Another common tendency among psychologists, is to assume from the outset that 
ideally competent reasoners are ideally rational, and therefore that this competence is 
identifiable with classical propositional logic, regarded as definitive of rational inference. 
However, if psychology is an empirical science, one supposes it surely must be allowed as 
possible that people's competence is not, in fact, equivalent to this logic. This is some- 
thing that psychologists might discover, it might turn out that no model implicating such a 
competence can be made to give a plausible account of reasoning processes. Such a result 
could be regarded as having one of two consequences: either people are not rational, or the 
logic does not after all successfully capture rational inference. On what grounds would 
one decide between these? 
While there are those who think that such a discovery does indeed show humans to 
be irrational because their competence is not equivalent to a specified norm, there are 
equally those who seem convinced that human competence actually must be equivalent to 
some favoured logic (usually the one mentioned above), and thus hold some particular 
characterisation of competence to be a condition of the plausibility of any cognitive reason- 
ing model. Such a position is always possible, because (although it may strain the credi- 
bility of other parts of the theory) one can always account for any given performance data 
using a given competence, if one builds in enough ad hoc provisos about memory limita- 
tions, etc., that prevent the competence from being `realised'. 
One can yet take the view, alternatively to either of these positions, that, while people 
evidently do not have the competence of a given logic, this shows not so much their irra- 
tionality, as the inadequacy of the logic in question. There is thus a curious triangular 
trade-off between one's attitudes towards rationality, logic, and competence, depending on 
the kind of intuitions one has about them. The intuition that they ought all to be in some 
sense equivalent, by itself drives a tendency to respond to empirical discrepancies by revis- 
ing logic and competence theories. The intuition that the first two are already well-defined 
and fixed, leads similarly to the assertion that people can be shown to be irrational, and 
have no fully logical competence. But these intuitions, when combined together, can also 
result in the apparatus of excuses to account for performance errors. 
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In what follows, we shall examine this trade-off, and, being generally sympathetic to 
the first-mentioned intuition, we shall find support for our view about the interdependence 
of logic and cognitive psychology in various arguments concerning the justification of 
deductive inferences. These questions about rationality are clearly embedded in a consider- 
able tangle of often only half-recognised presuppositions, encompassing issues ranging 
from the logical to the methodological. The attempt to sort these out seems interesting and 
useful in its own right, but is further motivated by the examination of Johnson-Laird's 
theory of reasoning, which occupies the second part of this thesis. Johnson-Laird's theory 
is one which depends particularly crucially on certain notions about competence and 
rationality - notions which, to his great credit, Johnson-Laird goes to some lengths to set 
out and defend. They remain, nonetheless, a potent source of difficulties, and on them 
depend several of the claims made for the far-reaching significance of his theory. We shall 
find it useful to discuss several of these aspects of his ideas during the course of this first 
part, and it will be found that these efforts will pay a dividend in the second. 
2 
Reasoning Tasks and Logical Form 
An obviously important question, but one rarely addressed in the detail it deserves, 
concerns what the psychology of reasoning is actually about. What is a theory of reason- 
ing a theory of? We ought to examine the methodological background against which such 
theorising occurs. 
2.1 What is Reasoning? 
A natural first step, is to take reasoning to be the drawing of inferences. But evi- 
dently not just any inferential performance counts as reasoning, since, as cognitivists are 
forever reminding us, virtually all of cognition can be seen as involving inferential 
processes. It requires countless inferences to see an object, comprehend a sentence, pot a 
snooker ball, etc. A theory of reasoning has to be distinguishable from theories - even 
cognitive theories - of everything else. 
The field is commonly restricted to linguistic cases, ie. where the premises of the 
inference can be found in some piece of language taken in by the reasoner, who then 
expresses his conclusions linguistically. But this is too restrictive for, eg, Johnson-Laird 
whose archetypal reasoning-situation, presented as a fundamental challenge for cognitive 
science, involves a conclusion expressed in the non-linguistic behaviour of the reasoner. 
The example concerns an individual who, upon asking 'Where is the university?', and 
being told that some of a nearby group of people are from there, goes at once to ask them. 
On the basis of observing this behaviour, we postulate that the individual has inferred; as 
Johnson-Laird puts it: 
[The] behaviour depends on a chain of inferences that includes at its centre the 
following deduction: 
Some of those people are from the university. 
Any person from the university is likely to know where the university is. 
Therefore: Some of those people are likely to know where the university is. 
(Johnson-Laird 1983 23) 
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One can easily go further than this, and imagine a situation in which no linguistic 
behaviour occurs at all - for instance, the potting of a snooker ball as mentioned above. In 
such an example, we may be able to get a clearer view of what it is that we are interested 
in, when we talk of reasoning, so let's start by assembling some intuitions about what is 
going on here. Whereas many inferential processes are no doubt required at some (rela- 
tively low) level, just to point the cue in the right direction, draw it back, and then hit the 
ball, these are not generally the processes we're after. These we might want loosely to 
characterise as perhaps 'motor' skills, in opposition to the (relatively high-level) 'cognitive' 
operations we want to investigate. It is when the snooker player is considering his shot, 
integrating it into a strategy for the break, deciding which ball to pot, and where the cue- 
ball ought to go afterwards, that he is most likely to be reasoning in the sense we require. 
But there is a curious grey area in between these extremes. To what extent we want 
to say that he reasons actually in executing the shot may depend on his level of skill - on 
the extent to which his actions have become 'automatic', or 'unthinking'. Does he reason 
that he needs backspin, or that he should hit the cue-ball just at this point, and just this 
hard? Does the cricketer reason that in order to clip the ball through wideish midwicket, 
he needs to angle the bat just so? 
We might propose that the snooker player reasons in a particular case as follows: 
Reds still in the pack cannot safely be potted. 
This red is still in the pack. 
Therefore: This red cannot safely be potted. 
Supposing that we wanted to write a snooker-playing computer program, for some kind of 
simulation purpose, we can imagine that this is the sort of rule we might apply in consider- 
ing each ball, and perhaps assigning it a weight in favour of selection as the one to play. 
It seems less easy to think of the human player (at least, one of any ability) as functioning 
in quite this way, because we suppose that he in some sense 'intuits' that balls in the pack 
are unsafe, and in fact probably never really considers them at all. At this point, the cog- 
nitivist tells us that, although neither we nor he may be aware of it, the fact remains that 
such processing must be going on. But accepting this does not solve our problem, for we 
still may ask whether it is reasoning that he is doing, or something at a level lower than 
we want to look at. No doubt much of the most basic motor-control processing could in 
principle be formulated or modelled as sets of syllogisms: this shows neither that it is rea- 
soning, nor that any explicitly syllogistic rules, representations or inference-algorithms are 
actually there involved. Somehow, we feel that in a case where an agent 'just knows' 
something, he has not reasoned his way to it on this occasion. He may have done so in 
the past; perhaps he no longer needs to: the intuition appealed to here is that if one relies, 
say, simply on memory of results previously worked out, one is not reasoning one's way 
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to them any more. 
The difficulty we are having here is not, of course, confined to nonlinguistic cases. 
Practically all uses of language involve something that might be regarded as being in some 
sense reasoning. A theory of reasoning, however, surely ought not simply to subsume the 
whole of psycholinguistics. There must be a very close connection, and clearly one cannot 
reason about a discourse, say, without having understood it (or misunderstood it) - but can 
one not understand it without at the same time, or thereafter, reasoning on it? Should a 
theory of reasoning include those undoubtedly inferential processes which must be 
involved in such matters as resolving anaphoric references? Traditionally, the answer is 
often yes, but I think we should question this. It's easy to suppose that anything appearing 
clearly to be an inference is an instance of some more or less cognitively universal 
phenomenon, but it can become a difficult position to defend. Reasoning, it might be safer 
to say, is something that really takes off only after the premises have been interpreted. At 
least we can then identify the premises and conclusion relatively securely. This may seem 
to be a matter mainly of terminology, but we shall return to it in more detail after the fol- 
lowing digression. 
2.2 Basic Inferences: Johnson-Laird's Early Theory 
To expose the kind of presuppositions that do tend to occur in psychologists' writing, 
let us here take time to consider in some detail part of an earlier theory offered by 
Johnson-Laird (1975). The point is not essentially to belabour Johnson-Laird for what he 
said then; it's worth noting that most of Johnson-Laird's views described below are 
retracted in his later work, and this is something we shall return to. The point is rather to 
find something more general to say about the psychological treatment of reasoning, and 
especially to indicate the treacherous ease with which it is possible to assume that some 
single simple mechanism can be described, and even modelled by a simple computer pro- 
gram, which covers all, or most interesting, cases. However, this will be a particularly 
worthwhile exercise, because it does relate to Johnson-Laird's later theories which are con- 
sidered in the second half of this thesis. 
In his paper, Johnson-Laird says, he is interested in discovering the 'set of psycho- 
logically basic inferences', by which he means those which cause no difficulty to 'logically 
naive subjects'. These terms are typical of those that psychologists use in describing the 
objects of their investigations, so we will be repaid if we pause, first, to consider what they 
cover. 
For one thing, 'psychologically basic inferences' apparently have to be couched (for 
want of a better word) in a particular manner. A system, Johnson-Laird says, which 
eschewed most of the connectives in favour of negation and disjunction, would be 
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psychologically implausible. Intuitively, something like modus ponens, say, ought not to 
be recast in such terms. Further, 'an inference schema can hardly be considered basic if 
most people are incapable of carrying it out, or can only do so in a matter of minutes, sub- 
sequently giving a detailed resumes of a whole chain of deduction they have carried out to 
make the inference' (17). These inferences must not result from the combining of several 
other inferences. 
Now, what becomes evident here is that we need to know whether we're talking 
about inferences that actually do get made, in ordinary language, or those that could. 
Johnson-Laird appears ambivalent about this. For instance, he gives as example 'inference 
schemata', A therefore A, and A or A, therefore A. Clearly, these sorts of inferences could 
be made, but it seems odd to suggest that they very often are. The fact that their logical 
structure is basic, in some sense, can be neither here nor there, psychologically speaking. 
Johnson-Laird says he's talking about 'inferences expressed in natural languages', but it is 
rarely indeed that one will hear natural sentences expressing propositions of the above 
forms (or rather, perhaps, sequences of them representing arguments of these forms), and 
even when one does, it is unconvincing to suggest that they represent inferences ('OK, if 
it's not a fish, it's not a fish!'). It tunas out that Johnson-Laird actually regards these and 
their like as 'auxiliary inferences', not drawn, as it were, in their own right, but only to 
support subconclusions of more plausible inferences. Even as such, though, it is unclear 
why they would in general be needed. Johnson-Laird goes on to give other examples, but 
he finds a problem with some of these, in that we apparently need to 'curb their produc- 
tivity' somehow, as otherwise we get things like 
(1) Boys eat apples and Mary threw a stone at the frog. 
which is 'barely acceptable'. Here is a case of a basic inference (derived from `Boys eat 
apples' and 'Mary threw a stone at the frog') which could be made, but in fact never 
would be. 'Why not?' asks Johnson-Laird. His answer, it seems to me, results from 
confusing the question of the nature of the mechanism which produces sentences having a 
certain sort of logical structure, with the question of how best that logical aspect of them is 
to be analysed and related to the same aspect of other sentences. No doubt (1) doesn't get 
produced, but this isn't because there are restraints on a logical inference schema; rather, 
it's for extra-logical, but perhaps linguistically important, reasons. The suggested inference 
to (1) is a perfectly good inference; an inference which in some sense would be made, if 
the conjuncts ever were presented together. The fact that they never are has to do with the 
information-conveying nature and purposes of language, and the structure of the actual 
world which is conversed about; its explanation should be related to that of the fact that 
the thing is indeed barely acceptable to begin with. 
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In many ways, Johnson-Laird seems to have drawn a somewhat arbitrary line around 
a class of phenomena, some of which appear curiously out of place, and called them 'infer- 
ences'. In particular, there are examples like (1): how far should we regard some of the 
processes involved in language production as being fair game for a theory of inference, 
rather than as more appropriately to be addressed by a separate (for the immediately fore- 
seeable future) theory of psycholinguistics? The connective 'and' is curious, in that it can 
often be regarded as implicit even where it's not present. For example, one might produce 
several declarative sentences in succession, or one might conjoin them with 'and's to pro- 
duce only one. To a large extent, this is surely an arbitrary choice, but what's interesting 
is that similar constraints apply to what follows what in either case. One wouldn't say: 
'Boys eat apples. Mary threw a stone at the frog.', any more than one would utter (1), 
and, as suggested above, for much the same reasons. But one might say: 'The sun is shin- 
ing. It's a lovely day.', or. 'The sun is shining and it's a lovely day.', without much 
preference for either style. It's hard to see that moving from one to the other constitutes 
an inference. Can we really conceive of simultaneously apprehending the conjuncts of 
something like (1), without in an important sense apprehending the conjunction itself? 
Have we similarly to suppose that when we know both that 'it's raining' and that 'the sun 
is shining', we have firstly to infer the conjoint truth of these propositions, before we can 
decide which connective most appropriately to interpose between them (eg. 'but')? What 
is needed here is not so much anything to do with inference as an explanation of why cer- 
tain sequences of declarative utterances are preferred in ordinary discourse. No doubt such 
a theory will postulate the existence of inferential processes, but these are again at a level 
distinct from one where a theory of reasoning as such should be expected to apply. 
Surely, an account of these phenomena will have to be in large part content driven, 
for the explanandum is how assertions are made, which clearly depends on what is 
asserted, and why. If this is right, though, Johnson-Laird's 'auxiliary inference' machine 
must be inadequate at best, but perniciously misleading at worst. Even if the device pro- 
duces all the correct behaviour, it's hard to see it as doing so in other than a rather ad hoc 
sort of way. Johnson-Laird has now redeemed himself by admitting precisely this 
(Johnson-Laird 1983 35), but it remains a type of argument not uncommonly seen in cog- 
nitive theorising. 
In many respects, Johnson-Laird's arguments against 'mental logic' (which we review 
later in chapter 12) are relevant here, but although turning to content-sensitivity is desir- 
able, it is not enough to eradicate the difficulties we have been looking at. The proposed 
field of coverage of a theory of reasoning, even one involving a fairly detailed mechanism, 
is all too often far too ambitious. It's noticeable that in his later theory Johnson-Laird 
abandons the short-term goal of giving the full details about propositional inference. He 
provides an algorithm, but points out that it works only for those relatively infrequent cases 
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where language is used truth-functionally, and moreover that it is empirically untestable 
(Johnson-Laird 1983, ch. 3, passim). In fact, the field he offers to cover is if anything 
even greater then it was previously, but he can only give brief, intuitive, anecdotal sketches 
of how he might achieve this. 
Let us continue to pursue Johnson-Laird's earlier theory, and consider how he then 
thought to submit it to empirical test. The characterisation of 'basic' inferences is impor- 
tant here, since it is upon these that the account of reasoning is based. They are to be dis- 
tinguished from more complex ones of which 'a detailed resume can be given', but are 
otherwise not easily recognisable. One might seek to describe this as a distinction between 
inferences drawn, as it were, subconsciously, and those drawn more reflectively. Johnson- 
Laird says that 'the methodology of making such tests of the model [as whether it per- 
forms in the same way as human reasoners] is not obvious, although human retrospections 
are likely to provide some useful evidence'. Perhaps the idea is that they are aware of fol- 
lowing a chain of reasoning composed of links that they cannot further describe - the basic 
inferences. 
But in any event it's unclear how we should take this. In cases where human reason- 
ers are provided with specific tasks, like 'draw an inference from these premises', we 
might expect to get some sensible retrospective answer to the question how the task was 
done. To take one of Johnson-Laird's examples, one might give the premises 
(2) A and C 
If Athen B 
expecting the answer 'B', and hope to get some such retrospective protocol as: 'Well, if A 
then B, and we know A because it says A and C, so B follows'. But this isn't quite how 
Johnson-Laird describes the matter: he talks of premises of this form. Here again, though, 
one is tempted to suspect that the process of inference is affected as much by the content 
as by the form, if content there is. Consider, for instance, the following snatch of dialo- 
gue: 
(3) - Fred's coming and George is coming; 
and if Fred's coming then Mary'll be coming too. 
- Well I hope she's not a vegetarian then! 
In this case, it looks as though the second speaker must in some sense have made an infer- 
ence from premises of exactly the form of (2) (as well as at least one other, possibly syl- 
logistic, inference that we might guess at). However, suppose you interrupt the people, 
who perhaps are planning a small dinner party, and ask the second speaker how the conclu- 
sion was arrived at. What will you get? I suggest: nothing of interest. At best the 
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speaker will produce a protocol not altogether unlike the one for (2) - but if he's more 
honest, he'll probably say, 'I don't know; it was just obvious'. In the first case, it's just a 
concocted story - a hypothesis or theory, certainly not seriously remembered thoughts - 
while the second reply gets us nowhere. It's unlikely, as well, that any average English 
speaker ever experiences the slightest difficulty in (3)-type situations, so does this give us 
reason to suppose that (2) represents a psychologically basic inference schema? Johnson- 
Laird's account requires that it is not, but the only criteria offered for basicness are lack of 
difficulty to the average speaker, and lack of structure. It might well, of course, be held 
that (2) - and hence (3) - has quite significant logical structure, but what has to be shown 
is that this results in any loss of psychological immediacy. 
I think, in fact, that Johnson-Laird's criteria for basicness can be interpreted so as to 
be quite plausible, but on that interpretation (3) is basic, although (2) might not be. What 
we learn from this is that basicness is in some sense context-relative and cannot be deter- 
mined by logical form. There is a similarity between (2) and (3), and in general between 
many formal representations of arguments and various sequences in discourse. However, 
in most cases, there is little prima facie evidence that this resemblance is anything other 
than spurious and misleading. 
It's clear that Johnson-Laird's theory here involves at least a gross oversimplification 
of the range of inferential performances, and that there's no real way of showing that it 
applies to many of these cases where inferences are relatively 'tacit'. In some yet mysteri- 
ous way, people have the ability linguistically to construct descriptions, etc, of the world: 
doing this in itself no doubt involves manifold inferences, yet surely on a level different 
from one where we might want to deploy rules and schemata in its explanation. This 
intuition is one which Johnson-Laird seemed to share, even when he wrote the paper under 
discussion. He says, for instance, that inferences which involve combining information, 
require his theory of mental models - and it's unclear why he thinks (3) is not such a case. 
A major feature of his later theory is in fact that it extends the idea of mental models to 
cover propositional inferences, rather than just those involving quantifiers as previously. In 
any event, an account of (3) in terms of rules and schemata would still seem to leave many 
other, still more tacit cases unaccounted for. It is more plausible in some cases outside 
ordinary discourse - experimental laboratory tests, for instance - to suppose that some sort 
of explicit rule-application is going on, but then the interesting question, which remains 
unsatisfactorily addressed, is how far one's explanations of these cases extend to others, 
and why. 
Considerations such as these seem to shed doubt on remarks such as Johnson-Laird's 
confident assertion that 'practical inference' is likely to involve large numbers of rules of 
inference (as in natural deduction). Indeed, its aim can be described as inferential, but it's 
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unclear that reflection on any sort of formal system will provide much illumination on how 
it achieves it. An unfortunate aspect of the matter, as I have been suggesting, is that com- 
parison with these systems is inclined to lead to the sometimes inappropriate assimilation 
of psychologically heterogeneous phenomena as 'inferences'. Significantly, Johnson- 
Laird's later account is explicit in its denial that a rule-system is needed for any kind of 
inference. In my view, however, he still gets into trouble by failing to take note of the 
large range of different kinds of inferential performances that exists. To the extent that he 
makes his theory precise - as when he deals with syllogistic inference - I suspect that he 
limits its application; he is over-ready to assume that all circumstances in which one can 
see a reasoner as solving a syllogism, will succumb to his mechanism. We shall find more 
arguments to this effect in Part U. 
2.3 Reasoning and Behaviour 
We now find ourselves returning to the question of what, then, `reasoning' is. It 
needs to be distinguished, I have claimed, from a vast mass of processes which might be 
called 'inference' in various forms, but whose explanation very likely belongs in a different 
domain. Has the person in (3) reasoned? There is little doubt that the typical answer 
would be 'yes'. It seems to me, though, that this is a mistake, not so much because (3) is 
clearly not a case of reasoning, but because the notion of reasoning needs to be clarified 
before we can tell; it needs to become theory-relative; we need to elaborate a theory of rea- 
soning based on clearer cases (eg. laboratory tests) and then ask whether it extends to 
ordinary discourse. We might find out that it does, or that if we adapt the theory we can 
make it cover both kinds of cases, or that no such adaptation is feasible, and that cases like 
(3) are best regarded as cases simply of language use, describable as having involved an 
inference, but not suitable for description as cases of reasoning because not demonstrably 
involving what we have come, or decided, to call `reasoning processes'. The error to 
avoid is supposing that an external description of a piece of behaviour in itself provides 
clues as to the nature of the processes responsible for producing that behaviour. 
If one asks why we should not start from ordinary discourse and see whether a 
theory of that will extend to laboratory cases, the answer should be that this is in principle 
an equally suitable course to take. In practice, however, it is obvious enough that it makes 
one's initial task much more difficult. For one thing, it's not at all obvious that `ordinary 
discourse' describes something amenable to treatment as a single phenomenon. There is a 
clear methodological advantange in being able to create a relatively simple and testable 
theory to start with and then investigate its ramifications. The other approach is likely to 
lead to unproductive floundering in a sea of complex and unstructured data. 
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So we return also to the suggestion advanced before this rather extended digression, 
that whether a performance has involved reasoning depends on the `level' at which pro- 
cessing took place in producing it. Unfortunately, we seem to lack any accepted empirical 
criterion for deciding the level at which processing has occurred (as well as an agreed cri- 
terion for when it counts as reasoning). Intuitively, to steal Johnson-Laird's concept, rea- 
soning has to involve the drawing of several connected psychologically basic inferences - 
but how do you identify such cases? One approach (we have already seen Johnson-Laird 
mention it) might be to use introspection: we ask for instance the snooker player whether 
he reasoned about such-and-such an aspect of his problem, and accept his judgment. 
(More naturally, one might ask if he thought about it, and then on the present account one 
would clearly be left with work to do in finding out just how he had thought.) 
Introspection is commonly treated with a good deal of suspicion, and rightly so. If 
one comes to be able to report, instrospectively (or retrospectively) how one has done 
something which one has hitherto done quite automatically, the nature of the report 
depends on how one conceptualises, in some sense, the performance in question, and this 
can depend on all sorts of external factors, such as how one was taught, etc. There are 
two points at which worry enters here: for one thing, there is no way to tell whether the 
report is accurate, rather than some kind of confabulation; and for the other there is no 
prima facie reason to suppose that one can gain introspective ability with respect to some 
performance, without changing the processes whereby it is produced. But these may be 
problems mainly where the concern is with using introspection to test the correctness of a 
hypothesis about the nature of processing. The present idea is merely to elicit from the 
subject whether he is aware of any processes at all having taken place, and this perhaps 
can be done in a way which does not 'lead' him by suggesting any particular conceptuali- 
sation of those processes; but I have to grant that to some extent we venture here into 
unfounded speculation. 
Even if people know they have done something, of course, they may not know how 
they have done it. Dennett (1978 165) recycles a remark of Lashley's, to the effect that all 
we are ever aware of, in mental processing, is the result. All the same, one can commonly 
decompose a case of processing into subprocesses, for each of which a result is available. 
At some level, the thing is a set of connected `black boxes', but sometimes one can say 
what boxes have been connected - and sometimes one cannot. It was like this with the 
snooker player we wanted to say that he was (quite probably) aware of intermediate 
results in the process of deciding which ball to pot next, and where to leave the cue ball, 
but that (quite probably) most of the decisions about how to bring this about were to him 
automatic, and he would be unable to say anything about the stages whereby they 
occurred; he simply knew and acted upon the results. The decisions of the first sort were 
those we felt most inclined to describe as cases of `reasoning'. If the reasoner can't say 
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what black boxes he connected, he effectively had for that (sub)process only one 
unanalysed black box; he had only a result, and it becomes difficult to describe what he 
did as a process of reasoning. (Except, perhaps, as a single psychologically basic inference 
- there's an obvious relationship between my proposed interpretation of this term, and my 
usage of the notion of a 'black box'.) 
A likely complaint here is that this is a ludicrously tight, and at the same time vague, 
restriction on what counts as reasoning. Apart from anything else, there is a strong ten- 
dency to regard the description of a task, for instance, as defining whether or not it is a 
reasoning task. If people are presented with cards bearing two premises, from which they 
are asked to draw a conclusion, it seems hard to deny that if they comply they must have 
reasoned, no matter what they can or cannot say about how they carried out the task, at 
any rate so long as their responses are plausible. When a subject says his correct answers 
'just came to him', we are surely almost bound to suppose that he reasoned unconsciously 
- which does not appear to be an internally incoherent notion. Moreover, it will be asked, 
which among the variously confused protocols that one gets from subjects one questions 
about these things, are to be taken as an account of subprocesses in a reasoning perfor- 
mance? 
At this point, a danger arises that we will conflate what are really (at least) two dis- 
tinct difficulties in looking at reasoning performances. On the one hand, we have the prob- 
lem that we have been considering here - the question about the level at which some task 
has been done. On the other, we have a problem well known to the literature in this area, 
which is the debate over the matter of whether people carrying out these tasks are or are 
not rationally following some course of logical deduction. My claim that these are distinct 
depends on the view that whether the processes we are interested in accounting for are 
'logical' or not, is something that can be considered separately from the question as to 
whether any such processes have occurred. The danger of confusion arises from the nature 
of certain theories, typically supporting the 'illogical' picture of reasoning, which propose, 
eg, that subjects apparently introspecting a rational process are in fact confabulating a plau- 
sible explanation for behaviour they cannot otherwise justify, and of whose real aetiology 
they are quite unaware (cf. the Wason/Evans 'dual-process' theory - Evans 1982 ch. 12.). 
We have a problem here in trying to support the idea that subjects can be aware of having 
done something, while being perhaps so completely unaware of how they did it. At best, 
on this type of theory, the subject can say that black boxes were connected, but he has no 
actual clue as to which or how. We now have no real access to intermediate results, 
except for the impression that there were some! And how can we tell that even this 
impression is not erroneous? 
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We are arriving now at a position for reasoning which resembles some of those copi- 
ously discussed in the philosophical literature on dreaming. How can we tell (a) whether 
and (b) about what someone has dreamt? The obvious answer is to ask him. It's certainly 
hard to imagine answering (b) in any other way. But the suggestion is made that (a) could 
be answered on the basis, say, of EEG output, examination of eye movements, and the 
like. A theory in vogue at one time held that dream reports were constructed in response 
to traces left in the brain by some almost instantaneous process that certainly could not 
have been an experience at all like that reported; they were post hoc confabulations. A 
commoner view nowadays is that dreaming occurs during particular periods of sleep, par- 
ticularly in association with rapid eye movements, and it is accordingly more likely to be 
experienced as described. Both of these theories, however, can in my view be seen to be 
logically dependent on the strength of the report. While it might be possible in some given 
case to cast doubt on a subject's claim to have dreamt - perhaps even, in view, say, of the 
duration of certain observations, to question the plausibility of his account of the course of 
the dream - it would make no sense to do this at all generally, because it would undermine 
the foundations of supposing that the reports and the other evidence related to the same 
phenomenon in the first place. The possibility of such questioning is based on the 
assumed reliability of a correlation between a great many dream reports and other kinds of 
external observations, and the distinctive discrepancy of a given case. If one is going to 
study dreams, one simply has to suppose that people's reports of dreams are in normal 
cases reasonably accurate, or else be prepared to concede that 'dreams' may not after all be 
what one is studying. One might end up holding that there is no single phenomenon that 
can be definitely pointed to as the normal cause of the propensity to report dreams, in 
which case so much the worse for a theory of dreams (cf. Dennett's view about pain - 
1978, ch. 11). 
Now, perhaps it's like this with reasoning, as well. Unless the notion can be given 
some wholly behavioural and circumstantial definition, so that for instance the production 
of valid conclusions to premises, perhaps with particular response latencies, etc., is ipso 
facto the performance of reasoning - which surely is both implausible and anathema to 
cognitivists - then this seems inevitable. People have done something that is at least a can- 
didate for a case of reasoning, if they say they have. 
It would never do anyway, of course, to find ourselves sustaining the claim that a 
task can be essentially a reasoning task. A task may be describable as a reasoning task, 
but it can also always be described in some other way. People (eg. who have done it 
often) might be doing simple memory retrieval, or guessing at random; and surely we are 
not going to call these approaches 'reasoning'. This is not to prejudge the issues alluded 
to above, which we shall presently look at in more detail, by supposing that reasoning has 
to be describable in terms of processes following a strict path of logical inference. But 
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there is a strong intuition in favour of the view that people have typically to be able to 
offer a sincere report of how they arrived at the conclusion, whether it appears logical or 
illogical, and however misguided our theory may later imply it to be. In some sense, what 
is important is the subject's description of a task (not the experimenter's), but only the sub- 
ject can tell us what this is. That is to say, people need to be aware that they arrived at 
the conclusion, even if they are wrong about how: they need to have understood the nature 
of the task, to have described it to themselves in something like the experimenter's terms, 
or at least in terms recognisable as descriptive of some reasoning task. It needs to be 
stressed that this is not a firm precondition of any case of reasoning (even as people may 
dream without being able to report the fact); but that it is typical is a presupposition of any 
theory of reasoning. 
A theory of reasoning, then, should begin as a theory of performances describable in 
behavioural terns as the drawing of inferences, typically in circumstances where the sub- 
ject was aware of actually doing the task (not simply of having done it) - can say some- 
thing about how the task was done. In my opinion, even Johnson-Laird's `test case' for 
cognitive theorising, quoted near the beginning of this chapter, is vulnerable to this point: it 
is highly doubtful, in default of further evidence, that anything like the processing of a syl- 
logistic argument was performed, and possibly even that the subject of the story reasoned 
at all. 
2.4 Reflective and Unreflective Performances 
Earlier, we mentioned a worry, aside from the worry about whether the report is 
unwitting confabulation, about whether the ability thus to report on one's processing at all 
might change that processing. By this is meant the following: if someone is prodded 
about how he is doing some task, until he does it reflectively - which is to say in some 
sense paying attention to what he is doing at the same time as doing it - how do we know 
that this has not lead to a change in the processing going on as compared to his previous 
unreflective performance? The answer to this, it seems to me, is that we cannot know such 
a thing. There is in fact no reason to suppose that the processing has not changed, in order 
for this apparent access (even if it is illusory) to have become possible. 
In general, it seems altogether likely that tasks done reflectively, on the one hand, and 
unreflectively, on the other, are done somehow differently in each case. We familiarly find 
variations in performance between the two cases, on otherwise similar tasks, so that people 
sometimes come to feel, when they reflect, that their unreflective conclusion was incorrect. 
In fact, a common state of affairs in cases of the latter kind is that subsequent unreflective 
performances are unchanged, even though supposed to be wrong. Changing them can 
require a substantial educating effort. If I find myself persistently in error over, say, some 
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particular class of mental arithmetic calculations, I may practise a method for solving such 
problems reliably until I always get them right, eventually without reflecting on the 
method, whenever they occur. But now, how can I tell whether the method I am using is 
still the one I practised? How could anyone tell? Have I, in 'internalising' the method, 
changed it importantly (or even completely) ? I can no longer report on it by recollection; 
I may believe that I know how I'm doing it, but I no longer claim to be able to remember 
what I did in a given case. 
What is true in this example holds afortiori in circumstances where we have no evi- 
dent link at all between a reflective and unreflective performance, save a similarity in the 
logical form of descriptions of them. What now might be thought to have happened, 
though, is that we have left no room for the possibility of theorising about unreflective rea- 
soning. We have not, but we have drawn attention to the fact that such a theory is going 
to be parasitic on a theory of reflective performances, because it is only in the latter cases 
that we can get a grip on the phenomenon we are intending to study. We have also indi- 
cated that considerable care needs to be taken in extrapolating from reflection. Unreflective 
reasoning can be identified only by the gross features of the behaviour and the cir- 
cumstances, only by our making an assumption that some process of a sort we might want 
to call 'reasoning' has occurred; and our very notion of what such a process is depends on 
our theory of reflective performance. We hope that our assumption can be checked by 
constructing a theory predicting additional phenomena such as behavioural proclivities in 
cases yet untried, response latencies, etc. 
We want to say that certain processes would not count as reasoning and an attempt at 
an account of these follows almost immediately. This remains all rather vague and 
pretheoretical, of course, but nonetheless evidently based on the experience of reasoning, 
and on accounts drawn from others' reflective solutions. The point is that making it more 
precise and theoretical involves firming up these intuitions, without altering their origin. 
Our theory of reflective reasoning is going to be crucially important to any theory of 
unreflective reasoning qua reasoning; and in fact it's a mainstay of the argument in the first 
part of this thesis that we could not provide any truly cognitive account of these perfor- 
mances without such appeal, because to do this requires the interpretation of proposed 
processes in intentional terms, and these are irrevocably rooted in our experientially-based 
cultural notions of what we are up to when behaving in certain ways (what is frequently 
known as 'folk psychology'). 
Notice that this is not an attempt to involve phenomenology, or anything of that kind; 
in fact I am sympathetic in many ways to the view of self-consciousness which takes it to 
be an essentially theoretical construct based ultimately on observations of behaviour and 
various devices aimed at its explanation (cf. Churchland 1979, Dennett 1982a,b, Evans 
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1982, Nisbett and Wilson 1977, but see also Egan 1983). An important determiner in 
many cases, though, is specifically verbal behaviour, and the kinds of it that occur or can 
be elicited in conjunction with non-verbal behaviour. On any sensible version of this 
theory, it is in fact only language that allows us to arrive at self-consciousness or intros- 
pection. In a very Wittgensteinian fashion, we can regard public, linguistic interactions as 
providing the basis for constructing our notions of a private, mental life. But then it can 
be seen all the more clearly that any effort to reconstruct mental processes will have to be 
firmly rooted in the publicised world of what we (and others) can say we have done. 
2.5 Reasoning Processes 
It seems appropriate now to return to a question fenced around a couple of times 
already, which is the question about what kinds of processes - given a presumably accurate 
description of them - count as reasoning processes. It's evident that not just any kind of 
process is going to count as reasoning. In tasks where subjects are offered premises and a 
set of possible conclusions to choose from, there is a good chance that they may do no rea- 
soning at all, in many cases, when selecting the conclusion. They may even guess at ran- 
dom, if they get bored. The likelihood that reasoning has been used can be increased by 
presenting only the premises: at least if people's conclusions are plausible, here, they are 
likely to have used something more than simple guesswork. No amount of task engineer- 
ing of this kind is going to guarantee that the performance has involved reasoning, how- 
ever. Even should the responses given be always correct (in some understood sense), 
uncertainty may remain. 
Reasoning, I think we want to say, is closely bound up with the notion of argument, 
and thereby that of proof. To reason one's way to a conclusion, is to produce (however 
implicitly or internally), an argument for that conclusion. It is to come to believe that one 
can prove, demonstrate the truth of the conclusion, from the given premises. To reason 
correctly is therefore naturally to produce a valid argument. However, this characterisation 
tells us really very little, since there are a number of different understandings of the ideas 
of proof and argument. 
The intuition described here is similar to one of Johnson-Laird's, expressed in the 
slogan that subjects, properly to be said to have reasoned, have to be seen as having 
reached their conclusion for the right reasons, not 'as a result of processes that do not 
suffice to establish validity'. How this is interpreted by Johnson-Laird is something to be 
considered later, but it clearly captures the idea that people who arrive even at systemati- 
cally correct conclusions, have not reasoned unless their processes have been of a certain 
sort. 
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Suppose we try to work backwards from cases where processing seems clearly not to 
be reasoning. Simple memory lookup and random guesswork are obvious examples, but 
what about these makes them non-reasoning processes? We can note that in the first case, 
information is sought from another source (memory), while in the second the information 
in the premises is not used, or not used very much. We might therefore suggest that in 
reasoning, the information in the premises is used, and used exclusively, to arrive at the 
conclusion. This entails that all sets of premises will be treated in the same way by these 
processes. Given standard accounts of what deductive logic is, this is an unsurprising 
suggestion: the conclusion contains nothing that was not given in the premises, and is 
derived from the premises by some reliable means. Notice, though, that there are no impli- 
cations here about the nature of the means, other than that it is reliable and general. Some 
sort of generate-and-test system might very well qualify, since we can see that while the 
initial generation may be even quite random, the subsequent stages will have to employ 
information from the premises again, in order to weed out unwanted conclusions. 
Taken in the large, it looks as though this will be too strict. Surely, we have to allow 
that reasoning can bring in 'world-knowledge', and certainly specific verbal knowledge? 
But these requirements can be accommodated by regarding the additional information as 
additional premises. It is always allowable to introduce extra premises, so long as they are 
then treated in the same way as the original ones; the crucial point is that the processing 
remains general and not bound to specific cases. There seems to have to be a mechanism 
such that arbitrary premises can be inserted at one end, and something appropriate result at 
the other. 
Since 'something appropriate' is actually (in the ideal case) valid conclusions, this 
amounts to a proof system for some logic. We shall see in chapter 4 that in the context of 
computationally based theories of reasoning we have here a characterisation of the subject- 
matter that becomes problematic to sustain. Even before we get to that point, though, 
there's something uncomfortable about it. Surely psychology is an empirical science, the 
aim of which is to describe just what goes on inside people, what causes their behaviour, 
regardless of whether that behaviour has another characterisation as, eg, the drawing of 
valid inferences. Psychology, one feels, should not take the view that people's conclusions 
ought to be valid; all it seeks is an explanation of why and how they were drawn. 
I think what emerges here is that if reasoning is defined in this way, then we know 
that (and exactly how) it occurs reflectively, but we don't know that it ever occurs 
unreflectively. If it does, the fact will be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to demonstrate. 
In our present state of knowledge, at least, it is quite conceivable that unreflective 'reason- 
ing' performances such as the ones in Johnson-Laird's test case are all manifestations of 
some complex, commonly accurate, but nonetheless far from guaranteed system of 
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guesswork, based on all kinds of heuristic applications of specific background facts about 
the topics mentioned in the premises. It is even plausible, especially on an evolutionary 
view: why should Nature take the sledgehammer of abstract logic to the relatively small 
nut of ordinary context-bound problem-solving? 
Such a state of affairs would of course reduce logical form to the status of one, 
perhaps minor influence, among very many, on the outcome of the processing. And this is 
important, from the point of view of creating a theory along algorithmic lines, intended to 
be at all general. I want to suggest that should our cognitive nature actually be like this, 
the prospect of creating a coherent cognitive theory of reasoning vanishes. At best, we can 
hope for a number of disparate theories covering performances in different domains. The 
following chapters will explain in more detail the reasons for supposing so, as likewise for 
supposing that the ideas of competence and rationality will lose their grip in discussions of 
performances of these kinds. One might suggest that we have left room for reflective per- 
formances to be characterised by a logic-based theory; this relates to discussions in Part II, 
but my answer to it turns essentially on the point that such a theory will tell us more about 
the domain of logic than about the processing involved, for I suspect that any remotely 
adequate processing account of reflective phenomena will be so complex as to obscure the 
logical aspects fairly thoroughly. 
2.6 Conclusion 
What we have really tried to do in this chapter is uncover some dubious practices in 
current cognitive psychological theorising about reasoning, and demonstrate that further 
thought about the question is actually needed. We have tried also to make suggestions 
about the direction work ought to go in. Our purpose is not simply to browbeat psycholo- 
gists for ignoring some important methodological groundwork required by their enterprise, 
but also to draw attention to issues which am important in the argument of the following 
chapters. In particular, it will be henceforth supposed that a theory of reasoning is a 
theory directed in the first instance at some range of clearly identifiable tasks, rather than at 
discourse phenomena in general. 
3 
Cognitive Models 
The point of this chapter is to expose certain underlying assumptions of a view of 
cognition commonly accepted in cognitive psychology, and cognitive science. There is 
nothing particularly original in this exposition, and it is not intended that it should involve 
either criticism or defence of the assumptions being investigated. I wish merely to estab- 
lish certain premises which will be useful in the subsequent argument, and many important 
issues are simply sidestepped. It is not necessarily the case that all cognitive scientists 
would accept the assumptions laid out here, at least in the form in which they appear, but 
the idea is that these assumptions are sufficiently widely accepted, in some form or other, 
to characterise an approach that it is worthwhile to examine. 
3.1 Models as Algorithms. 
The general view of the mind presupposed in these areas of study (at least by the 
majority of participants) is that it is in some sense a computational device or mechanism. 
In trying briefly to establish why this is and what it entails, I shall draw heavily on the 
account offered by Pylyshyn (1980). It will be claimed that cognitive models depend on 
the postulation of rules whereby the mind is to be seen as operating, and indeed that these 
specify processes of an algorithmic nature, which are assumed mentally to occur. (It 
should be noted here that there are various popular notions in cognitive science, particu- 
larly some of those falling under the umbrella of 'connectionism', that fit this description 
only doubtfully, but it is beyond the scope of the present discussion to investigate the 
consequences of this.) It will be urged, further, that the postulation and, more particularly, 
the interpretation of these rules, depends on the assumption that the behaviour being 
modelled is rational. This point is rather significant in view of the arguments to come in 
later chapters, but it will be treated here only in an introductory fashion. Drawn substan- 
tially from the views of Dennett, it is probably somewhat more controversial than much 
else in the chapter. 
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The object of cognitive psychology is to capture, and then explain, certain regularities 
in human behaviour, which emerge under a particular kind of description. The kind of 
description in question is, essentially, one which relates the organism to its environment, 
and allows us to state such relationships in illuminating ways. This is familiar, of course, 
in such constructions as: X desired that p, and believed that q, and that's why he did A; 
where p, and q, are each descriptions of some state of affairs either in or previously or 
potentially in the organism's (or person's) immediate environment, and A is a description 
of X's behaviour as an action, not just movements, etc. In pretheoretic 'folk-psychology', 
of course, we routinely describe and account for people's (and animals', etc.) behaviour in 
just these terns of belief, desire and action. We say, to steal Pylyshyn's example, that 
someone is running out of a building because of his belief that it is on fire, and his desire 
to escape the fire. We can account for the acquisition of the belief in various ways - the 
smelling of smoke, the recieving of a 'phone call - and hence an important regularity can 
be stamped upon a number of events quite diverse under other (eg, physical) descriptions. 
What is essential in all this is that the behaviour of the organism (person) can be inter- 
preted as a series of actions, directed toward some goal, and informed by a description of 
the environment of the action (this is particularly noticeable when anomalous behaviour is 
explained via the postulation of false beliefs about the environment). Also essential is that 
beliefs and desires are not just arbitrarily combined to explain action: there are severe logi- 
cal constraints, which one might regard as rules governing the procedure of constructing 
explanation-descriptions of this kind. (We shall discuss these later.) 
The cognitive theorist is disposed to think of these informational and goal states as 
being (internally) represented by the organism, these representations then being manipu- 
lated according to certain rules (essentially, serving as premises in a practical deduction) in 
a process leading to the determination of action (cf, in particular, Fodor 1975). As 
Pylyshyn says (op. cit. 112), we have here generalisations which `can only be stated in 
terms of the agent's internal representation of the situation (ie, in mentalistic terms)'. (It 
cannot go without comment that thus to equate mentalism with representationalism, assum- 
ing that the 'mentalistic terms' are straightforwardly what is represented, is a somewhat 
controversial assertion, unargued by Pylyshyn; but it is commonplace in the field. We 
shall have cause to note this point again below.) 
Given this characterisation of the phenomena to be explained, it is natural to turn to 
computation for an explanatory theory. For, as Pylyshyn notes, 
... computation is the only worked-out view of process that is both compatible 
with a materialist view of how a process is realized, and that attributes the 
behavior of the process to the operation of rules upon representations. In other 
words, what makes it possible to view computation and cognition as processes 
of fundamentally the same type is the fact that both are physically realized and 
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both are governed by rules and representations. 
The point to be focussed on here is that computation is not intended to be seen merely as 
some sort of useful model of cognition, nor is it just that there is a useful analogy between 
the two: Pylyshyn's (and, in general, cognitive science's) claim is that cognition literally is 
computation - in some sense. Naturally, this is not supposed to involve regarding the brain 
as constructed in literally the same fashion as contemporary electronic devices, nor that it 
functions precisely similarly. The notion of computation is complex, and there are no 
doubt possible kinds of computational device yet to be produced, or conceived of. How- 
ever, there is supposed to be this feature central to all conceivable computational processes, 
that they 'are governed by rules and representations'. It is true that this is stipulative in 
that, eg, it simply rules out 'analog' devices as not being properly computational, since 
they don't seem to involve rules defined over representations, but perhaps Pylyshyn is 
justified in holding that it is not arbitrary. Support is garnered from Brian Smith (1982 - 
see below) and Haugeland (1978), at least if Pylyshyn will agree that by 'computation', he 
means 'symbolic computation'. 
Mental activity, then, is to be regarded as 'the execution of algorithms'; and the con- 
struction of a cognitive model - an attempt at explaining some feature of this activity - 
must accordingly involve the attempt to specify an algorithm (or 'program'). It should be 
stressed, somewhat incidentally, that this has nothing to do with so-called 'non- 
algorithmic', 'heuristic' programming techniques, eg. in chess-playing programs: even 
here, the operation of the heuristics must be in accordance with some algorithm, if it can 
be executed on a computer. It has been claimed (eg. Dreyfus 1972) that human perfor- 
mance on at least some tasks requires unprogrammable heuristics; but this remains to be 
shown, and if it is shown to hold on a wide scale, then the whole project of computational 
cognitive psychology will possibly have been a mistake. (In the conclusion of this thesis, 
however, we will recommend a position which entails the partial acceptance of a position 
related to this.) 
One must be careful to say how much is involved in specifying the algorithm. We 
need, of course, more than just an 'input-output' description of the 'behaviour' it is sup- 
posed to produce, since many different algorithms could be equivalent in this respect. The 
'rules and representations' must both be described in detail, so that one can distinguish 
between different algorithms, which might be proposed to account for the same 
phenomena. Pylyshyn adduces a notion of 'strong equivalence' of algorithms, which 
unfortunately has to be left informal and intuitive; but the suggestion is that it can be 
approximated by some other notion, to which end we are offered the following: 
.. , all processes that, for each input, produce 1) the same output, and 2) the 
same measure of computational complexity, as assessed by some independent 
means, are referred to as complexity-equivalent (117). 
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The idea here is that complexity-equivalence can be empirically investigated if the 
'independent means' of assessment is empirical; and it is held that reaction-time data, care- 
fully interpreted, might be such a means. Hence, we require algorithms to be specified 
such that their properties with respect to complexity can be judged and tested, since the 
goal of the research is ostensibly to discover the algorithm that the subject actually uses. 
We speak of the algorithm as consisting of rules defined over representations, but the 
consequences of this have to be recognised. In a physical realisation of the process, its 
actual state-transitions are caused physically, and to that extent depend wholly on physical 
laws. But we have an account of these state-changes in terms of the properties of the 
domain of objects (whatever it is) appealed to in an interpretation of the representations. 
For instance, if the program carries out addition, 
... in order to explain why the machine prints out the symbol '5' when it is 
provided with the expression '(PLUS 2 3)', we must refer to the meaning of the 
symbols in the domain of numbers. The explanation of why the particular 
number '5' is printed out then follows from these semantic definitions (ie, it 
prints out '5' because that symbol represents the number five, 'PLUS' 
represents the addition operator applied to the referents of the other two sym- 
bols, etc., and five is indeed the sum of two and three (113). 
This works only because all the representations are somehow physically distinct, and in 
such a way that when they interact with the physical realisation of the rules, the appropri- 
ate result emerges. The 'realisation of the rules' is known as an 'interpreter', because of 
this property; and its general properties are known as the 'functional architecture' of a 'vir- 
tual machine' - in this case, an adding machine. It should be noted that the description of 
this is always in purely functional terms - hence 'virtual' - and it could be implemented in 
principle in any number of ways, even as a program for some other machine; Pylyshyn, 
though, always assumes the 'cognitive' architecture to be implemented directly in the bio- 
logical or neurological substrate. 
A consequence of these observations is that all the relevant semantic distinctions 
which are captured in the representations used, have to be realised as physical (one usually 
says, 'syntactic') distinctions between these representations; and all these must be corre- 
lated with functional differences in the architecture of the interpreter: 
This is what we mean when we say that a device represents something. Simply 
put, all and only syntactically encoded aspects of the represented domain can 
affect the way a process behaves (113-4) 
The same principle is also visible in Fodor's famous 'formality condition' on computa- 
tional representation (Fodor 1980). 
The discussion here is remarkably similar in many respects to the account of 'compu- 
tational process' offered by Brian Smith (op. cit. 23-27). A process is understood, initially, 
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to be somehow defined only in terms of its `surface', ie. its behaviour. Smith adduces the 
notion of a `reduction' of a process, whereby it is broken down and seen to consist of, 
basically, an inner process operating over some `structural field' of semantically interpreted 
symbols. According to Smith, it is essential to a process' being computational, that it is 
susceptible to such a reduction. Clearly enough, the inner process here corresponds to the 
notion of an interpreter, while the field of symbols amounts to an inscription, in some 
appropriate notation, of the algorithm in question. In principle, there can be many embed- 
ded reductions, but, significantly, the inner process(or) of the last reduction is only ever 
described in terms of its surface or behaviour, and thus is not revealed to be computational. 
This corresponds to Pylyshyn's view of the computationally opaque nature of the func- 
tional architecture of a given machine. 
What seems completely clear is that on this account a major task of cognitive 
psychology must be to elaborate as far as possible what Pylyshyn calls `the functional 
architecture of the cognitive virtual machine', since this and the range of possible algo- 
rithms (up to strong equivalence) that it can execute are strongly mutually determining, like 
a lock and key: `... different architectures are in general not capable of executing strongly 
equivalent algorithms' (124). The main point for us here is that the functional architecture 
decides the primitive functions that the algorithm can appeal to. An architecture might be 
such, for instance, as to offer addition as a primitive, but not multiplication, in which case 
the latter would have to be implemented perhaps as repeated addition; if, though, multipli- 
cation were primitive, then we would not have to (indeed could not) offer an account of it 
in terms of an algorithm interpreted by this machine. Pylyshyn's contention, here, is that 
such primitive operations are not part of the subject-matter of cognitive psychology, for 
which they must remain fundamentally unanalysed. It is not that these primitives of the 
cognitive architecture have to be left utterly mysterious, but rather that any account of them 
must be non-cognitive, perhaps neurophysiological, or in terms of analog processes of 
some kind. Those, such as Dreyfus and the followers of Gibson, who seem to urge that 
everything in the brain is analog, are thus seen to be urging that everything is primitive, 
and thus that there is no scope at all for cognitive explanations. Cognitive psychology is 
clearly committed to the assumption, which as Pylyshyn stresses ought to be regarded as 
empirical, that this is false. 
Pylyshyn, in fact, goes on to establish `algorithmic accountability' as definitive of the 
now technical notion of a cognitive phenomenon, and suggests that the conditions under 
which it is manifest can be identified with those in which a phenomenon is or can be sys- 
tematically influenced by cognitive factors such as `changes in instructions or the 
information-bearing aspects of the context'. The apparent circularity here is explained 
away by supposing that what is going on is a process of gradual evolution and as it were 
theoreticising of our basic intuitions about what cognitive phenomena are. Thus is 
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Pylyshyn led to produce his well-known condition that primitive functions and properties 
have to be cognitively impenetrable, by which he means that they cannot be directly 
influenced by any factor which has a cognitive description (155). 
Pylyshyn's view here is, perhaps, a little extreme. Haugeland (1978 op. cit.), for 
instance, holds that there is, or might be, a hierarchy of 'intentional black boxes', several 
of them interacting at any given level, but each of them decomposable into a number of 
other interacting black boxes. This is rather similar to Lycan's (1981) and Dennett's 
(1978) 'homuncular functionalism', and might lead to the suggestion (cf. Haugeland's com- 
mentary in Pylyshyn op. cit. 138) that the cognitive functional architecture ought to be seen 
as just another level of computational processing, itself reducible after Smith's fashion to a 
further processor and a different algorithm. The main value of this would be its admitting 
an idea that Pylyshyn does not discuss, which is that of compilation. In conventional com- 
puters, algorithms are often not executed directly, but instead translated (compiled) into a 
possibly different but behaviourally equivalent algorithm, which is executed instead. If one 
has an interpreter for a high-level language implemented in some lower-level language 
('machine code', perhaps), one can sometimes selectively compile just certain routines or 
procedures, components of some larger program, into the lower level language. They then, 
from the point of view of the top level, become primitive. The possible application is that 
skills, for instance, which at first can be practised only with careful thought, and attention 
to every step, might eventually become compiled and thereafter operate very much more 
quickly, and without the possibility of cognitive penetration. Such a notion might turn out 
to be of great psychological value, although Pylyshyn seems obscurely to doubt this (165). 
A significant further matter is that the actual, physical instantiation of the functional 
architecture might at certain points become of interest for the cognitive theorist. He will 
have to consider cases where the execution of the algorithm fails to proceed smoothly, for 
some reason or other. This might be due, for instance, to arbitrary limitations on 
memory-space, or the appearance of some kind of interference in certain situations. Pre- 
cisely what circumstances these phenomena occur in, may well be a useful pointer to the 
nature of the architecture. 
3.2 Representation and Interpretation. 
The task of the cognitive-model builder, then, is to propose an algorithm (or set of 
algorithms) whereby the behaviour which interests him might be produced. This has to be 
supported by arguments showing that it is the right algorithm, the algorithm actually pro- 
ducing the behaviour of his subjects. So far, however, this is a purely formal enterprise. 
We have seen that the machine executing an algorithm has no access to the domain of 
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semantic interpretation of its representations, save insofar as this is mirrored in syntactic 
features and distinctions. In principle, then, one could carry out the project of proposing 
these algorithms without ever mentioning the interpretational domain, describing one's 
results merely in terms of their syntax. Indeed, Stephen Stich, in his `Peer Commentary' 
on Pylyshyn's paper, suggests that semantics is just irrelevant to cognitive psychology; talk 
of representation, Stich says, `is simply excess baggage' (152). This is a topic addressed 
by various people - eg. Fodor (1980) - and enlarged upon at length by Stich in his later 
book (1983). It would delay us indefinitely to go into it here. Pylyshyn rejects Stich's 
thesis because, he holds, it would be to `abandon the goal of relating a computational 
psychology to a folk belief-desire psychology' (161), and to do this would be to lose the 
explanatory powers of the theory with respect to the behavioural regularities mentioned at 
the outset. The point is that these regularities, as noted above, are stated under an interpre- 
tation of the behaviour, and cannot be satisfactorily explained under that interpretation by a 
wholly uninterpreted algorithm. (We want to know why the computer prints out five, not 
merely `5'). It would have to appear ad hoc; its features could not be motivated in the 
appropriate ways; it would lack the required relationship with the agent's environment. As 
Pylyshyn says: 
The only way both to capture the important underlying generalisations ... and 
to see ... behaviour as being rationally related to certain conditions, is to take 
the bold but hightly motivated step of interpreting the expressions in the theory 
as goals and beliefs (loc. cit.). 
This is a revealing remark (even if overstated: as will appear, it is questionable whether 
the expressions are to be interpreted as beliefs and desires), and it prompts attention to the 
second main assumption of cognitive theorising, which I proposed to introduce in this 
chapter, viz. the assumption of rationality in the agent. 
Discussions of this assumption are not uncommon in the literature of philosophical 
psychology, particularly since Quine and Davidson. In those contexts, it often takes the 
form of a `principle of charity' in radical translation: if one fails to assume that the native 
is responding rationally to his environment and its stimuli, then translation cannot get off 
the ground. We shall have cause to examine this claim in later chapters, but problems of 
translation are, naturally enough, tightly related to problems of folk-psychology generally. 
As Grice (1975) has made as clear as anyone, one's interpretation of a speaker's utterances 
depends on one's views about his psychological states, in particular his propositional atti- 
tudes; his intentions, or beliefs and desires. In general, utterances, particularly regarded as 
speech-acts, are just a subclass of actions, and the contention is that the whole enterprise of 
interpreting behaviour in terms of actions, verbal or otherwise, depends on the rationality 
assumption. 
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A particularly clear and forceful statement of these points, which has the added virtue 
of relating them specifically to cognitive theorising, is provided by Daniel Dennett (1981a; 
see also 1981b). He contends that any kind of 'intentional' psychology - a psychology, 
that is, which depends on the attribution to organisms of contentful, or in some sense 
information-bearing, states - has to begin by recognising the organism as an instance of 
what he calls an 'intentional system'. What this entails, Dennett explains, is that the 
behaviour of the organism can be usefully predicted by applying to it such notions (in a 
suitably systematised and clarified form) as 'belief, 'desire' and 'action'. There is a sort 
of 'abstract calculus' according to which one can manipulate these attributions in order to 
arrive at one's predictions. Dennett holds that this kind of approach depends not at all on 
any kind of knowledge about the internal constitution of the organism in question, nor on 
any notion of the (physical-causal) aetiology of the observed behaviour, just so long as that 
behaviour exhibits the right sort of 'patterns'. 
What we have here is a version of an overtly instrumentalistic 'logical behaviourist' 
doctrine, differing, eg, from that of Ryle (1949) in that all intentional attributions are inter- 
linked, and not accountable in isolation. (Which avoids the major thrusts of many of 
Ryle's critics, particularly Fodor, 1975.) Dennett regards his intentional systems theory as a 
kind of distillation of much that is important, and effective, in folk-psychology, the rest, he 
believes - whatever can be said about the actual realisation of intentional systems in, for 
instance, human beings - gives rise to a discipline he entitles 'sub-personal cognitive 
psychology' (SPCP). 
The success of the intentional strategy in predicting behaviour depends on that 
behaviour being rational. The attribution of intentional states to any system depends on the 
assumption that the system is rational, or well designed (which Dennett supposes is what 
evolution selects for). These remarks amount to declaring an equation between being 
rational and responding to 'intentional characterisation according to the rules of attribution'; 
these rules are in some sense definitve of rationality, and vice versa. Dennett insists that 
intentional theorising, and indeed folk-psychology itself, are normative: 
A system's beliefs are those it ought to have, given its perceptual capacities, its 
epistemic needs, and its biography ... A system's desires are those it ought to 
have, given its biological needs and the most practicable means of satisfying 
them ... A system's behaviour will consist of those acts that it would be 
rational for an agent with those belief and desires to perform (1981a 42-3). 
This is, of course, an idealisation, since no system is ideally 'ensconced in its environmen- 
tal niche', and no (at least, no human) system is ideally rational. When these things fail, 
`special stories' have to be told; but the apparatus works just to the extent that agents 
approximate the ideal 
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If folk-psychology and intentional systems theory depend so crucially on the rational- 
ity assumption, then no less so, according to Dennett, does SPCP. This is simply because, 
where semantics is concerned, the former doctrines are prior to the latter. Dennett's view 
of SPCP entails that its main task is to account for the brain's functioning as a 'semantic 
engine', when really all it can be is a 'syntactic engine'. This parallels the remarks above 
about computational systems being essentially purely formal. The brain, evidently, has to 
mimic the behaviour of the impossible object (the semantic engine) by capitaliz- 
ing on close (close enough) fortuitous correspondences between structural regu- 
larities - of the environment and of its own internal states and operations - and 
semantic types (54) 
- which recapitulates the point about semantically relevant distinctions having to be mir- 
rored by syntactic ones. What one necessarily ends up with, then, are 
... systems that seem to discriminate meanings by actually discriminating 
things (tokens of no doubt wildly disjunctive types) that co-vary reliably with 
meanings (55). 
I want to maintain that SPCP as envisaged by Dennett is essentially the same discip- 
line of cognitive-model construction that was discussed with reference to Pylyshyn. This 
seems uncontroversial enough, given Dennett's assertion that 
It is the task of sub-personal cognitive psychology to propose and test models 
of such activity - of pattern recognition or stimulus generalization, concept- 
learning, expectation, learning, goal-directed behaviour, problem-solving - that 
not only produce a simulacrum of genuine content-sensitivity, but that do this in 
ways demonstrably like the ways people's brains do it, exhibiting the same 
powers and the same vulnerability to deception, overload and confusion (55). 
Dennett denies that we are likely to find here anything corresponding to the 'personal- 
level' categories of belief and desire; contra, eg, Fodor (1975), he thinks it implausible that 
propositional attitudes as such are couched directly in some language of thought, but rather 
that they are 'emergent' regularities exhibited by the algorithms that actually are operative 
(cf. Dennett 1978, esp. chs. 2, 6). It is not, as Pylyshyn has been sniped at above for sug- 
gesting, that the expressions in the theory are interpreted 'as goals and beliefs'; but they 
are interpreted as contentful states, of perhaps some other kind, in the light of our attribu- 
tions of goals and beliefs, to the system as a whole. 
This is unsurprising, given Dennett's instrumentalism, but he also provides elsewhere 
(Dennett 1978 107) a persuasive example of a chess-playing computer, which, to the extent 
that the intentional stance works with it at all, can be said to believe that it should develop 
its queen early, whereas there is nothing in its program that says this; it simply 'emerges' 
from the actual instructions. Dennett accordingly thinks that 
the only similarity we can be sure of discovering in the illata of sub-personal 
-41- 
cognitive psychology is the intentionality of their labels. They will be charac- 
terised as events with content, bearing information, signalling this and ordering 
that (1981a, 55). 
And this is where the crucial dependence on the uppermost-level attributions comes in; this 
`content' has to be attributed to the postulated events (they have to be interpreted; cf also 
Smith, op cit), and this can only be done by bearing in mind (however implicitly) the 
intentional characterisation of the system or organism as a whole: 
In order to give the illata these labels, in order to maintain any intentional 
interpretation of their operation at all, the theorist must keep glancing outside 
the system, to see what normally produces the configuration he is describing, 
what effects the system's responses normally have on the environment, and 
what benefit normally accrues to the whole system from this activity. In other 
words the cognitive psychologist cannot ignore the fact that it is the realization 
of an intentional system he is studying on pain of abandoning semantic interpre- 
tation and hence psychology (56). 
To the extent, then, that SPCP, or cognitive modelling in general, aspires to speak 
seriously of representations, it must depend on the assumption central to the notion of 
intentionality, that the system being modelled is rational. What it is important to recognise, 
however, is that this does not entail that its behaviour is always `correct'. Stich (1982) cri- 
ticises Dennett's defence of the rationality assumption, on the ground that it shows many 
psychologists working on reasoning to be wasting their time, since `all of this work limn- 
ing the boundaries of human rationality is simply incoherent' due to the fact that `the 
presuppositions of intentional explanation ... put prediction of lapses in principle beyond 
its scope' (54). This criticism is partially misguided because, although there is, as will be 
argued later, a sense in which it's incoherent to look for the boundaries of human rational- 
ity, and although it's true that intentional explanation fails on errors, what one ought to be 
saying is that psychologists such as those Stich mentions are working within SPCP, at the 
sub-personal level, where explanation is not (or not only) intentional even though it 
presupposes an intentional account at a higher level. SPCP, as a previous quotation 
showed, can, does and should address errors; it can and does concern itself with the ques- 
tion of competence; but it cannot address the issue of rationality. 
In the next chapter, we shall follow up these themes by investigating the notion of 
competence for a theory of this kind. After that, subsequent chapters will raise more gen- 
eral and problematic issues about the relationships between rationality, logic and com- 
petence. 
4 
Competence and Performance 
The account of cognitive theorising, just given, would seem to suggest that, in the 
case of a model of reasoning, we require to postulate a particular account of the processes 
or algorithms that are responsible for the production of the conclusions offered by subjects 
to given premises. For simplicity, imagine that we begin by restricting ourselves to the 
consideration of some well-defined and closely constrained type of task (eg. the solving of 
syllogisms, or Wason's selection task, or the like), in which subjects are asked to provide 
responses to stimuli easily seen (at least by the experimenter) as clear and explicit sets of 
premises. Regarding the premises as `inputs' and the conclusions as `outputs', we need to 
postulate an algorithm which is input-output equivalent to the behaviour of the subjects. 
As noted, this sort of equivalence is in general far too weak for the aims of cognitive 
psychology, yet even so it involves a number of serious methodological issues. In the 
present chapter, I shall aim briefly to expose what I see as one of the main questions 
encountered in the generation of this input-output characterisation. It will emerge as the 
nexus of the issues discussed in the last chapter and in the next, and hence will receive 
considerable further discussion. The present effort, then, is in order to establish sufficient 
background behind the use of certain terms to prevent their subsequent appearances from 
being too isolated and uncertain in their connotations. 
We have supposed already that the actual behaviour of the subjects may, in some 
cases, be due not directly to the algorithm, but to its interaction with various comparatively 
unprincipled interfering factors. There may be behaviour which the algorithm would have 
produced but for these factors, but in the event did not. A firm line, as on a graph, the 
algorithm has the subjects' behaviour dotted about it: it must be seen as input-output 
equivalent only to an idealisation of the subjects' behaviour. We can thus expect counter- 
factual predictions and unpredicted behaviour, and amongst these the question arises as to 
how we are to select the `best straight line', the best idealisation. Another way to put this, 
common in the literature on reasoning (and of course linguistics), is to ask after the nature 
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of the 'competence' underlying the subjects' 'performances'. A suggestion often advanced 
is that people are always essentially capable of arriving at a normatively correct conclusion 
to a reasoning problem, but that for various reasons (poor memory, lack of motivation, dis- 
tractions, etc.) they commonly do not. Accepting this would entail the postulation of an 
algorithm which computed a function from input premises to conclusions correct by logical 
canons, in a fashion compatible (given many assumptions about the sort of system it is 
operating in) with its failing in the sorts of ways in which people do. 
4.1 An anlogy with Grammar 
We may wonder, here, why it is supposed that people have perfect competence, how 
it is decided which nonnative system best characterises it, and whether they may be right 
who argue that competence is in fact not perfect. We shall address these matters in the 
following chapters, but whatever the answers a possible problem, vigorously propounded 
by Johnson-Laird (1983), is that there is in general a very large (indeed, infinite) set of 
normatively sanctioned conclusions to any given set of premises, although many of these 
are trivial (eg. conjunctions and disjunctions of repetitions of the premises, etc.). We 
naturally do not want to be in the position of predicting that subjects will actually draw all 
of these conclusions. Johnson-Laird holds that a theory of competence should predict the 
drawing only of those correct conclusions that people actually would ideally draw, and he 
undertakes to produce one for syllogistic reasoning (see Part II of this thesis). 
His objection appears odd, however, since his analogy is with Chomsky-based 
psycholinguistics. An extensive quote seems worthwhile: 
The theory of grammar... characterizes the syntactic structure of sentences, and 
the theory of parsing specifies an algorithm for computing that structure. This 
approach to psychology is powerful though double-edged, in that a correct 
theory of competence is an invaluable constraint on theories of performance, but 
an incorrect theory of competence can seriously mislead researchers. In the 
case of inference, no one has successfully formulated what exactly the mind 
computes, and the resulting theoretical gap has been filled by a largely tacit (and 
accordingly potent) assumption that formal logic constitutes the theory of com- 
petence. The fundamental shortcoming of this doctrine is that most inferences 
in daily life depend on drawing spontaneous conclusions, and reasoners do not 
draw just any valid conclusion - and sometimes do not draw a valid conclusion 
at all. It is therefore misleading to assume that what has to be computed is the 
set of valid deductions, since spontaneous valid deductions are only a subset of 
this class. (Johnson-Laird 1983 396-7.) 
If there is a shortcoming here, it is surely manifest also in the theory of grammar. Most 
discourses in daily life depend on uttering spontaneous sentences, and speakers do not utter 
just any grammatical sentence - and sometimes do not utter a grammatical sentence at all. 
Notoriously, there are 'grammatical' sentences (eg. very long ones) which no-one will ever 
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produce. The speaker may (in theory) understand any grammatical utterance - but then 
perhaps a subject will, equally, accept any normatively correct inference (although in fact, 
of course, this acceptance, like understanding, is often not immediate). 
It is noticeable that the typical method in theoretical linguistics is not the analysis of 
spontaneous utterances, but rather the elicitation of explicit grammaticality judgments on 
presenting sample sentences to speakers assumed to be competent: Johnson-Laird is fre- 
quently scathing about the procedure of offering both premises and conclusions to subjects 
for validity judgments, and indeed a quite different spread of results is often thus obtained. 
The point is, though, that the competence theory might be thought to define (in both logic 
and linguistics) the set within which the predicted utterances ought to fall, if there are no 
errors, and not the particular responses produced. That this set is unnecessarily large is an 
interesting suggestion, but surely one which applies similarly to both cases. Johnson- 
Laird's analogy is a good one, but his own use of it is misguided. What we should have 
made clear above, therefore, is that people are capable of arriving at some normatively 
correct conclusion, but from the competence theory alone we know not which. Com- 
petence theories are acceptors or filters, not generators. 
4.2 Validity and Competence Separated 
Is there, then, no harm (nor any psychological implications of the sort Johnson-Laird 
has in mind) in admitting that logic can provide us with a competence theory for reason- 
ing? There appears no special 'theoretical gap' in this particular case, if no competence 
theory shows 'what exactly the mind computes', if what a competence theory does is show 
us what sort of thing has to be computed; more to the point, perhaps, what sort of thing 
ought not to be. 
But perhaps this counter to Johnson-Laird is weaker than it might seem. What he 
really has in mind is a principled restriction on the actual set of 'correct' conclusions our 
theory allows. He has a notion of the 'semantic content' of the premises and conclusion, 
and his suggestion is, in effect, that we should enshrine its preservation, like that of truth, 
as a basic principle of the competence system (along with the rule that the 'parsimony' of 
its expression must be increased). He inserts a wedge between the notions of a valid con- 
clusion, and a competent one. 
His grounds for this are ostensibly empirical, derived from observation and analysis 
of what kinds of conclusions people actually, spontaneously draw. We rely here on evi- 
dence from 'competent spontaneous reasoners' and derive our account of competence from 
this. The rationale and justification for this type of procedure will be discussed in the next 
chapter, but now we need to contrast it with certain others of Johnson-Laird's remarks. He 
has a set of criterial goals for any theory of reasoning, one of which reads as follows: 
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The theory must allow that people are capable of making valid inferences, that 
is, they are potentially rational. A theory is inadequate if it permits valid infer- 
ences to occur only by chance or as a result of processes that do not suffice to 
establish validity (op cit. 66, original italics). 
The significance of this claim is far-reaching, and it will be examined further in subsequent 
chapters. For the present, though, it discloses a curious two-stage nature in Johnson- 
Laird's notion of competence. Where people 'do not draw a valid conclusion at all', this 
cannot be because they are essentially incompetent to do so, but rather (assuming they do 
not lack motivation, etc.) must evince the effect of some performance limitation; the 
requirement is introduced a priori that competence lies within logic. No evidence is going 
to be allowed to undermine this requirement, but observational study has its place in res- 
tricting the theory to the prediction only of some subset of all valid conclusions. One 
might have supposed that on this view the latter enterprise was part of the description of 
performance, but Johnson-Laird thinks not. One reason for this, perhaps, is that (mistak- 
enly, as I shall argue later) he regards the existence and nature of mathematics and formal 
logic as empirical grounds for the quoted criterion, and hence concludes that his entire 
competence theory is empirically based. But this, again, raises questions. It is clear 
enough that mathematics and logic require competence for behaviour far removed from 
anything seen in `spontaneous' reasoning. A logician might well say `John is tall: there- 
fore, John is tall or Mary is small', although inferences of this form are certainly not to be 
anticipated in ordinary discourse - even (usually) that of off-duty logicians. There are 
therefore apparently different competences for these two cases or domains, albeit one is 
perhaps merely an extension of the other. 
This is not a consequence of his theory which Johnson-Laird either mentions or 
shows evidence of desiring. Nonetheless, I do not wish to deny that it is reasonable: but if 
it is, where is the ground for insisting that the competence for spontaneous inference can- 
not be so impoverished as completely to exclude, for some arguments, all valid conclu- 
sions? Or, if people must have the competence to draw correct conclusions, say to all syl- 
logisms, why can they not have the competence to conclude `A or B' from 'A'? Do we 
want to say that their actually doing this would constitute an error? 
4.3 Validity and Competence Reunited 
In order to avoid his wedge being squeezed out here, Johnson-Laird is going to have 
to assault some traditional intuitions. Separating the dichotomies 'valid/invalid' and 
`competentlincompetent', while continuing to equate the latter with 'correct/incorrect', 
would leave an embarrassing remainder of valid, but incorrect, incompetent conclusions. 
What Johnson-Laird wants to say, presumably, is that these are, no doubt, logically correct, 
but they are somehow pragmatically (in a sense captured by his 'semantic content' theory) 
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incorrect and, in any event and most importantly, they are not computed. The problem 
here remains his insistence that competence is decided in this odd, two-stage way, its logi- 
cal impeccability being known in advance, while its pragmatic component has to be 
discovered observationally. 
One way out of this is to withdraw the wedge after all, and admit that the sorting out 
of the pragmatic matters is something most appropriately to be placed in the area of perfor- 
mance. The pragmatically incorrect conclusions no doubt are not computed, but perhaps 
the fact remains that (in suitable circumstances) they might have been, or would have been, 
which is just what Johnson-Laird wants to say about valid conclusions to reasoning prob- 
lems for which none such is ever normally offered. On his account, validity is the outside 
boundary, as it were, of correct performance in any circumstances whatever, and this is just 
what is generally thought of as competence: there is then only one theory of competence 
after all. 
An alternative is to drive the wedge so far as to create a complete split. In fact, the 
empirical approach to competence assessment would suggest that the persistent failure to 
offer any valid conclusion to particular premises can no more be overlooked than the 
failure to offer certain ones to others. If there are different competence theories for 
different domains, there seems no obvious reason why they should assume some hierarchi- 
cal and nested nature, rather than being subject to wholesale revision. In that event, we 
should have to have a different cognitive model for inference in each domain, with a 
different central algorithm in each case; and this is a possibility which will be considered 
in the following chapters. The important point is that (in a domain) the competence theory 
specifies the behaviour of the ideal subject; the empirical approach simply takes it that the 
best route to this is the examination of actual behaviour, and admits the possible existence 
of more than one domain. It accepts also the possibility that competence will be found to 
have no clear connection with validity, and that the subjects may therefore have to be 
characterised as 'irrational'. 
What I want to do is not to take either of these courses, but rather to leave the wedge 
more or less where it is. This involves supposing that Johnson-Laird is right in certain 
respects - in particular, in his view that some aspects of competence are decided on the 
basis of what is normatively sanctioned, and other aspects on the basis of what behaviour 
is observed. We do indeed import a large a priori component into drawing the boundaries 
of competence, and this depends importantly on our notions of what a rational agent should 
be capable of. We are not inclined to wait upon the evidence of behaviour before making 
assumptions about the abilities of ideal subjects. On the other hand, competence theories 
are intimately connected with the prediction of behaviour, and so I suppose also that it was 
correct to conclude above that competence theories should then be domain-relative, and 
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possibly independent of each other. This is more complicated even than it might seem, 
though, because of the argument to be introduced later in favour of thinking that our 
choice of competence theory can have a reciprocating rebound effect on ideas of what is 
normatively right in a given domain. My suggestion is that the instability of the situation 
leads to an increasing tendency to push the wedge out, but by drawing the notions of vali- 
dity and competence together rather than simply collapsing the latter into the former. 
There is as it were an iterative process which modifies the notion of normative correctness 
(validity) in the light of the emerging notion of competence, and vice versa. Naturally, this 
will need some arguing, and such is part of the burden of subsequent chapters. 
Johnson-Laird's difficulty, in particular, now appears as arising from his failure 
correctly to identify the relationship between competence and normativity, so that he is 
unable convincingly to recover from the counterintuitiveness of cutting them apart. 
Although his proposal to involve semantic content as a criterion is intriguing, it remains 
unclear how it stands in the context of this problem. My conjecture, which Johnson-Laird 
might be able to accept in part, is that if it became established (in certain domains, eg. 
some areas of ordinary discourse) that people's behaviour was best described by a theory 
based on some logic modified by the semantic principle, then there would be pressure to 
adopt that logic as the ideal of normative correctness in that domain. I depart from 
Johnson-Laird in conjecturing further that there could be good empirical reasons for includ- 
ing in this normative theory inferences which in other circumstances might be regarded as 
clearly erroneous; it might not be simply a subset of normally accepted logic. I do not 
believe that it is possible, at present, further to refine my notion of a `domain', but I don't 
see the matter as pressing, since there are many other aspects of the idea that need equally 
to be worked out. 
In summary, we have the following idea. An ideally rational being will, given a set 
of premises, always advance to a normatively correct conclusion. Assume that humans are, 
at bottom, ideally rational; to the extent that it captures rationality, normative logic then 
presents a characterisation of their most competent reasoning behaviour. An algorithm 
explanatory of that behaviour will therefore be constrained, by that logic, in its input-output 
characteristics (the corresponding output must be among the logical consequences of a 
given input). Further assumptions (to be empirically assessed) about the nature of the 
algorithm and the `functional architecture' will lead on this basis to an account of the actu- 
ally observed behaviour. It might be that, to some premises, people never produce a 
correct conclusion (a position that in fact arises with respect to Johnson-Laird's data for 
performances on one particular syllogism): nonetheless, the algorithm must predict that, in 
principle, they would have done, had something not interfered with its execution. The 
internal complexity of the algorithm should, of course, be such as to explain as naturally as 
possible the errors that are observed to be made, given the postulated nature of the 
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implementation. It follows that the relativisation of all this to a domain depends on the 
view that in different domains, different behaviour is rational. 
4.4 The Machine Analogy 
This could all be expressed by comparing the reasoner to a computer intended to per- 
form inferences, along the lines discussed in the last chapter the machine is designed (pro- 
grammed) so that it always produces a correct inference; if it does not, there has been 
some malfunction, it has not performed as it is designed to do. There might, of course, be 
systematic and inductively predictable such malfunctions; the machine might have limited 
resources, be in an environment which regularly disrupts its operations, and so forth. This 
does not matter. All that concerns us in our present enterprise is to describe the program, 
the algorithm, which essentially governs its activity; we are after a computational account 
of its behaviour. The various interferences am not computationally to be described - in 
retranslation to the human case, they are not cognitive processes. Zenon Pylyshyn has put 
this well: 
Errors and imperfections are not the primary phenomena to be accounted for, 
rather, it is the competence to deal with the task. The importance of error data 
is that they provide clues as to how this competence may be realised within cer- 
tain kinds of resource-limited mechanisms. In other words, errors tell us some- 
thing about the way the algorithms and the architecture fit together - just as 
errors in real computers can do the same (though in that case they are called 
'bugs' and we try to eliminate them). (Pylyshyn 1978 124.) 
The decision as to what parts of the observed behaviour are competent, therefore, is 
centrally connected with the question as to the basic nature of any cognitive account of it. 
The central algorithm determines, effectively is, the competence theory. Pylyshyn, also, is 
aware of this: 
The way in which experimental data are interpreted is extremely sensitive to 
one's implicit normative system. Whether behaviour is to be construed as 
appropriate to a task or aberrant depends on one's understanding of the task and 
its goals as well as on the normative system one adopts. (loc. cit.) 
Thus it is vital to the cognitive theorist to clarify the issues about what the competence 
theory for a particular domain actually is, and Johnson-Laird is at least correct in asserting 
that too little attention is typically paid to this question in the psychology of reasoning. It 
tends to be assumed (tacitly, as he says) that some mainstream notion of classical logic 
naturally provides what is required. There are two principal doubts about this, Johnson- 
Laird has already claimed that formal logic will not do as a competence theory; this seems 
to depend on the domain in question, but what he ought to have said is that in general no 
standard system such as classical first-order predicate logic is a suitable choice. There will 
always be some formal theory, expressible as a (perhaps highly deviant) logic that 
-49- 
describes the behaviour, but in any event the question remains as to which logic is the 
appropriate choice. In view of the above discussion, we can note also that it looks as 
though different logics will be found best suited to different domains. 
4.5 Competence and Computability 
It's clearly possible to think of the algorithm as a proof system. If the competence 
theory defines the set of 'valid' arguments, then what we seek is a system that is capable 
of generating (in the ideal case, of course) all and only these: a sound and complete proof 
system. This is problematic, however. Logicians well know that not all arguments can be 
said to belong to such a system, as indeed any that go beyond first-order predicate logic do 
not. Moreover, if we are insisting that there is a mechanical procedure (ie, an algorithmic 
one) for generating these proofs, we are insisting that its basis is a decidable logic - but lit- 
tle beyond the monadic predicate calculus fulfils this requirement (though we shall have 
cause to note later that this includes syllogistic logic). 
These facts make it difficult to sustain the notion that a theory of reasoning can be 
simultaneously algorithmic, and have a competence requirement described by a logic which 
may not be complete. This is something that Johnson-Laird comes up against when he 
considers inferences such as (1983, op. cit, 140) 
More than half the musicians were classically trained 
More than half the musicians were in rock groups 
Therefore: 
Some of the musicians were both classically trained and in rock groups 
which cannot be formalised in first-order logic, and apparently not in any complete (let 
alone decidable) system. He says that the solution to this problem is to be found in 
effective procedures (ie, algorithms) for translating such arguments into mental models, and 
then manipulating these to yield up the conclusion (145). It certainly seems obvious 
enough that the particular example in question can be catered for, and doubtless many 
more. But if Johnson-Laird wants to claim as his goal the description of a system deriving 
all valid inferences, it is bound to be impossible in general, since if (say) second-order 
logic formalises the set of valid arguments of this type, then any effective procedure for 
deriving such arguments renders that logic decidable, which we know already that it is not. 
In cases where arguments cannot be formalised by a decidable logic, it is therefore neces- 
sary to abandon either the idea that the processes must be algorithmic, or the condition that 
they (can be shown to) produce all and only valid inferences. 
It might be thought that such a result vitiates the substance of the foregoing argu- 
ments about competence and normative logic (and the ones that will follow). This would 
be a mistake, I think, because it is wrong to suppose that the central algorithm in a 
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cognitive reasoning theory has (provably) to provide a decision procedure for the logic 
describing the related normative theory. A competence theory, on our account sketched 
above, is a theory which lays down what inferences a reasoner will draw, in ideal cir- 
cumstances, from a set of premises. It is based in large part upon the evidence available 
from experimental and observational studies on reasoners in a particular domain. Such a 
theory is distinct from a normative theory for the same domain, but is to some extent con- 
ditioned by it because the decision as to which of the data should be treated as competent 
can be only partly determined by considerations of, eg, simplicity in explaining the data. 
The normative theory is itself reciprocally affected by the competence account, and the two 
may in the long run converge, but it is clearly wrong simply to identify them. It does 
emerge, however, that insofar as a competence theory for an essentially algorithmic system 
is a logical one, it has to be of a decidable logic. I am inclined to regard this as important 
evidence in favour of the view that one should not conflate competence and normativity, 
but also as an indicator of a deep problem in the whole area of cognitive theorising about 
reasoning. For it shows that there is a limit to the extent to which formal theories of com- 
petence and normativity can be expected ever to converge, at least for most domains. In 
particular, it shows that Johnson-Laird can't both have his cake and eat it when he wants 
to have a theory offering effective procedures for the making of all the valid inferences 
people can make. This is a point which will receive considerable further discussion in Part 
II (chapters 12 and 13). 
It is worthwhile mentioning here, somewhat parenthetically, a relatively early discus- 
sion of some of these issues by Pylyshyn (1973). His concern is primarily with com- 
petence theories in linguistics, but he specifically addresses the undecidability problem, and 
concludes that it is of little psychological importance because competence theories say so 
little about the details of how tasks are performed. This, while true enough, is no help in 
dealing with the question of how competence relates to rationality, because that question 
doesn't depend on the detailed `psychological reality' of the competence characterisation: 
its I/O features, so to speak, are enough for the difficulty to arise. We do, however, gen- 
erally endorse in this chapter Pylyshyn's view of a proper account of competence as a deep 
theory about the abstract structure of the subject's behaviour, in large measure empirically 
arrived at as an explanatory construction. 
It might be thought that in identifying the competence theory so closely with the 
algorithm, I have accepted Johnson-Laird's characterisation of it as a specification of `what 
exactly the mind computes'. However, I want to hang on to the idea of competence as 
being a somewhat abstract notion, not so much a generative one. I suppose this is best put 
by saying that it specifies what exactly the mind can compute. Algorithms in this sort of 
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theory ought ultimately to be highly complex and sensitive to a large range of circumstan- 
tial influences on the reasoning task (any which are cognitively effective, in fact). There 
may very well in general be more than one computable conclusion to a given inference 
problem, and no doubt a sufficiently well-elaborated theory might provide an algorithm that 
predicts which actually will be computed given the particular complex initial conditions of 
a specific case. We don't want to hold, though, that this is the competent conclusion. At 
the current stage of theoretical development, we want to say that a competence theory is in 
fact a regulative notion derived jointly from behavioural observations and normative theory, 
which informs us in our attempts to construct a suitable algorithm. Which, of course, is 
really just how Johnson-Laird uses the notion. 
This allows us to account for the possibility that the algorithm might include some 
arrangement for taking resource limitations into account. If a machine knows it has a 
small memory, at can perhaps tell when its usage is becoming critical, and presumably then 
it will do something sensible such as issue an appropriate message. It will thus avoid fal- 
ling into reasoning errors of a certain kind, but also its 'competence', as defined by the 
algorithm, will become itself resource-limited. In this case, I think we still want to speak 
of its competence as before, recognising that a particular sort of gap has arisen between 
this and the algorithm that describes its actual behaviour. The case is somewhat analogous 
to that of a calculator whose 'competence' is described by arithmetic, but whose perfor- 
mance is limited so that after a certain point it produces a warning of imminent overflow. 
A true malfunction might cause errors without warning; the algorithm in the machine 
specifies what it will do when it's working properly, and although this is consistent with 
arithmetic only up to a certain point we still want to say that arithmetic is what it is doing. 
That is to say, the theory of arithmetic provides our best interpretive account of its 
behaviour, and we want to describe the algorithm as being directed at implementing that 
theory, however imperfectly the available resources allow it to do this. 
In order to pursue the various issues raised in this chapter, it seems sensible to 
proceed in the direction of an inquiry into the nature of rationality and its relationship to 
the foundation of normative systems. The general argument here has been in agreement 
with Ellis (1979), who has the notion of scientific laws being specifications of ideal 
behaviour, any deviation from which constitutes an 'effect' requiring independent explana- 
tion. 
In general, physical laws do not describe the actual behaviour of ordinary physi- 
cal systems. They say only how these systems would behave if they were ideal. 
Similarly, we should not expect the laws of rationality to describe the actual 
thought behaviour of ordinary human beings. Rather, we should expect such 
laws to describe the thought behaviour of ideally rational beings, and to provide 
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only a framework for explaining how ordinary human beings think. Given such 
a framework, the effects to be explained are deviations from the rational ideal. 
(Ellis op. cit, 20.) 
This 'framework', it has been suggested, can be thought of as a normative theory, but one 
under strain because ultimately there has to be some close connection between the abstract 
idea of an ideal being, and the theoretically elucidated nature of a real one. The ideal can- 
not be too far away; its formulation must take the real into account. 
In this context, the reader is entitled to some further explanation (or at least discus- 
sion) of what the 'rational ideal' is, how we can decide what it is, and why we suppose 
that humans even approximate to it. These are the primary topics of the next chapter. 
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5 
Rationality, Logic and Justification 
The account of cognitive theories of reasoning, whereby they are characterised as 
computational in the manner above outlined, draws together several strands of significant 
philosophical discussion. If the behavioural description of the computation is held to be 
constrained by an account of the competence of the reasoner, and that competence is 
identified with some nonnative logical theory, then we have a natural way of defining 
`incorrect', `erroneous' or `incompetent' behaviour. But, the question arises, what is the 
justification for characterising these lapses from the competence model as normatively 
wrong, in this way? If there were a simple answer to this, or one relying solely on prem- 
ises drawn from a different domain of inquiry, it would be none of our concern. However, 
such is not the case. It appears that as well as depending on a nonnative evaluation of 
behaviour, our cognitive theory also contributes (potentially, at least, in a crucial way) to 
the grounding of that evaluation. 
5.1 Historical Introduction. 
The connection can be traced back to Nelson Goodman's account of how normative 
logical systems are justified: 
Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted 
deductive practice. Their validity depends upon accordance with the particular 
deductive inferences we actually make and sanction. If a rule yields inaccept- 
able inferences, we drop it as invalid. Justification of general rules thus derives 
from judgments rejecting or accepting particular deductive inferences ... The 
point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought 
into agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference we 
are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are 
unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the delicate one of making 
mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences: and in the agreement 
achieved lies the only justification needed for either. (Goodman 1965 63-4.) 
These brief remarks provided the foundations of an orthodoxy. Rawis (1971), in 
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producing a similar account of the justification of ethical norms, gave Goodman's 'agree- 
ment' the felicitous new label 'reflective equilibrium'. Soon after Goodman wrote, how- 
ever, psychologists began to gather evidence that human performance, on many diverse 
kinds of task, is not what it might be. People err, often and badly, when compared with 
normative theories such as logic, probability and decision-making calculi. This is (prima 
facie) odd, if people's practices are supposed to be in reflective equilibrium with those 
theories. 
Some psychologists began to claim that man was not so rational an animal as had 
been thought; but, on the reflective equilibrium theory, how was this possible? A further 
complication resided in the idea of Quine and Davidson (among others) that the very basis 
of ascribing intentional states to others, and evaluating the meaning of their utterances, is a 
crucial assumption that these others are essentially rational, indeed, logical. Was the 
psychologists' contention necessarily false? 
Richard E. Nisbett (with various colleagues) has appeared as something of a catalyst 
in a certain comer of this debate. His claims about the demonstrability of human irra- 
tionality (eg, Nisbett and Borgida 1975; Nisbett and Ross 1980), as well as those of others, 
provoked a strong reaction from L. J. Cohen (1981), who argued from reflective equili- 
brium that human competence was necessarily in accord with justified norms. The storm 
of protest from commentators reflected the trend behind an attempt by Stich and Nisbett 
(1980) to replace Goodman's theory with another - appealing, in this case, to 'epistemic 
authorities'; Paul Thagard (1982) later produced a more subtle effort, appealing to coher- 
ence and efficiency, toward a similar end. Most recently, Thagard and Nisbett (1983) tried 
to combine these arguments with an attack on the 'strong principle of charity' assumed by 
Quine and Davidson to be characteristic of translation and even intralinguistic understand- 
ing. 
In what follows, there will be a discussion of the issues of this debate, with an 
attempt to relate it usefully to a somewhat wider literature, including that of 'naturalised 
epistemology' in the philosophy of science, and its preoccupation with 'what ought to be 
believed'. However, no effort will be made at a comprehensive survey here. The central 
underlying theme in this chapter will be that there is an interplay between normative 
theorising and the construction of cognitive psychological theories, and that this relation- 
ship is important to the development of both. In short, the two must be interdetermining, 
each depending for its justification (arid sometimes also its construction) upon the other. 
5.2 The Argument For Necessary Rationality. 
There are, as noted, two strands to the argument that people are and must be rational, 
and these are to some degree independent. We have (i) the argument from reflective 
equilibrium, whereby it is supposed that the notion of what is correct stems simply from a 
description of what is typically in fact done; and we have (ii) the Quine-Davidson view 
that all comprehension of others as persons (not to put it too strongly) depends on taking 
them to be 'right in most matters', especially matters logical. Let us outline these in turn, 
and then consider some objections. 
(i) Reflective Equilibrium 
L. Jonathan Cohen's recent (1981) vigorous attack on presumptuous psychologists is 
an ideal example of the first, on account of its uncompromising nature. According to 
Cohen, the actual behaviour of untutored, naive individuals must betray a competence for 
logically, normatively, correct behaviour (however often this may be faulted in perfor- 
mance), for the simple reason that the construction of the normative theory depends at 
crucial nodes' on consulting that behaviour. The picture here is remarkably similar to that 
which one finds in Chomskyan linguistic theories. The 'intuitions' (perhaps only implicitly 
revealed in behaviour) of what one might call native reasoners, are systematised and regu- 
larised using essentially the process described by Goodman in the quotation above. 
Ordinary human reasoning, Cohen says, sets its own standards. He argues that 
intuition-free justification for a formal logical system can be had neither from the 
`empirical-inductive' tactic of adjoining a logical system to the rest of science and assess- 
ing the merits of the whole, nor from any 'metamathematical' argument, which will give us 
at best a demonstration of the theory's soundness but not its application to everyday rea- 
soning. One has to consult people's intuitions, eg. to see whether 'if...then_' is a material 
conditional or, if not, what it is. (Cf. Anderson and Belnap 1975 - an example of this con- 
sultation in action.) And 'unless we assume appropriate intuitions to be correct, we cannot 
take the normative theory of everyday reasoning that they support to be correct' (319). Of 
course, these intuitions have to be idealised, generalised over, abstracted from; and the final 
formal system has to be seen as applying to real arguments only in a rather dissipated way, 
`since the actual judgments and reasonings of human beings occur on particular dates and 
in particular locations, in a particular causal context' (321). However, 
where you accept that a normative theory has to be based ultimately on the data 
of human intuition, you are committed to the acceptance of human rationality as 
a matter of fact in that area (loc. cit.) 
or, perhaps more trenchantly still, 
we cannot attribute inferior rationality to those who are themselves among the 
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canonical arbiters of rationality. Nothing can count as a error of reasoning 
among our fellow adults unless even the author of the error would, under ideal 
conditions, agree that it is an error (322). 
Among the reasons he offers for psychologists' having been misled into ignoring this, 
Cohen adduces the notion of a 'cognitive illusion'. The terminology is deliberately remin- 
iscent of other, eg. visual, illusions. What one finds here is that there is a wholly charac- 
teristic type of error under particular (non-ideal) conditions, but one which is easily seen to 
be such, even by the subject, if the circumstances are altered (eg, the light changed in the 
visual presentation, or a suitable content variation inserted into the reasoning problem). 
The suggestion is that in certain instances - paradigmatically, the 'four-card selection task' 
of Wason (1966 etc.), and some cases of 'judgment under uncertainty' (eg. Tversky and 
Kahneman 1973, Kahneman and Tversky 1974) - people's competence is overridden or 
obstructed 'by factors like the recency or emotional salience of the existing evidential 
input, by the existence of competing claims for computing time, or by a preference for 
least effort' (325). Cohen insists that this interpretation is to be favoured over the more 
frequently encountered view that subjects use radically incorrect heuristics and assumptions 
in their cognition, and have no general procedure available for doing otherwise. His opin- 
ion here is forced by his holding the strong position that 
possession of a competence... entails the possession of a mechanism that must 
include...a method of generating additional procedures, corresponding to the 
proof of theorems or derived rules in [the relevant] normative system (325). 
Of course, this mechanism is not often much used beyond the simplest cases, because this 
'may require skills that are relatively rare'. Such use depends, according to Cohen, on 
'intelligence', where 'intelligence is understood not as the competence that everyone has 
but as the level of those skills that are required to supply the novel input necessary for the 
discovery of proofs' (326). (If intelligence is the sort of thing measured by intelligence 
tests, however, there may be evidence against this - cf. Wason's famous 'Mensa protocol', 
Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972.) 
A second line of argument offered by Cohen is one which he expounded in more 
detail in earlier writings (Cohen 1979, 1980). Psychologists (in particular, Kahneman and 
Tversky, for whose reply see Kahneman and Tversky 1979) are accused of failing correctly 
to characterise the subjects' task, in normative terms. They have applied, in this case, the 
wrong theory of probability to their subjects' performances, and have hence held them in 
error when, Cohen says, they were not. Cohen has a theory (Cohen 1970, 1977) in which 
he elaborates and systematises a 'Baconian' notion of probability, which is quite distinct in 
its rules and theorems, from the usual 'Pascalian' sort. Cohen holds that Tversky and 
Kahneman's (1973, Kahneman and Tversky 1974) data is best interpreted as showing that 
their subjects are using or conforming to something very like this Baconian probability 
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system - and that there is nothing irrational or normatively reproachable about their so 
doing. Kahneman and Tversky contest this, but there is underlying the whole argument an 
important lesson which will receive further discussion later. One has to be very careful 
about specifying the normative theory that characterises one's model of 'competence'. 
The most apparently unfortunate aspect of Cohen's theory, which will be discussed in 
some detail later, is the very immunity to disconfirmation which motivates it. Any 
phenomenon, with sufficient ingenuity, can be redescribed in terms favourable to Cohen; 
and stipulations to ensure this gradually weaken the explanatory value of the whole. Con- 
sider, for instance, the suggestion that an innate competence may depend for its maturation 
on a felicitous environment, or need a suitable education fully to realise it (322). We shall 
have presently to ask whether such a dogmatic position is in fact defensible, insofar as it 
purports to have consequences for the empirical science of psychology. 
(ii) The Strong Principle of Charity 
The 'strong principle of charity' seems to have its roots in some remarks of Quine's 
(1960, section 13). These are concerned with the development of his theory about radical 
translation, the details of which do not presently concern us. Suffice it to say that Quine's 
project, at the point where these remarks occur, is to say something about how, in princi- 
ple, we might work out the meaning of the utterances of a native speaking some language 
with which we are utterly unfamiliar. He explicitly addresses the issue of 'prelogical men- 
tality': might we discover that the native accepted-as-true sentences translatable as having 
the form 'p and not-p'? Quine thinks not. He supposes that 'semantic criteria' for truth- 
functions can be stated in terns of assent and dissent (negation turns a sentence to which 
one will assent into one from which one will dissent, etc.), and then native constructions 
which fulfill these criteria can, 'subject to sundry humdrum provisos', be translated as 
'not', 'and', 'or', etc. Under these criteria, Quire says, the claim about prelogical natives 
is absurd: 
Wanton translation can make natives sound as queer as one pleases. Better 
translation imposes our logic upon them, and would beg the question of prelogi- 
cality if there were a question to beg (58-9). 
Quine goes on to point out that this sort of charitable approach is manifest even where we 
interpret other English speakers: if someone answers us 'Yes and no', we 'assume that the 
queried sentence is meant differently in the affirmation and negation'. In general, 'fair 
translation preserves logical laws', 'assertions startlingly false on the face of them are 
likely to turn on hidden differences of language', and 'one's interlocutor's silliness, beyond 
a certain point, is less likely than bad translation - or, in the domestic case, linguistic diver- 
gence' (59). 
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This doctrine has been taken up and elaborated upon by various of Quine's followers, 
including his pupil, Donald Davidson. The latter has a somewhat complex philosophy of 
language and psychology in which the assumption of rationality is central. For present 
purposes I shall introduce this obliquely, via a recent review article specifically about 
rationality, by another pupil of Quine's (Follesdal 1982). Here, Follesdal notes that, on 
Davidson's view, the assumption of rationality is essential for the attribution of beliefs, 
desires and actions (in general, intentional states). The point is that these attributions are 
inseparable from the interpretation of a speaker's utterances: 
In trying to understand the other person's actions I attribute beliefs and values 
to him on the assumption that he is rational...In the learning of the semantic 
aspects of language, belief and meaning are intertwined in such a way that there 
are not two elements there to be separated:..we assume that a person is rational 
and then try to find out what beliefs and values we may attribute to him that are 
compatible with his being rational (Follesdal op. cit. 308-9). 
Or as Davidson himself puts it, 
the satisfaction of conditions of consistency and rational coherence may be 
viewed as constitutive of the range of application of such concepts as belief, 
desire, intention and action (Davidson 1980 237). 
Since charity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory, it is 
meaningless to suggest that we might fall into massive error by endorsing it ... 
Charity is forced on us - whether we like it or not, if we want to understand 
others we must count them right in most matters (Davidson 1973/74 19). 
In the writings of more recent philosophers of psychology it has become common- 
place to assert that some notion of rationality is implicit in the commonsense attributions of 
'folk psychology' (commonplace, but not wholly universal - cf. Stich 1982, 1983). This is 
a cornerstone in the theories of Dennett (eg, 1978, 1981a,b), which are markedly similar to 
those of Davidson in many respects, and is given an interesting twist by Paul Churchland 
(1979). Churchland's idea is that folk psychology can be construed as a certain sort of 
'measuring system', on analogy with the way in which quantities are measured in, say, 
classical physics. Mass and acceleration, for instance, are properties (of objects), the rela- 
tions between which are the relations between numbers; similarly, beliefs and desires are 
properties (of persons), the relations between which are the relations between propositions. 
And just as the one set of relations can be handled with the calculus of numbers (ie. arith- 
metic), so the other can be handled with the calculus of propositions (ie. logic). It's hard 
to assess just how far the analogy can be pushed, but it is, at least, a clear presupposition 
of this system that only rational beings can be accounted for within it, since only such are 
likely to conform to the relevant logical laws. Irrational, illogical beings would present 
problems for folk psychology at least as great as those presented to classical physics by the 
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discovery of what happens to the mass/acceleration relationship at velocities near to that of 
light, and require at least a substantial overhaul and complexification of the entire theory. 
It is thus common ground to the collection of views just mentioned, that an assump- 
tion of rationality is central to our interpretation of our fellows' utterances, our ability to 
make any sense even of their non-verbal behaviour, and ultimately our ability to see them 
as persons at all. The notion of a person is essentially that of a rational being. If Dennett 
(1982a) is right, we need this assumption even to make sense of ourselves, introspectively. 
It would seem that there could be scarcely a better ground than the correctness of these 
arguments, for supposing there to be some basic incoherence in the claims of those 
psychologists who impugn our rationality. 
5.3 Arguments Against Necessary Rationality. 
In these circumstances, it is only to be expected that the psychologists referred to, 
and their philosophical apologists, should mount an attack upon the preceding arguments. 
I want to consider, in particular, (i) two attacks on Goodman's reflective-equilibrium 
theory, and then (ii) an attack on the Quine-Davidson position. After that, we shall have 
the issues in perspective, and be able to hold an informed discussion. 
(i) Attacks on Reflective Equilibrium 
(a) Stich and Nisbett 
Stich and Nisbett (1980) take as their starting point the quotation from Goodman 
offered at the beginning of this chapter. Their attack hinges on the claim that Goodman 
makes tacit assumptions about the ways in which people infer, and that these assumptions 
are empirical and false (189). They cast the argument primarily in terms of induction and 
inductive inference, largely because that is the kind of literature in which they find the evi- 
dence to use against Goodman's alleged assumptions; but they might equally well have 
spoken in terms of deduction all along. The problem is, anyway, similar in both cases, and 
the evidence similarly suggestive. Essentially, they claim, one finds that the rules and 
inferences which are in fact in reflective equilibrium, are often just the wrong ones. 
Goodman's account, applied to the psychologists' discovered facts, shows all sorts of 
clearly invalid principles to be fully justified. Stich and Nisbett provide three examples of 
fallacies which, they hold, are so entrenched in practice that Goodman would have to allow 
them. 
The `Gambler's Fallacy' is exemplified by the belief that, if a (fair) die is rolled a 
large number of times without a particular face turning up, then the probability of that 
face's turning up on the next roll increases the longer this goes on. In fact, probability 
theory tells us, the face in question will always have a one-sixth probability of appearing; 
but people not only fail to realise this in practice, they have even been known reflectively 
to endorse the fallacy. Stich and Nisbett adduce a telling quotation from Professor Henry 
Coppee's Elements of Logic (1874), in which the fallacy is committed. 
The second case is the lack of grasp of the notion of statistical regression to the 
mean, as exibited by a large range of subjects (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). When 
asked about their procedure, subjects offer a rule which has nothing to do with regression 
(Nisbett and Ross 1980), and 'their non-regressive rule is in reflective equilibrium with 
their actual inductive practice. So for Goodman, both their rule and their individual infer- 
ences are justified.' (Stich and Nisbett, op. cit. 194.) 
Thirdly, erroneous analysis of covariation is considered, as in, eg, Smedslund's 
(1963) well-known study. People seem typically both to reason in accordance with, and 
apparently actually to endorse, the obviously defective rule: 
If the presence of A ... is often followed by the presence of B ... then the 
chance of B occurring is greater when A has occurred than when A has not 
occurred (Stich and Nisbett, op. cit. 195). 
This operates, for instance, to the enormous potential benefit of quack doctors; 'often', in 
the above quotation, may mean 'more often that not', but this is regardless of the relative 
number of instances observed in which A is present and absent: people also just seem to 
leave out of account cases where not-A is followed by B, and the other combinations. In 
inference research generally, 
the picture that emerges...is hardly a flattering one. Subjects frequently and sys- 
tematically invoke inference patterns ranging from the merely invalid to the 
bizarre. And, though the evidence is less substantial on this point, there is 
every reason to think that many of these patterns are in reflective equilibrium 
(loc. cit.). 
Stich and Nisbett go on to consider two possible defences that a Goodmanian might offer. 
Firstly, they suggest (in effect) that perhaps these errors are all due to various kinds of 
cognitive illusions. In that case, rational subjects can be educated into a better reflective 
equilibrium, which is more 'stable'. The problem with this is that there is little reason to 
suppose better reflective equilibria to be the only stable ones (even, they would presumably 
add, in what Cohen calls 'ideal conditions'). 
While it is quite true that subjects can often be gotten to reject invalid rules they 
had previously accepted, it is also true that they can be gotten to accept invalid 
rules they had previously rejected (196). 
Research to prove this has not been conducted in detail, 'for obvious moral reasons'. 
However, it would surely be churlish to deny Stich and Nisbett their point that 'there is no 
reason to think that this more stringent reflective process would have a unique outcome for 
a given subject' (197). What is less clear is whether Goodman would or should be 
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impressed by this: most likely, he envisaged his 'agreement' as being a rather general one, 
holding throughout a society or culture, and surely not without many individual exceptions. 
(Perhaps Goodman's alleged neglect of the 'social component' of justification (189) is 
more a consequence of his almost cryptic brevity, than anything else.) 
The second defence is 'digging in'. Suppose the Goodmanian were to insist that 
rules in reflective equilibrium for a given subject are thereby justified for that subject. But 
not for others, and certainly not for us. If the idea just attributed to Goodman about cul- 
tural nouns is correct, then no supporter of his will actually offer this defence; in any 
event, Stich and Nisbett seem right to reject it as 'bizarre' (198). However, their reason - 
that it falls short of capturing our intuitive idea of what it means to say an inferential prin- 
ciple is justified - is weak, and calls for clarification. We shall return to it. 
Stich and Nisbett follow up their critique with some positive suggestions. The notion 
of 'epistemic authorities' is adduced: these are just those in society who are acknowledged 
'experts' on the subject in question. The suggestion is that deference to such experts is 
both rational and normatively indicated. 
The man who persists in believing that his theorem is valid, despite the dissent 
of leading mathematicians, is a fool. The man who acts on his belief that a 
treatment, disparaged by medical experts, will cure his child's leukemia, is 
worse than a fool (199). 
Well, perhaps. Usually. (As a matter of interest, Roget juxtaposes 'disparage' with 'under- 
rate'!) Anyway, might Goodman really have meant that rules, to be justified, should be in 
reflective equilibrium for the experts? Stich and Nisbett think this an unreasonably charit- 
able reading of him; but they think he would still be wrong, even if it were right. The 
trouble is, they say, that one is not contradicting oneself if one holds both that a principle 
is justified and that the relevant authorities deny it (or the reverse, presumably: Henry 
Coppee, pilloried above, was no doubt an 'expert' in his own time). And this, surely, can- 
not be gainsaid. The 'expert reflective equilibrium' is accordingly weakened - Stich and 
Nisbett present the following analysis of 'Rule r is justified': 
Rule r accords with the reflective inferential practice of the (person or) group of 
people I (the speaker) think appropriate (201). 
There are no restrictions offered on the possible composition of this group. I may unila- 
terally constitute anyone an epistemic authority. Sanity prevails, nay exists, only because 
.most people are cognitive conservatives most of the time' (loc. cit.). 
This view is admittedly 'a bit radical'. Worse, there seems strikingly little, in point 
of its capturing any intuitions. to distinguish it from the 'digging in' strategy withheld from 
Goodman's hypothetical apologist. It is scarcely any less bizarre. Moreover, as pointed 
out by Conee and Feldman (1983), it seems still to entail, counterintuitively, that certain 
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statements are self-contradictory. Consider 
This rule is justified, but it is not in accordance with anyone's reflective inferen- 
tial practice (Conee and Feldman, op. cit. 330) 
Stich and Nisbett's formula renders this incoherent, but it is surely not so. In fact, their 
own formula evades any of their objections to Goodman's, only if the experimental sub- 
jects referred to are 'cognitive conservatives', since otherwise their rules and strategies may 
indeed be justified. But this consequence is intuitively absurd if anything is, and the 
assumption (though plausible) is anyway unsupported by any offered evidence. The thesis 
that the subjects are in any way irrational, or that their practices are in any way unjustified 
or 'invalid' (earlier taken entirely for granted), thus depends, on Stich and Nisbett's own 
final account no less than Goodman's, on empirical assumptions, which are neither made 
fully explicit nor defended. 
Despite its ultimate collapse into obscure self-refutation, Stich and Nisbett's paper 
raises some interesting points, its very failure to illuminate them highlighting their interest. 
Chief among these is the question: what is justification? Where is the role of reflection 
and adjustment, if the statement quoted above from Conee and Feldman makes sense? 
One response worth considering is that of Paul Thagard (1982): reflective equilibrium has 
no role; it is 'redundant', 'at best incidental'. 
(b) Thagard 
Thagard seeks 'a methodology for revising normative (prescriptive) logical principles 
in the light of descriptive psychological findings' (25). This, he considers against the 
background of two existing descriptive-to-normative methodologies: historical philosophy 
of science (BPS), and the theory of 'wide reflective equilibrium' (WRE) in ethics (see 
Daniels 1979). Neither of these will do, he contends, for the case of logic. 
Thagard's characterisation of HPS depicts it as frequently re-running a loop between 
'case studies' and 'methodological principles' observed to be upheld in these cases, which 
process finally eventuates in the production of 'normative models' (27-8). These models 
are then tested against other case-studies, and so forth. The objection to an HPS-style 
approach turns on the 'expert' status of the exemplary scientists there considered (eg. 
Darwin and Newton). Thagard draws an interesting distinction, here, between two sorts of 
experts: 'those who are expert at performing a task, and those who are expert about expli- 
citly saying how a task should be done' (32). These do not necessarily coincide; we do 
not have a clear set of experts in logical practice, independent of their pronouncements. 
(This relates interestingly to the reflective/unreflective distinction discussed in chapter 2.) 
The intended analogy is with scientists: we should look at what they do, not what they say 
they do, since the latter may be ideologically contaminated (as may the former, no doubt, 
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but perhaps less or differently so). The problem, for Thagard, is that the practices of logi- 
cians (and statisticians, high-level managers and other inferential paragons) are always 
'severely infected by philosophical views' (33). There are meta-level debates (such as the 
classicism/intuitionism dispute or the Pascalian/Baconian problem) which completely condi- 
tion the inferential behaviour of the disputing factions. Universally valid 'case studies' 
cannot be found. 
The problem is even worse, in a way which Thagard does not mention, when one 
tries to apply any of this to the question of everyday inference. We do not assume, Tha- 
gard supposes, that Tversky and Kahneman's subjects 'know what they are doing'; he 
thinks that 'instruction in statistics can be expected to change their behaviour in desirable 
ways' (32). But this is far from clearly the case. Their behaviour would improve insofar 
as they became statisticians, but they might remain no better off qua everyday reasoners. 
There is no lack of evidence (see Einhom and Hogarth 1981; Nisbett and Ross 1980; 
Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972) suggesting that some of the best reasoners, qua statisti- 
cians or mathematicians, will yet perform poorly qua everyday reasoners, if unsuspectingly 
given a problem to solve in informal circumstances. 
This may be a reason for supposing cognitive illusions to be even more pervasive 
than seems to have been feared. On the other hand, expert everyday reasoners - if there 
are any - may neither be, nor especially easily become, good formal reasoners. The most 
effective ways of 'improving' people's everyday reasoning might be by some method radi- 
cally other than training in the use of any kind of formal rule system. Teachers of second 
languages are frequently heard to say that it's better to absorb a language through concen- 
trated exposure, rather than attempting to learn its grammar, and this applies also to learn- 
ing improved writing skills, etc., in one's own language (Lindemann, 1982). The case is 
no different with logical argument. A good paradigm of cogent, rigorous, yet informal 
argumentation, is the sort of thing philosophy students are asked to produce. Anyone fam- 
iliar with such students knows that their production of these arguments is often in no way 
improved by successful completion of courses in formal logic, and further that the best for- 
malists are commonly a quite distinct set from the best arguers in discourse. 
This is related to a point made by Cohen (1981 op. cit.; but see also 1979) in which 
he postulates that there is a 'characteristic indeterminacy' (Cohen 1981: 323, 328) in the 
experiments of the psychological investigator when the precise nature of the task has been 
made sufficiently clear to the subject, for one to be able accurately to characterise what the 
subject is doing, one has thereby 'trained' the subject to an extent where one is no longer 
investigating his capacities as an everyday reasoner, but rather as an 'expert' reasoner of 
some kind. For instance, Cohen maintains that those who commit the Gambler's Fallacy 
might really be considering the probability, say at the nth toss of a fair coin, of having at 
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least one tails outcome within any space that consists of n outcomes - and this does indeed 
increase with increasing n. Eliminating this possibility entails descnbing the one in which 
you are interested, in such detail that error becomes unlikely, or at least has very different 
implications. (It has become a case of what in chapter 2 was called reflective reasoning, 
whereas previously it was unreflective.) By the time you have made sure you know what 
the subject is doing, he's probably doing something different; even if he isn't, I would add, 
he may well be doing the same thing in a very different way. The problem which Thagard 
has omitted to deal with here, is that one might want to postulate different competence 
theories for expert and non-expert reasoning (as suggested in the last chapter); and to the 
extent that one does, the practices of expert reasoners, qua experts, are strictly irrelevant to 
the latter case. This is not, of course, to detract from his point about the difficulty of 
finding suitable case studies: there are certainly few enough candidates in the literature on 
everyday reasoning, and on Cohen's view it would be hard to know what to make of them 
anyway. 
Thagard's view of WRE consists of a loop, similar to the HPS loop, between 'partic- 
ular moral judgements' and 'ethical principles', the running of which is however strongly 
conditioned by reference to some set of 'background theories', especially concerning 
psychological limitations ('ought' implies 'can', so knowledge of this kind may be crucial). 
The invocation of these background theories is what makes the RE wide rather than merely 
narrow (Goodman's RE is a narrow one). 'Normative principles are outputs from the sys- 
tem only after repeated adjustments of moral judgements and principles in the light of 
background theories have been made' (Thagard, op. cit., 31). He says that 'unlike HPS, 
WRE is similar to the psychology/logic problem in that there are no case studies or partic- 
ular moral judgements with assumed prior validity', (34), and holds that, because of this, 
the justification of ethical principles is comparatively shaky. Some evidence of 'progress' 
would be required to make a compelling foundation. However, there are said to be attrac- 
tive similarities between this model and what is required in the logical case. Background 
information or theory is essential in the latter also, Thagard holds, and what we therefore 
require is a wide rather than a narrow equilibrium. We need to know (a) what humans are 
capable of (since 'ought implies can' holds also in the logical sphere - cf. Goldman 1978), 
and (b) what are the 'goals' of the behaviour. These include achieving true beliefs and 
avoiding false ones, but also achieving explanations and holistically coherent belief sys- 
tems. Practical aims are important, and may dictate a cost/benefit trade-off in terms of 
rigour against psychological simplicity (cf. here the remarks of Dennett 1981a about our 
'satisficing' rationality, and Thagard's reference to March 1978). But this is not enough, 
Thagard says: we have, in the case of logic, to take into account a set of background 
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philosophical theories, and this is something over and above ordinary, ethical WRE (35). 
It is unclear, at this point, why WRE might not include these, but for our purposes this is 
an unimportant quibble. What is important is the theory Thagard offers us, and he partially 
defends this by rebutting Cohen's (1981 op. cit.) claim that the reflective equilibrium 
involved here is and should be only narrow. 
Thagard says that Cohen asserts this `without argument', but this is unfair. It is true, 
though, that the argument is unclear, and perhaps unconvincing. It depends, in fact, on the 
remarks, considered above, about the alleged indeterminacy in inferential psychological 
investigations. The argument is that if we are interested in discovering the competence of 
untrained people, they are who we have to examine. But any kind of scientific or 
mathematical reasoning, to which there applied `nonnative criteria that were the product of 
philosophical argument for some appropriately wide reflective equilibrium', could be han- 
dled by subjects `only to the extent that these subjects were not ordinary people but spe- 
cially trained experts' (Cohen, op. cit. 322-3). 
Though a person may well acquire a wide reflective equilibrium with regard to 
ethical theories that is inconsistent with a previously existing narrow reflective 
equilibrium, there is no possibility of an analogous inconsistency with regard to 
deducibility or probability. In the case of deducibility, narrow reflective equili- 
brium remains the ultimate framework of argument about the merits of other 
deductive systems ... (loc. cit.) 
The motivation for Cohen's distinction here, between ethics and logic, is not obvious. But 
in any event, he has to be taken as saying that, in the latter case, the emergence of the 
relevant kind of `inconsistency' is possible only insofar as the subject has now become a 
logical expert. And Cohen has claimed already that the systems constructed by such 
experts are worthless either as competence theories or normative theories, for everyday rea- 
soning, if not shown compatible with the intuitions of ordinary folk. Hence, this kind of 
inconsistency would show nothing about such folk's irrationality; indeed, Cohen seems 
committed to saying, it would reflect poorly on the adequacy of the expert's system. 
Thagard's response to this is to insist that the normative force, central to logical as 
opposed to linguistic competence theories, is such as to require at least WRE for its foun- 
dation. Further, the philosophical issues involved in elucidating the notion of improvement 
in logical practice are such as to go beyond even this. We shall return later to the theme 
of the analogy between logical and linguistic competence, and in particular the alleged 
disanalogy in point of normativity. 
Thagard offers a model for resolving normative disputes, called FPL (`from psychol- 
ogy to logic'), which is as follows: 
(1) We do empirical studies to describe inferential behavior. 
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(2) We generate sets of logical principles which explain and justify that inferential 
behavior. 
(3) When inferential behavior deviates from logical norms, we consider whether 
new norms are needed or whether we can just revise inferential behavior to 
bring it in line with existing norms. 
(4) This consideration is based on an attempt to develop a maximally coherent set 
of beliefs about peoples' actual behaviour, their optimal behaviour given their 
cognitive limitations and the goals of inferential behaviour, and background phi- 
losophical issues. 
(5) The logical principles among the maximally coherent set of beliefs are then 
deemed to be justified. 
A caveat is that this way of laying it out conceals the point that there is a loop between 
'inferential practice' and 'logical principles', run repeatedly but in the light of the back- 
ground theories and goals (36-7). As Thagard observes, we now require, with regard to 
step 4, 'an account of how to evaluate coherence among practice, principles, goals and 
background theories'. The existence of a set of criteria for doing this, the claim goes, 
'renders any discussion of reflective equilibrium redundant' (loc. cit). Thagard proposes 
three main criteria: robustness ('a system is robust if its normative principles account for 
inferential practice in a wide range of situations'), accommodation ('we can accomodate 
[deviant] behaviour by using background psychological theory to explain why in some 
cases people deviate from the system's logical norms') and efficacy ('the extent to which 
the principles and practices of a system lead to satisfaction of the relevant inferential 
goals'). 
An 'inferential system', Thagard says, is a matrix of four elements: nonnative princi- 
ples, descriptions of inferential practice, inferential goals, background psychological and 
philosophical theories - schematically, 
S = <NP, IP, G, T>. 
Thagard then maintains that 
In a given domain, we can assume that T and G will be common to competing 
systems, and this gives us some hope of reaching an objective conclusion that 
one system is more coherent than the other. In particular, comparison of the 
efficacy of the two systems may enable us to make choice of systems more than 
a matter of purely internal coherence. Choice will obviously be highly complex 
and non-algorithmic, but nevertheless may be determinate and objective (38). 
in a given domain...': here we need to know (but are not told) what is meant by a 
'domain', since otherwise it is unclear why the stated assumption is unassailable. For 
instance, it is rather far from evident that T and G are or should be the same for systems 
characterising the inferences of everyday reasoners, on the one hand, and those of various 
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kinds of experts, on the other. Are these, then, different domains? If so, what are the 
consequences for those who would impugn the rationality (in the sense of normative- 
system adherence) of the everyday reasoner? In particular, does a theory have to be 
`robust' only relative to a domain? Thagard obviously supposes, when FPL is originally 
defined, that T and G are universal; that there just are certain essential goals, and perhaps 
also psychological theories, underlying all inference and inferential behaviour: but the first 
of these ideas is unargued, and the second flies in the face of several psychological obser- 
vations, as noted above and in chapter 2. One suspects that in fact the notion of a domain 
is intended to be nothing more significant than the distinction between deduction and 
induction or decision theory: even here, though, the characterisation and delimitation of 
domains may be tendentious - Thagard does not go into it. How many domains are there? 
How do we decide? 
Given his account, Thagard argues, the notion of reflective equilibrium has no work 
left to do. Stich and Nisbett (op. cit.) are cited as evidence that `resoundingly non- 
efficacious' inferential systems may be sanctioned by it, including such errors as the 
Gambler's Fallacy. But is this particular fallacy (at least) really 'non-efficacious'? (Cf. 
Cohen 1981 op. cit. 328). The answer is less than apparent because of the implicit feature 
of Thagard's model, that efficacy is relative to G, the inferential goals of the reasoner. 
These goals are at best vaguely specified, and it seems that they may hold only over a 
specific domain. Hence, it may be that domains exist in which the goals of the reasoners 
are such as to render the gamblers' fallacy (for instance) wholly efficacious and thus 
justified. It does not help to say that 
the justification of a set of normative principles is based, not on the reflective 
equilibrium of any individual or group, but on the place of the principles in a 
defensible inferential system. Defense is based on arguments that the system is 
coherent according to the criteria discussed above (39). 
It does not help because the smuggling in, in a crucial phrase, of the notion of a domain, 
leaves open the possibility that Thagard's model is also constrained to relativise its charac- 
terisation of coherence to the practices of an individual or group, with the unwelcome 
result that, lacking arguments for the near-universality of T and G, its promise of greater 
`objectivity' is somewhat diluted. The analogue to the question 'whose reflective equili- 
brium?' is the question 'whose goals, and the theories of the psychology of whose reason- 
ing?'. No argument backs Thagard's assertion that `education in sophisticated inferential 
techniques can be expected to provide the individual with a much more efficacious system' 
(loc. cit.), and such argument would have to show that these techniques would be more 
efficacious, given (a) the individual's goals, and (b) the nature of his inferential psychol- 
ogy, particularly the constraints operating in the circumstances of his typical inferential per- 
formances (since Thagard has said: 
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Efficacy also should take into account what background psychological theories 
tell us about how easily principles will be applicable given human information 
processing mechanisms (38) 
- and we are surely at liberty to suppose this will not be constant over different domains 
and circumstances). Thagard falls foul of the same problem when he follows Stich and 
Nisbett and urges us to take the advice of experts, saying that they are more likely to have 
highly coherent inference systems (40): this depends on his claim that experts are more 
familiar with the elements in the matrix than are ordinary people, but in fact the back- 
ground theories are as yet in an infant state and we have no persuasive characterisation of 
most everyday inferential goals. What is most crucially lacking, in fact, is some account 
of what inferential goals there are or might be, and indeed ought to be, which is something 
we shall presently be investigating. 
These, then, are the attacks on reflective equilibrium. Let us tum now to the matter 
of the Quine-Davidson argument for the necessary rationality of all people. 
(ii) An Attack on Charity 
Thagard and Nisbett (1983) present an attack, most generally, on all theories which 
entail a strong 'principle of charity', that is, theories which insist that without overwhelm- 
ing evidence to the contrary we should not suppose anyone to be less than wholly rational. 
The position of those influenced by Quine and Davidson is an extreme example of such a 
theory, seeming to indicate that we cannot suppose someone to be less than wholly 
rational, at least while continuing to make any sense of him at all. The strategy of this 
attack is to show that a moderate principle of charity is acceptable, which however leaves 
room for empirically justified judgments of irrationality. 
To begin, rational behaviour is defined as 'what people should do given an optimal 
set of inferential rules' (Thagard and Nisbett 1983 251). It needs to be noted that these 
rules are not immutable, but subject to change and revision: however, to be irrational is to 
violate 'the principles that we currently, objectively, hold'. Given this, the most general 
principle of charity is: Avoid interpreting people as violating normative standards. But this 
is too vague, so Thagard and Nisbett propose the following five different levels of 
stringency in such principles: 
(1) Do not assume a priori that people are irrational. 
(2) Do not give any special prior favour to the interpretation that people are irra- 
tional. 
(3) Do not judge people to be irrational unless you have an empirically justified 
account of what they are doing when they violate normative standards. 
(4) Interpret people as irrational only given overwhelming evidence. 
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(5) Never interpret people as irrational. 
The proposal is that level (3) is the correct level for principles of charity as canons of 
social science methodology. 
In criticism of Quine, Thagard and Nisbett quote some of those passages from Word 
and Object (Quine 1960) which were offered in section 5.2 above, and suggest that these 
indicate a level (5) principle of charity for translation. Suppose though, they ask, that a 
native were to assent and dissent in most cases, in such a fashion as to establish plausible 
translations of logical words such as `not' and `and', but then, in isolated cases, apparently 
assented to blatant contradictions? Would we not have either to abandon our translation, 
or to admit an inconsistency here? Quine, they say, urges the first option, but surely the 
second makes more sense (253). At this point, one is tempted to go along with Thagard 
and Nisbett. It seems clearly absurd to abandon one's hard-won translation in such a case; 
and indeed a sensible procedure is, one would have thought, to keep the translation only 
unless and until the frequency of deviations becomes such that an alteration will lead to a 
simpler system overall. Quine is sensitive to this, however, and as we noted above really 
suggests that where we have (on our established translation) a prima facie contradiction, 
we need only alter the translation (qua theory) if no special story can be told about this 
particular isolated case. But, of course, usually (as in the `Yes and no' example) a special 
story can be told, and telling it is a manifestation of charity. Thagard and Nisbett seem on 
stronger ground, though, in citing Kekes' (1976) ideas about the asymmetric notion of 
identity apparent in the religion of the Nuer, as described by Evans-Pritchard. It is prob- 
ably true that 
[u]nderstanding illogical beliefs requires a much larger battery of hermeneutic 
techniques than Quine's behavioristic reliance on criteria of assent and dissent 
(loc. cit.) 
but we must beware of excessive glibness in talk of `illogical beliefs', and be alert to the 
consequences of talking of them at all. Thagard and Nisbett's idea, anyway, is that 
apparently incoherent practices or concepts can have a `social role', and that `because 
language can have functions other than communication of truths, translation cannot always 
be charitable' (254). One cannot deny that in many ritual practices, as well as much per- 
fectly ordinary poetry, contradictions may abound. But this is unimportant, it seems to me, 
since the laws of logic, the breaking of which is here supposed to constitute irrationality, 
lose their normative force (if not their very application) in such circumstances. Logic is 
concerned primarily with the communication of truths (or at least the treatment of proposi- 
tions stated as such), and is elsewhere of doubtful relevance. It is at the lowest estimate 
tendentious to suggest that it is irrational to break logical laws in non-literal language of 
the sorts in question. It is not, therefore, an argument against charity to point these out. 
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Still less is it an argument against Quine since, as I read him, he is saying nothing about 
any language uses that are at all metaphorical. Hence, when Thagard and Nisbett say 
The argument against level (4) and (5) principles of charity is that we can gain 
such a thorough knowledge of a subject's language through study of those other 
aspects [of his thought - eg. at other levels of generality] that, when faced with 
an apparently contradictory utterance, we should construe it as contradictory 
rather than revise our well-established translations 
the response is that perhaps we should construe it as figurative, or else as a symptom of 
confusion or misunderstanding, in which case the actual existence of a contradiction is not 
indicative of irrationality. Quine may be regarded as assuming that the subject's assenting 
etc. can be known to be free of such problems while the translation is being produced: 
indeed, he says that in cases, eg. of conjunction with long components, 'the subject may 
get mixed up' (Quine op. cit., 58), and so limits his account to short components. Presum- 
ably, Quine's point is that translation has to start in cases where assent and dissent can be 
regarded as genuine and sincere, cases where the subject is being related explicitly with his 
environment and statements about the latter are being made and evaluated for truth. If 
rationality has to be assumed here, it can hardly be dropped with impunity later on. 
Thagard and Nisbett follow up these anthropological musings with the problem of 
Hegel. Hegel apparently challenges the principle of contradiction, but to understand this 
'we need a full account ... of his complex notions of dialectical negation and contradic- 
tion' (255). The suggestion is that despite this he can only be understood and translated as 
violating that principle, which 'is not to be 'uncharitable', but merely to take him seriously 
as a complex and iconoclastic thinker'. Perhaps so, but it is not to regard him as irrational 
either. A strain is developing between Thagard and Nisbett's argument against principles 
of charity concerning the breaking of logical rules, and against those concerning irrational- 
ity. Maybe, contra hypothesi, irrationality is not thus to be defined. In any event, this 
quotation from Quine seems to provide a response to the argument about Hegel: 
Consider the familiar remark that even the most audacious system-builder is 
bound by the law of contradiction. How is he really bound? If he were to 
accept contradiction, he would so readjust his logical laws as to insure distinc- 
tions of some sort; for the classical laws yield all sentences as consequences of 
any contradiction. But then we would proceed to reconstrue his heroically 
novel logic as a non-contradictory logic, perhaps even as familiar logic, in per- 
verse notation (Quine op. cit. 59). 
Hegel's 'complex notions of ... contradiction' are surely such as to insure distinctions of 
some sort: and it therefore seems likely that Quine's way out will apply. If it doesn't, 
then perhaps Hegel is irrational, and his thought complex to the point of insanity. (The 
other feature to notice about this quotation is the implication that Quine is prepared to 
accept that the system builder be bound by an unfamiliar, although necessarily 'non- 
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contradictory', logic. This is a point that will loom large later.) 
The strain referred to in the last paragraph becomes severe at the end of Thagard and 
Nisbett's section on translation. They offer the following conclusions: 
Behind the translational principle of charity is the assumption that the primary 
function of language is usually communication ... But in many contexts, from 
Zen to cultural rituals, language can be used for social or other ends. Mainte- 
nance of principles of logic may be irrelevant to such ends. 
Hence translation of the utterances of people of other cultures and philosophies 
may well require that we understand them as violating our principles of logic, 
of rationality (Thagard and Nisbett, loc. cit.). 
The assumption at the beginning, here, seems to be that language can be used sensibly and 
rationally for other ends, and logic is irrelevant to this. Translation of the utterances in 
question depends, not on finding that people are violating logical principles, but rather on 
finding that logical principles simply do not apply to their utterances. They are not stating 
facts; we are not in the position of having to ascribe to them inconsistent beliefs; they in 
fact are not appearing to be in any way irrational. So far from arguing that people need 
not be seen as rational, Thagard and Nisbett have really argued for the conclusion that 
rationality is not to be determined by `maintenance of principles of logic', at least in cir- 
cumstances where the expressing of truths is not in question. This may be unQuinean 
(especially without that final caveat), but it is not their advertised aim. 
Attention is next turned to the cognitive psychologists' information-processing 
account of the derivation of new beliefs from old, which is nearer our central concerns. In 
a rationally organised system, one supposes, this proceeds in accord with logical laws con- 
necting the contents of the beliefs. Is logic 'hard-wired' into us? Must it be? This, they 
say, is particularly implausible in the case of inductive principles - which is not surprising 
given that `statisticians have grave disputes about the foundations of their work' (Thagani 
1982 op. cit. 33), and thus that we don't really know what these principles are. It is also 
no news, despite the continuing effort apparently directed at proving it, that `people make 
inferential errors', and that they `are not fully rational in that their inferences fall short of 
the best available normative standards' (Thagard and Nisbett op. cit. 257). Performance 
has always been known to be imperfect by these standards, which is the commonsense 
basis of much advertising practice, and the like, but surely mere error has to be dis- 
tinguished from irrationality, of which it may or may not be a symptom. These facts, 
though, are now employed in an attack on Dennett's claim that any intentional system must 
be rational (which Dennett now insists is not the claim that such systems `must be sup- 
posed to follow the rules of logic' - Dennett 1982a). There is a substantial problem here, 
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it has to be admitted, but treatment of it will be deferred until after the current exposition, 
since some further literature will be dragged in. Let us now merely note that Thagard and 
Nisbett are probably right to assert that 
There is no reason . . . why it should not be possible to determine empirically 
that a system is regularly using some inferential principle or heuristic that 
departs from standard logical principles, then to use the operation of this heuris- 
tic as part of an explanation of the system's behavior (loc. cit.) 
- the question is to what extent this falsifies Dennett's claims, and the answer to be offered 
will be that even to formulate this sort of account itself crucially depends on a rationality 
assumption (much as the attribution of inconsistency in discourse depends on a translation 
based on charitable assumptions). 
Dennett is joined by Davidson in Thagard and Nisbett's target area, when the point is 
noted that both these writers urge not only that inferences are rational, but that in general 
beliefs are true. Davidson says, we must count others `right in most matters', which is 
characterised as 'an astoundingly strong kind of charitable principle' (Thagard and Nisbett 
260). Now, of course, we all know that everyone has a large number of false beliefs. 
This is not at issue; rather, the question must be when, and in what circumstances, we are 
entitled to ascribe these. What Davidson and Dennett are both suggesting is that the 
ascription of each false belief must be embedded in a web of true beliefs, or at least beliefs 
shared with the ascriber, or else the system would be too incoherent to avoid collapse. 
The context of Davidson's remark (elided from the quotation in section 5.2) is: 
Until we have successfully established a systematic correlation of sentences held 
true with sentences held true, there are no mistakes to make. Charity is forced 
on us ... we must count [others] right in most matters (Davidson 1973/4 19) 
and his point is that we must seek to `maximise agreement' - the process of interpretation 
or translation depends on these assumptions - and only then will meaningful disagreement 
be possible. But Davidson also says we must do this 
subject to considerations of simplicity, hunches about the effects of social con- 
ditioning, and of course our common sense, or scientific, knowledge of explica- 
ble error (loc. cit) 
which seems to be precisely what Thagard and Nisbett are calling for! 
In their conclusion, Thagard and Nisbett reiterate their central claim, which is that 
`whether people's behavior diverges from normative standards is an empirical question'. 
They seem satisfactorily to have shown that people's behaviour certainly diverges from 
some normative standards (although, as Cohen suggests, perhaps sometimes irrelevant 
ones), but then we knew this anyway. The important question is what this shows about 
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people's rationality. One is inclined to suppose that (a) people may (and often do) diverge 
from normative principles for mundane reasons to do with confusion and forgetfulness - ie. 
these are errors of performance rather than competence - and that (b) since logical princi- 
ples are revisable (as Thagard and Nisbett insist), people may sometimes be diverging from 
them quite rationally. Surely it is not irrational to forget, or to act on principles into 
which presently accepted canons are destined to be revised. Thagard and Nisbett do not 
seem to have made it clear that 'strong principles of charity are indeed hindrances to 
understanding human behavior' (264). Nor are they 'socially undesirable': it is just false 
that 
the assumption that people must be fundamentally rational blocks the possibility 
of systematic education to eliminate the gap between behavior and normative 
standards 
- indeed, it is not evident that systematic education should succeed if people were not 
rational. It is certain, at least, that the 'gap' in question might both exist and be closable 
on any commonplace account in which competent reasoners err because of (in educated 
practice controllable) performance factors. 
Thagard and Nisbett's parting shot is plausible only because of their erroneous 
conflation of rationality with adherence to a particular set of normative principles: they 
suggest that strong principles of charity will hinder the development of new normative 
principles. This cannot be, if these new principles are to be decided in the light of what is 
rational, and if charity is about rationality. The worthwhile point to be taken here is that 
this danger will arise, if rationality is shortsightedly equated with current logic: and we are 
forewarned accordingly. 
This concludes the advertised survey of attacks on the two ways of presenting the 
notion of man's essential rationality. None of these attacks was seen to be wholly con- 
vincing, and in the role of advocate for Quine and Davidson, we might (almost) expect to 
see concerted opposition collapse. This would be premature, however. perhaps something 
can be salvaged from the debris which will illuminate the central problems here. What 
seems to be indicated is a deeper analysis of the positions assailed, in the light of the 
pointers provided by the critics. 
5.4 Summary 
In this rather long chapter, we have begun to look into the question of the relation- 
ship between logic and rationality in psychology. Ultimately, the aim is to uncover the 
way in which, as I have claimed, logic and psychology come to be in a position of mutual 
determination and justification. This aim will be further pursued in the following chapter, 
but so far we have examined some of the issues raised in previous discussions in the 
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literature. 
We pointed to Goodman's introduction of reflective equilibrium, and followed this up 
with descriptions of the work of Cohen and some of his critics. We considered also the 
view, inspired by Quine, that the assumption of rationality is a central pillar of the network 
of concepts often referred to as 'folk psychology', especially the language of intentional 
states and their attribution, including the problem of radical translation. Some arguments 
were then investigated, that purport to show the inappropriateness of these ideas. Stich and 
Nisbett's critique of reflective equilibrium was seen to be defective, but still suggestive that 
something is wrong with a simplistic approach to it; we therefore investigated Thagard's 
attempt to replace it with a more complex system. The view was taken that this develops a 
useful framework, but one marred by an over-eager acceptance of the idea that ordinary 
reasoning should be assessed by the standards of 'expert' reasoning, that stems from a 
failure to follow up its own pointers to the importance of the domain and the set of 
inferential goals, with respect to which the reasoner is operating. 
It was claimed that Thagard and Nisbett's efforts to reduce the significance of the 
Quine-Davidson view on 'charity' fail, on account of confusions between error and irra- 
tionality, between departing from logical principles and using language to which they are 
irrelevant, and in general between current logical principles and rationality. The arguments 
seemed not to appreciate the weight of Dennett's and Davidson's claim that attribution of 
false beliefs depends on a background of a shared system of beliefs held true. The task of 
the next chapter is accordingly to explore these ideas further, with particular reference to 
the role of rationality in relation to the idea of competence. 
6 
Rationality Reconsidered 
To recapitulate: a crucial question before us is, what is the relationship between 
characterising a piece of behaviour as `incompetent' according to some cognitive psycho- 
logical theory, and characterising it normatively as `wrong'? We have seen that there is 
generally supposed to be a relationship between competence theories for reasoning, and 
`logic': more often than not, it is taken a priori to be the case that this relationship is iden- 
tity. It is also often regarded as uncontroversial that some mainstream notion of logic - 
predicate calculus, or (as frequently in the case of syllogistic reasoning) some more or less 
Aristotelian theory - encapsulates the canons of 'correct' inference, departures from which 
are ipso facto `wrong'. However, the concluding criticism, just offered, of Thagard and 
Nisbett, indicates that this is too hasty a way with the problem. Contemporary theories in 
which logic is seen as subject to reform and progress, rather than as a collection of eternal 
truths, clearly point to some higher court of appeal on the matter of correctness. This, I 
am suggesting, is the court of rationality: the correct is the maximally rational, and the 
justification of a logical system depends on maintaining that its recommendations are 
everywhere rational. Here, we suppose that on accounts such as Goodman's, or Thagard's, 
strategies like the search for reflective equilibrium, or the increasing of coherence and 
efficacy, are just suggestions as to how best the rationality of a system is to be maximised. 
The response to the opening question then is that lapses from theoretically 'com- 
petent' behaviour are `wrong' if and only if they are seen also to be lapses from rational- 
ity. The traditional type of account is therefore right just insofar as the psychological 
theory at issue includes an account of competence which is identical to (or at least con- 
strained by) a logical system that successfully captures rational inference. This way of put- 
ting the matter still has its disadvantages. It creates the appearance that there in fact does 
exist a body of eternal truths, this time of rationality rather than logic, to the capturing of 
which all logical theories aspire; and it is not clear that this gains us anything over what it 
replaces. The appearance, though, can be dispelled by reflecting on what the notion of 
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'rational inference' is, if rationality is thereby revealed not to be something eternal or 
divorced from empirical considerations. 
Clearly, at any particular time, the currently accepted canons of normative logic (or 
decision theory, etc.) are taken to be the most expressive of rationality. The suggestion to 
be amplified here, however, is that the attempt to use these as a guide in the construction 
of a cognitive reasoning theory - most particularly, to use them as an a priori characterisa- 
tion of the appropriate competence - may lead to their re-evaluation in this respect. It may 
be that the characterisation of rationality changes, in the course of this theory construction, 
such that changes are forced in the normative theory of inference. We shall see presently 
some more of the implications of this. 
6.1 What is Rationality? 
In the present chapter, I want to consider what the required notion of rationality 
might be. A possibility which arises is that the authors discussed in the last two chapters 
are using more than one such notion, and hence that some of the disputes are somewhat 
empty. In any event, we need to try to find some notion appropriate to our general discus- 
sion in the context of cognitive theories of reasoning, which will leave us in a position to 
evaluate the impact of the above discussions on our project. 
Follesdal (1982 op. cit.) notes that Elster (1982) distinguishes more than twenty 
senses of 'rationality', many of which, however, are neither in conflict nor of any particular 
relevance to the sorts of issues we are addressing here. It seems sufficient to consider, as 
Follesdal does, a smallish subset of these. Follesdal settles for four. 
(1) Rationality as logical consistency 
(2) Rationality as well-foundedness of beliefs 
(3) Rationality as well-foundedness of values 
(4) Rationality of action. 
Follesdal notes that (2) is much stronger than (1), since 'well-foundedness' presumably 
involves a large number of empirical factors, and that (1) itself is open to different 
strengths of interpretation, depending on whether it is taken to mean that one has no con- 
tradictory beliefs, or that one's beliefs entail no contradiction. The importance of (3) 
relates to its potential in evaluating the rationality of normative prescriptions, whether in 
ethics (which is what one initially takes 'values' to imply) or science and logic - this type 
of rationality, as Follesdal says and as we have already seen, is generally and most promis- 
ingly discussed in terms of reflective equilibrium. Follesdal holds that (4) is best thought 
of in terms of decision theory (by which, however, he seems to mean something more akin 
to Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'), bearing in mind the epistemic and cognitive 
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limitations of the particular subject: 
Rationality of action is normally a question of how to make the best use of 
one's resources, one's information-seeking capabilities, and one's ability to 
create good alternatives, and not a question of choosing from within a vast set 
of alternatives that lie there ready for one's inspection (Follesdal 1982 307). 
He also makes the point, with regard to (3), that when one is asked to discuss the rational- 
ity of an individual, only rarely does one attend to his values, rather than simply his 
actions and the beliefs from which they stem - perhaps because of the tendency to regard 
ultimate values as 'beyond the realm of rational justification'. One concentrates only on 
those aspects of intentional states which are related to their logical form. 
Follesdal takes this neglect of the content of states to be a mistake, but it seems 
nonetheless to be in a sense at the root of the notion of rationality inherent in the Quine- 
Davidson approach. It will be recalled that mention was made above of Churchland's 
(1979) way of stating this in terms of intentionally-describable objects or systems (ie, per- 
sons) conforming their intentional states to the rules of a logical calculus. Here, no atten- 
tion is paid to the origins of the system's beliefs and goals except insofar as they are pro- 
duced from other beliefs and goals. To the extent that a rationality assumption is indeed 
involved, it obtains just so long as these states are appropriately related, no matter how 
bizarre they may be in themselves. One might say that the system, and its behaviour, is 
rational on this occasion or in this respect, given that goal (and those beliefs). 
Dennett, in 'Beyond Belief (1982c), endorses Churchland's general approach, but is 
always somewhat evasive about the relationship between logic and rationality. Stich 
(1982) takes Dennett to task over some alleged consequences of his rationality assumption 
(which controversy we shall discuss in due course), and Dennett (1982a) replies by admit- 
ting that he has never been very explicit about what he takes rationality to be. He says the 
concept is 'slippery' and 'systematically pre-theoretical', and remarks, 
I want to use 'rational' as a general-purpose term of cognitive approval - which 
requires maintaining only conditional and revisable allegiances between rational- 
ity, so considered, and the proposed (or even universally acclaimed) methods of 
getting ahead, cognitively, in the world. I take this usage of the term to be 
quite standard, and I take appeals to rationality by proponents of cognitive dis- 
ciplines or practices to require this understanding of the notion. ... [Cf. 
theories about compartmentalisation of memory:] The claim is that it is rational 
to be inconsistent sometimes, not the pseudo-paradoxical claim that it is rational 
sometimes to be irrational.... One may, then, decline to identify rationality 
with the features of any formal system ... (Dennett 1982a 76-7). 
This suggests that Dennett's 'principle of charity' does not even extend to insistence on the 
rule of noncontradiction. It all depends on the reasons for a contradiction's occurrence. 
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However, it has to be said that others of Dennett's observations on the subject are not 
clearly in keeping with the above. One of his best known discussions, 'Intentional Sys- 
tems' (in Dennett 1978), conveys a strong impression that we can assume an intentional 
system to have its beliefs, goals and actions interrelated very much as Churchland suggests, 
with the actions (or intentions to act) being derived by some form of implicit practical syl- 
logism from the other states. The idea seems to be that this follows from the system's 
having evolved successfully (in the case of a natural system) or from its having an optimal 
design. The implication is that the possibility of adopting what Dennett calls the 'inten- 
tional stance' (or, as in 1981b, the 'intentional strategy') towards a system depends on its 
being organised this way, and that any optimally efficient system in fact will be organised 
this way. Follesdal also emphasises the point: there would be no way to work out a 
person's beliefs and goals from the evidence of his actions (the only possible evidence) 
were one not to presuppose a rational organisation. Rationality is constitutive of the 
notions of beliefs, values and actions. 
Perhaps, though, the idea that this kind of rationality is strictly related to logic, is on 
the wrong lines. Follesdal asks: 'How much rationality do we have to require in order to 
talk meaningfully about desires and other 'intentional' notions?' (312) - and his answer is 
that we need enough to be able to indulge in 'reason explanations' of someone's actions, 
rather than mere 'causal explanations'. It's not clear, however, that this is more than a tau- 
tology: 'reason explanations', surely, just are explanations in terms of beliefs, desires and 
other intentional notions. (I leave aside, here, Davidson's, 1963, view that reasons are 
causes.) In any event, Follesdal agrees that one does not often find perfect rationality in 
sense (1) above, especially interpreted strongly. Rationality in sense (4), on the other 
hand, seems common, provided we take care not to make unreasonable assumptions about 
what the agent has taken into consideration. 
Follesdal is again slipping here into talking of the rationality also of beliefs in them- 
selves, rather than simply that of their interactions: 
causal, irrational factors come into the picture at a number of places, where our 
general theory of man makes us expect them to come in, as when a person gets 
his beliefs and values formed through propaganda, advertising or group pres- 
sure, or when he acts under the influence of hypnosis, drugs, drives with which 
he is not yet familiar, etc. (313). 
It is important (if we can relate this to our earlier discussion) to distinguish the features of 
those processes which are to be regarded as competent - 'due to the (supposed) algorithm' 
- and those not. To what extent does the algorithm purport to cover the acquisition of 
beliefs? And how far is its operation prey to various interfering factors, such as the rela- 
tive emotional salience of pieces of information? One might advance the view that 
Follesdal's 'causal' factors, are just those which give rise to behaviour 'incompetent' by 
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the standards and operations of the cognitive theory; the domain of 'reason explanation' is 
coextensive with that of algorithm-explanation. This returns us once more to the position 
of asserting the essentially perfect rational competence of humans, ascribing faults to 
'causal' performance factors. Consider this: 
In trying to understand a person and his actions, we must weigh against one 
another [assumptions about his beliefs and attitudes] that we make on the basis 
of observation of his actions and what goes on at his sensory surfaces .. . 
Causal factors that are not reasons should in part be regarded as influencing the 
agent's consideration of alternatives, in part as affecting the alternatives them- 
selves, and in part as dispositions that are to be weighed together with the 
person's beliefs and desires . . . Physiological urges, hypnotic instructions, and 
sub-conscious beliefs all seem to be amenable to this kind of treatment (loc. 
cit.) 
Here again we have the picture of trying to interpret the agent as wholly rational, except 
where the interpolation of causal factors seems essential. 
It might be worth noting that Follesdal apparently does not hold 'reason explanation' 
to cover a domain coextensive with that of explanation in terms of contentful states (unlike 
Pylyshyn - cf. ch. 3, above - and probably Churchland and Dennett, and certainly Davidson 
1982). Hypnotic instruction and subconscious beliefs (and desires) are evidently among 
the latter, and hence, perhaps, would be better regarded more as among the range of rea- 
sons (if bad ones) rather than that of causal factors. The ascription of subconscious 
beliefs, that is to say, is part of a rationality-assuming reason-explanation. This, it seems 
to me, extends even to an example Follesdal uses in arguing against trying to see people as 
maximally rational (310, 3141). The example (attributed to Suppes) is that of a pubescent 
boy who explains his keenness frequently to come up and ask questions, after class, of his 
attractive female teacher, purely in terms of his desire to learn - and does this in complete 
sincerity. Clearly we are likely, here, to suppose that the boy's explanation is wrong, and 
that his real, if subconscious, motivation is much less intellectual. But is this to denigrate 
the boy's rationality? Follesdal says 'we should not easily set aside the agent's reason 
explanation in favour of a causal explanation' (314); but this may not be what we propose 
to do. We might say, instead, that the agent here is not (fully) cognisant of his own rea- 
sons; we might say that he acts as he does because of beliefs and (more particularly, in 
this case) desires which, unfortunately no doubt, he does not himself recognise. This pat- 
tern of explanation would not be causal. Causal factors, maybe, would account for his 
failure correctly to assess his own mental states - and here we have an interesting problem 
for the psychology of what is known as 'cognitive dissonance' - but this does not seem to 
provide (what Follesdal claims) an argument that we should not ascribe beliefs and desires 
so as to make the agent come out as rational as possible. 
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Follesdal offers the principle: 
When ascribing beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes to a person on 
the basis of observation of what he does and says, do not try to maximise his 
rationality or his agreement with yourself, but use all your knowledge about 
how beliefs and attitudes are formed under the influence of causal factors, 
reflection, and so forth, and in particular your knowledge about his past experi- 
ence and his personality traits, such as credulity, alertness, reflectiveness etc. 
Ascribe to him the beliefs and attitudes you should expect him to have on the 
basis of this whole theory of man in general and him in particular (316) 
- which seems laudable enough (and closely resembles Thagard and Nisbett's suggestions) 
but which taken with the paper as a whole seems to say: temper your ascriptions with the 
knowledge that the individual's capacity for perfectly rational actions is tainted by a mortal 
proneness to causal performance limitations. As observed before, we all know in advance 
of any high-level discussion, that people's actual behaviour is never perfectly rational, and 
very often is a long, long way from that ideal - but here we do not have something that 
Quine and Davidson (or Dennett and Churchland) have failed to allow for. 
Given Dennett's quoted proposal to use `rational' as a term of `cognitive approval', 
one might be tempted to argue as follows. Follesdal has essentially given his seal of 
approval to those kinds of causally (rather than reason-) based infelicities in behaviour that 
we do not typically avoid, and that we can reliably predict from general theories of man. 
He has, perhaps, decided to regard these tendencies as endearing rather than reprehensible. 
And this, of course, would simply make his position even more suggestive of one which 
promotes thoroughgoing rationality. The largest problem here seems to be that Dennett's 
proposal threatens to subsume any fairly broad-minded theory under the umbrella of 
theories like his - ie, theories which insist that people are essentially rational - and do this 
in a manner smelling suspiciously of aprioristic fiat, of argument by redefinition of terms. 
Is this really what `rational' means; and, if so, can any bounds be set to what can be 
approved of? 
The answer, perhaps, is that Dennett is right, so long as `approval' is not too widely 
interpreted. What it should indicate is a high rating on some fairly specific scale, such as 
(what Dennett himself implicitly suggests at many places) a scale of survival value, or (just 
slightly less vacuously) of fit with the environment, in the sense of adaptedness to exploit- 
ing the opportunities and avoiding the dangers which it presents. (This is not, of course, 
going to be in general very easy to assess.) It then is, perhaps, necessarily true that any 
optimally efficient system is essentially rational. 
6.2 Rationality and Normative Logic 
The point of the foregoing has been to defend the view that the interpretability of 
behaviour entails its fundamental rationality. The notion of 'rationality' at issue seems no 
less vague for Follesdal's endeavours, nor Dennett's, but the main question was what it has 
to do with logic. My answer to this turns on the idea that the connection can be seen as 
mediated by the postulated cognitive theory cast in computational terms. The suggestion 
has already been made that algorithm-explainable phenomena are those susceptible of 'rea- 
son explanation'; and it has also to be recognised that in an important sense these are inter- 
determining. Insofar as the algorithm is seen to embody interpreted items of some kind, 
we have the argument of Dennett (1981a - see ch. 3 above), among others, that the 
interpretation proceeds necessarily from a prior intentional characterisation of the whole 
system; and we can now observe also that this characterisation essentially amounts to a 
reason-explanation of its behaviour. 
An analogy was used in chapter 4, whereby the problem of determining the com- 
petence theory for a particular behavioural domain was likened to that of finding the best- 
fitting curve through a set of points on a graph. One has the observed behaviour, and one 
has to decide what the nature of the ideal is. It seems clear that, for instance in a reason- 
ing task, the competence theory chosen specifies a function from premises to conclusions 
regarded as 'correct'. What we can now notice, is the interplay between the 'logic' thus 
defined, and the notion of rationality inherent in the overall intentional characterisation 
which grounds the interpretation of premises and conclusions. It looks as though we want 
to say, here, that the latter notion is somehow prior to the logic defined - which would be 
consistent with, say, the views of L. J. Cohen, and also those of Dennett. But now, 
although this notion of rationality is still obscure, and perhaps incorrigibly so, we have 
seen enough to note that it is somewhat loose, and related to an evaluation of, in some 
sense, the utility of behaviour in certain circumstances. This remark echoes a particular 
strain in the above discussion of Thagard's work. 
Thagard tells us that a major component in the evaluation of a set of normative prin- 
ciples is its 'efficacy', which means 'the extent to which the principles and practices of a 
system lead to satisfaction of the relevant inferential goals'. This, on his account, has to 
be essentially whence the normativity of a system is derived: one ought to have an 
efficacious system. And, as observed before, the question now arises as to what these 
goals are, and whether they themselves are subject to criticism in point of their rationality. 
An example of such a goal might be the preservation of truth in inference, and indeed it 
seems clear that this is one which Thagard has in mind. But it is just this kind of goal 
which Dennett is suggesting, in the passage quoted above, might be inappropriate in certain 
circumstances - eg. if the costs of ensuring truth-preservation outweighed its benefits in 
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those circumstances. That is to say that, in those particular circumstances, a system which 
effectively promoted a certain inferential goal would still not be recommended because this 
would fail to coincide with the current best interests of the reasoner. 
The lesson to be drawn here, in my view, is the same as previously noted - that the 
set of goals used in assessing the efficacy of a system has to be relativised to the cir- 
cumstances of the reasoner. The same reasoner in a different situation, or a different rea- 
soner in the same situation, might be served differently by a particular choice of inferential 
goals, and to that extent it might be rational to adopt a different set of normative princi- 
ples. If we can suppose, what is enormously simplifying if not necessarily well furnished 
with empirical support, that individual people are similar in their cognitive apparatus etc., 
this yet leaves us with the strong suggestion that the inferential situation is crucial. Cohen 
might be right, for instance, to suggest that gamblers are well advised to stick to their fal- 
lacy. Except, of course, that this would then be the wrong way to put it, since what might 
well be a statistician's fallacy is revealed to be entirely justified for the gambler. 
But it should be noted that we still are not in Cohen's apparent position of supposing 
something to be normatively vindicated simply because reasoners do it, in whatever situa- 
tion they happen to be in. Thagard tackles Cohen about this issue, on the ground that he 
takes too strictly his analogy between the psychology/logic case, and the language/grammar 
case. In the former, but not the latter, we have normative force: 
Practice can be improved. Logical practice has improved enormously with the 
developments in deductive, inductive, and practical logic of the past several 
hundred years. There is no analogous sense in which linguists aim to improve 
the overall grammar of a linguistic population ... (Thagard 1982, op. cit., 35). 
This is a point made before (cf. Rescher 1977 242,x`:), and it seems to me a dubious 
one, if it is meant to allude to some essential, immutable difference between these cases. 
There are two problems. Firstly, Thagard has again confused the practices of logicians qua 
logicians (which no doubt have improved even as he says) with those of everyday reason- 
ers (who, for all any evidence I have seen suggests, perform as badly as ever); moreover, 
logicians' practices are, after all, often theory-constructive, and it is arguably in 'this area 
that they have mostly improved. (Was even Aristotle's inferential practice all that 
poor? Surely he was primitive mainly in theory-construction - cf. Thagard and Nisbett, 
1983: `Modem symbolic logic provides methods for assessing the validity of complex 
arguments which are much more powerful than Aristotelian methods, which were largely 
restricted to the syllogism' (259) - this provides no ground for supposing that many of his 
actual arguments were invalid.) However, linguists' theory-constructive practices have 
surely also improved greatly, especially since Chomsky. 
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Secondly, although it's true enough that logicians aim to reform and improve, and 
that linguists (nowadays) do not, it is unclear that this is more than in some sense acciden- 
tal: Thagard goes on to say 
The logician ... is concerned to develop a set of principles which is inferen- 
tially optimal given the cognitive limitations of reasoners (Thagard, loc. cit.) 
- and this is clearly so (if hardly expressed in terms the average logician might use), but 
could it not have been, equally, that the linguist strove to develop a set of communicatively 
optimal principles? Or stylistically optimal principles? Or whatever, might he not have 
had some goal, at any rate, which would render his activities similarly prescriptive and nor- 
mative? If he had, though, his methods might have to change; and this is the point of the 
objection. No longer could he maintain the laissez-faire position of merely describing the 
practices of his subjects or informants (or himself). Such is what Thagard would maintain. 
The linguist would then have to adopt a wide reflective equilibrium approach, and import 
background psychological and other theories so as to allow the assessment of practices 
with respect to 'efficacy' and 'optimality'. 
Cohen would disagree, of course. The linguist would have to compare his emerging 
theory with the intuitions of his informants: he could not characterise them as 'ungrammat- 
ical' unless he could show that his theory both conformed to and captured their intuitions 
(otherwise it would not be a theory of their practice), and also revealed those intuitions as 
being in 'contradiction' with it; and this would be impossible. But here we do seem to see 
a certain poverty in Cohen's theory. No doubt it's true that 'unless we assume appropriate 
intuitions to be correct, we cannot take the normative theory ... that they support to be 
correct' (Cohen, op. cit. 319), but then perhaps the theory based on them is not 'correct'; 
which is to say, we might take something else as the standard of correctness - eg, efficacy 
- and compare the theory raised on intuitions with the theory raised on that. 
This discussion of the linguistics analogy has been of value, in that it has brought to 
our attention an evident gap between competence theories and normative theories; a 
difference not recognised by Cohen. Competence theories - most obviously as one 
encounters them in linguistics, but elsewhere too - are things wrought solely for the pur- 
poses of explanatory theory, and should not in themselves be taken to have any normative 
import. Of course, they will entail a certain regularisation of the data - this happens even 
in linguistics, where the occasionally espoused ideal of describing multifarious 'idiolectal' 
grammars rarely seems to have any value, and is usually forsaken for something more gen- 
eral. This in itself provides no opportunity for accusations of error. The creation of a nor- 
mative theory needs additional considerations, such as Thagard suggests, with the com- 
petence theory having an important constraining role to play insofar as it can show what 
things are possible for the reasoner. What the reasoner cannot do (or avoid), he cannot be 
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normatively required to do (or avoid); but equally, he need not be required to do or to 
avoid something, simply because he is able. Typically, of course, normative theories, at 
least in logic, do not require a particular (or any) inference, but simply allow any of 
several while forbidding all others. This is more than one is going to get out of a com- 
petence theory derived from observations and data, since many permissible inferences are 
just never made (cf. the discussion in chapter 4, particularly with reference to Pylyshyn, 
1973). 
The discussion of the last few paragraphs in some respects parallels one offered 
more recently by Stich (1985), who also discusses Cohen's position in the light of the 
linguistics analogy. Stich concludes that Cohen is committed to the idea that there are 
many normative theories of cognition and reasoning. But then, he asks, which is the right 
one? Cohen might respond to this with a 'thoroughgoing relativism: my normative theory 
is the right one for me, yours is the right one for you', but Stich rejects the idea as too 
unpalatable: 
We are not in the least inclined to say that any old inference is normatively 
acceptable for a subject merely because it accords with the rules which consti- 
tute his cognitive competence. If the inference is stupid or irrational, and if it 
accords with the subject's cognitive competence, then his competence is stupid 
or irrational too, in this quarter at least. (132) 
After this, he returns to the idea of normative correctness as expert RE, much as in Stich 
and Nisbett (1983), op. cit. 
My response here is that for one thing, Stich has underestimated the role of the nor- 
mative theory in the initial formulation of an account of competence, but that for another 
he has artificially limited the range of options open to normative theorising at this point. 
For he excludes my option, which is to suppose that competences extend across subjects, 
but not necessarily across tasks, or more accurately task domains. I thus embrace a form 
of relativism; but I resist 'the unhappy conclusion that a patently irrational inferential stra- 
tegy might turn out to be the normatively correct one', because I insist that the relation- 
ships here are more subtle than Stich makes out. In circumstances where strategies of this 
kind seem to arise, pressure builds up on the components of the description of the situa- 
tion. If the subject continues to be seen as irrational, the possibility of coherently model- 
ling his cognitive processes is eroded. If he does not, the characterisation of the inference 
as normatively incorrect cannot be sustained. In either case, the competence theory behind 
the cognitive account of the strategy is forced to respond. Such circumstances are 
inherently unstable; profitable theorising demands that they gravitate towards a resolution. 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
We have encountered the idea that normative principles are to be relativised to the 
circumstances of the subject. Likewise seems the case of competence theories. In 
different situations, an ideal reasoner, we have supposed, will behave differently, and prop- 
erly so. What we want to say about the relation of competence theories to normative 
theories is then really that prior to both of them is that ill-defined notion, rationality of 
action in a given type of situation. It might be said that the elaboration of these two kinds 
of theory constitutes two different ways of trying to define that notion. But really it's 
always curiously circular because, to start with, the implicit idea of rationality is used in 
perceiving behaviour as intelligible at all, and the resulting interpretation strongly condi- 
tions the nature of any cognitive theory of that behaviour, but then also our theory of what 
is normatively correct conditions the selection by such a cognitive theory of certain aspects 
of behaviour as 'competent'; but that normative theory depends for a crucial part of its 
justification on the sort of cognitive account of human abilities that it is being used to help 
found. 
If we are lucky, the circle is really an upward spiral. In each new loop, as it were, 
the notions of competence and normativity used are those from the theories in the previous 
level, 'bootstrapping' themselves aloft. Thus we might support the idea of some kind of 
mutual progress in the concurrent development of the two types of theory. We might hold 
that in some sense it would be better to see this as the construction of a single, unified 
theory, in which the notions of competence and normativity gradually converge to meet in 
unity with the rational ideal. In any event, the notion of 'rationality' itself always remains 
logically pre-theoretic, a springboard for the process, and an ultimate arbiter should it 
threaten to get out of hand. If our account is right, however, it is also an arbiter, or (to 
change the metaphor) a referee, liable at any time to move the goalposts in unexpected 
ways, and indeed to present goalposts in different places when the game is played in 
differing circumstances. This state of affairs should not necessarily occasion any great 
surprise. As Wittgenstein indicated, the way the game is played is the ultimate fact of the 
matter, and there's no guarantee that the game is played always in the same way; it may 
consist of any number of relatively inconsistent subgames. 
Part II 
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Introduction to Part II: 
Psychology and Syllogisms 
This second part of the thesis consists essentially of a detailed examination of P. N. 
Johnson-Laird's theory of internal representation and inference. In the process, we shall be 
paying particularly close attention to his account of syllogistic reasoning. Our eventual 
purpose is to expose some of the important presuppositions of computational cognitive 
psychology, as it applies to reasoning. Having spent some time in a preliminary explora- 
tion of background material, we are in a position to look in a detailed way at an example 
of an actual piece of psychological theory, in order to see how these things show up. One 
of the questions that will interest us here, is the way in which theory is related to experi- 
mental test, and we shall therefore devote significant effort to a close inspection of impor- 
tant experimental data, and the claims surrounding it. The task of the present introduction 
is to provide some motivation for looking at the domain of syllogisms, and this theory in 
particular. 
As noted before, it will not be necessary to cover in detail the history of investiga- 
tions into the syllogistic task, since this has been done for us in a most competent fashion, 
by Evans (1982) and Johnson-Laird himself (1983). We shall eventually come to consider 
some of Johnson-Laird's criticisms of the previous literature, but for now we may be con- 
tent to pass over this history relatively briefly. 
The syllogistic task is of general interest, firstly because it involves quantified propo- 
sitions. Earlier (in chapter 2) we looked at Johnson-Laird's (1975) theory of propositional 
reasoning, and noted that he regarded quantified reasoning as quite a different kettle of 
fish, calling for the 'combination of information' in 'mental models', rather than the appli- 
cation of some kind of rule schemata. He persists in this view, although he later extends 
the remit of a mental-model-based account to cover propositional reasoning as well. Cer- 
tainly, from a purely formal point of view, quantification introduces a great many extra 
complexities into a logical system, that can cause trouble for inference schemata. From a 
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psychological point of view, there is no doubt that many cases of quantified reasoning are 
substantially more difficult than most propositional tasks, and that serious processing issues 
are thereby raised. 
There are various formal approaches to the problem of extending propositional logic 
to operate with quantified propositions. In natural deduction systems, one tackles the 
matter in basically the same way as for the logical connectives, by postulating introduction 
and elimination rules for the quantifiers, which allow, for instance, reasoning about all 
objects to go ahead through reasoning propositionally about one object, on the basis that 
that one object is understood to be arbitrary, and in some sense therefore representative of 
all other objects, insofar as it differs from them in no respect relevant to the current argu- 
ment. In a sense, this is perhaps at the root of Johnson-Laird's intuitive notion of a mental 
model. For he suggests that such a model represents a class of entities by containing some 
arbitrary number of arbitrary exemplars of that class. Reasoning about these entities gen- 
eralises precisely because of their arbitrariness. (At least for non-numerical quantification, 
it is generally unnecessary for this number to be greater than one, but Johnson-Laird holds 
that, if nothing else, some number greater than one has more intuitive psychological 
appeal.) With such a model, we can reason about the items it contains, and then implicitly 
generalise the results on the grounds of arbitrariness. If one formalises syllogisms in a 
sorted first-order logic, it becomes quite natural, as we shall see, to regard Johnson-Laird's 
models as rather similar to sets of statements about the sorted objects. 
This suggestion is in fact somewhat radical in terms of Johnson-Laird's theory, since 
it is one of his more important claims that his models represent whatever they do represent 
precisely not as anything like a set of propositional statements, but rather by somehow 
analogically representing its structure. He is here reflecting a distinction which has been 
important in several departments of cognitive psychology, and the issue is one that will 
crop up frequently in the following chapters. One of our claims will be that he has overes- 
timated the extent to which any such distinction with respect to his own models can be 
supported either on formal or on empirical grounds. 
Such claims detract little from the interest of his theory, of course, which remains one 
of the most provocative to appear in cognitive science. It is an interesting theory, particu- 
larly, in that it tries to say something highly detailed psychologically (about the cognitive 
processes involved in solving syllogisms), but at the same time very principled in its logi- 
cal aspect (so far as it tries to capture the sense in which this is a process of reasoning, 
based on rational operations). A significant observation concerning preceding work on 
syllogistic reasoning is the lack, in many cases, of either of these features, and certainly the 
almost complete absence of any attempt at their combination. Early theorising about syllo- 
gisms was in the tradition of verbal testing, and more emphasis was given to the statistical 
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treatment of the experimental data than to the question about what sort of processes might 
have led to their production. The closest one gets to a theory about any kind of mechan- 
ism is the so-called "atmosphere effect" story (Woodworth and Sells, 1935), which postu- 
lated that reasoners were simply somehow affected by the `mood' (partly in the Aristo- 
telian sense, but also with vaguer overtones) of the syllogism, so that for instance a gen- 
erally universal or particular mood was liable to lead to a universal or particular conclusion 
(or agreement with one if offered it), regardless of its validity or otherwise. This turned 
out to be a moderately successful predictor of experimental data, but it obviously says 
nothing about either of the points noted above. 
Atmosphere theory was succeeded by the `illicit conversion' theory of Chapman and 
Chapman (1959), where it is supposed that subjects convert premises, for instance those of 
the form All A are B into (more or less) All and only A are B, prior to working with them 
thereafter in a wholly logical fashion. Here we have an attempt to say more about both 
processing and the role of logic, but only a rather vague one. Its most important feature, 
perhaps, is the insistence that subjects are to be seen as reasoning logically, in accordance 
with normatively standard rules of inference, once they have unreasonably converted their 
premises. Evans (1982) goes to some lengths to stress that there is actually very little 
empirical evidence to suggest that subjects do reason in a wholly logical way. He regards 
this as a prejudice which is held by many psychologists, more in the face of the evidence 
than anything else, out of a conviction that man must be essentially a rational animal. We 
have already addressed several of the main issues surrounding this point, in Part I, where 
we noted that Johnson-Laird is himself particularly prey to the prejudice in question. We 
concluded that such a prejudice is in some respects justified, but not if the logic required 
by the theory is assumed a priori to be (say) first-order classical logic, or indeed Aristo- 
telian syllogistic. The approach is particularly necessary if one's account of reasoning is to 
be a cognitive one, offering a computational model of processing. The Chapmans' account 
is of course not of that kind, and to that extent its importance to the theme of this thesis is 
diminished. But there is value in highlighting the fact that where a processing theory 
assumes a particular logic, a salient possibility for dealing with recalcitrant data is to sup- 
pose that subjects do `illicitly convert', or in some other way misrepresent or misunder- 
stand the premises of their inferences. 
Johnson-Laird's theory, however, postulates that subjects understand the premises 
perfectly well. On the other hand, they may get into trouble when it comes to putting 
them together to form a syllogism, which is crucial given that the whole problem of solv- 
ing a syllogism can be seen as the problem of deciding what the combination of the prem- 
ises means, and thus arriving at its implications. Johnson-Laird's theory is among very 
few that suggest an algorithm whereby subjects are supposed to compute their conclusions, 
and it is largely because it does so that Johnson-Laird is led to make some very strong 
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claims about the implications of his theory for our assessment of the rationality, and the 
reasoning competence, of our subjects, in the syllogistic domain. Johnson-Laird suggests 
that this act of combining the premises in many cases is one fraught with difficulty and one 
that imposes such demands on cognitive resources that it may overtax restricted mechan- 
isms such as short-term memory. A processing system which in principle is capable of 
running until it generates a correct conclusion every time may thus be thwarted and driven 
into error. This, of course, describes a system very much in the mould we considered in 
Part I, where the 'central algorithm' provides the basis of perfect competence for the task. 
The domain of syllogisms commands attention, perhaps most centrally for just the 
reason that it focuses on the issue of interpretation and understanding of premises. It is 
because of this feature that Johnson-Laird can make it the cornerstone of his mental-model 
theory, which purports to extend its coverage to virtually all significant cognitive 
phenomena. It is because of this, too, that Johnson-Laird can summon some plausibility 
for setting up the explanation of an apparently syllogistic reasoning performance as his cru- 
cial test case for cognitive science (see Chapter 2, above). It is also because of this that 
what seem on the face of things to be a particularly boring range of obsolete logical curios, 
can be seen as being actually the simplest, and hence most investigable, of the really 
interesting problems of cognitive psychology. It needs to be noted, however, that this 
interest arises almost wholly from syllogisms' potential wider relevance, and that a theory 
which addresses only syllogisms, and cannot be shown to extend insights to other areas, is 
all but worthless, except on the doubtful view that syllogistic forms are themselves a ubi- 
quitous feature of everyday discourse, and that they are there processed in the same way as 
in laboratory tasks. Evaluating claims for the extendibility of Johnson-Laird's theory is 
accordingly one of our more important aims. 
Our strategy will be to begin by expounding Johnson-Laird's theory in some detail, 
taking into account its interesting development since its first appearance and the way it 
grows out of empirical studies, and encompassing some wider aspects of the idea of mental 
models in areas other than syllogisms specifically. Then, we shall pay considerable atten- 
tion to the 'central algorithm' that it embodies, directing ourselves in particular to the ques- 
tion of its status as an 'effective procedure' for solving syllogisms, and the consequences 
of its being one if it is. We shall examine how far we can uphold Johnson-Laird's crucial 
claims that his system is importantly different from various other theories that preceded it, 
and that its processing model shows the nature of the internal representation used (ie, the 
mental models) to be irreducibly semantic and analogical. Our contention will be that 
these aspects of the theory have been overstated in important ways. In conclusion, we will 
look also at Johnson-Laird's claims about the necessity of casting a theory in the form of 
an effective procedure in order for it to be explanatory, and we will assess the explanatory 
achievements of his account of reasoning. 
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We now proceed, therefore, to examine the actual mechanism Johnson-Laird pro- 
poses, with the aim of discovering its detailed motivation - the reasons for its being the 
way it is - and subsequently to view this both on its merits as claimed for it, and in the 
light of the preceding discussions. 
alv ZAT, 
8 
Johnson-Laird's Theory of Syllogistic Reasoning : 
An Introduction 
This chapter takes the form essentially of a commentary, in more or less the old- 
fashioned philosophical sense of a critical exposition, on Johnson-Laird's theory of syl- 
logistic reasoning. This is undertaken not only for its own interest (which however is con- 
siderable), but as necessary groundwork for the chapters that follow. It also seems natural 
in the context of treating it as a kind of case study on an approach to investigating reason- 
ing. My strategy will be to expound the two main versions of the theory along with their 
associated empirical investigations, in parallel, so that we can compare them and observe 
the salient points of difference. In the process, we shall discuss some of the issues which 
arise about experimental design and interpretation, and generally the more psychologically- 
oriented aspects of the subject, including basic questions concerning the nature of internal 
representation. In later chapters, we shall devote more sustained attention to the detailed 
representational, logical and semantic claims which Johnson-Laird regards as so important 
in his work, where we shall widen our view to take in areas outside the specific topic of 
syllogistic reasoning. 
Johnson-Laird's syllogistic theory purports in fact to be a theory of reasoning with 
quantifiers in general, but as we shall see, there are good reasons to doubt that it can be 
extended very far in this direction, and in fact it alludes only peripherally to the very possi- 
bility. It began as a theory mainly of syllogistic reasoning, presented in `Models of 
Deduction' (1975). In this paper, Johnson-Laird starts out by developing the account of 
propositional reasoning that we looked at in chapter 2, above. He then addresses the ques- 
tion `whether it is possible to devise a general model of inference with quantifiers along 
the lines of the model for propositional inference' (38). The model which then follows is 
the prototype for all his later accounts (although it bears little apparent resemblance to the 
model for propositional inference). 
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The model is developed as an explanation for certain data collected in a set of experi- 
ments, which turn out to be the ones reported in Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978), 
where the theory receives further elaboration into what it seems fair to regard as its first 
fully worked-out form. Subsequently, this model undergoes several changes in detail, 
some of which, taken together with the explanations offered of their motivation, are quite 
revealing about the underpinnings of the whole project. 
8.1 General Outline 
Johnson-Laird's model, in both its versions, is based on two essential notions, which 
both appeared in his 1975 paper, and which now form the basis of a much wider-ranging 
theory. One is that reasoners proceed by constructing 'mental models' which represent, in 
some sense, what is asserted in the premises; the other is that there are various ways of 
doing this, not all of which may be correct, and that what drives the inferential mechanism 
is the fact that an inference is valid if and only if the conclusion is true in all possible 
correct representations of the premises (all circumstances in which the premises are true). 
His beliefs about the ways in which these essentials are 'implemented' in the human 
reasoner, have changed through time, but can be broken into two basic sets: 
(a) those forming the theory of Johnson-Laird and Steedman 1978; 
(b) those forming the theory of Johnson-Laird and Bara 1983. 
(There is a version in Johnson-Laird, 1983, very similar to (b), which we shall mention 
only occasionally in this chapter.) There are some fairly substantial differences of detail 
between these, but they both involve the following basic steps. (Note: For the sake of 
brevity, I tend in what follows to attribute all quotations and paraphrases, from both 
papers, to Johnson-Laird alone. This is not intended to belittle the contributions of his col- 
laborators.) 
(1) The premises are represented, together, as a combined mental model. Traditional 
scholastic logic recognises 4 forms of proposition, designated by mnemonic letters: 
All Xare Y (A) 
Some X are Y (I) 
No X are Y (E) 
Some X are not Y (0) 
Johnson-Laird uses these, as well as his own set of 'figures', 
1. A B 2. B A 3. A B 4. B A 
B C C B C B B C 
which allow any pair of premises to be specified, as eg. the syllogism 
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All A are B 
Some B are C 
is 'IAI'. (Also, I will at times refer to a proposition using the form-mnemonic in lower- 
case between the two terms, eg 'All A are B' appears as 'AaB', 'Some B are A' as 'BiA'.) 
There is a fairly trivial algorithm which translates premises of these forms into models as 
follows: 
All Aare B > a = b 
a = b 
(b) 
Some A are B > a = b 
(a) (b) 
No Aare B > a * b 
a b 
Some Aare notB > a b 
(a) = b 
(there are important notational differences between this and (a) and (b), but we neglect 
these for simplicity just at present). 
The idea is that the tokens in the models represent individuals in the sets (eg. of As) 
being modelled, and that any arbitrary number of these can be regarded as modelling the 
entire actual set. Items in brackets are supposed to be 'optional', in the sense that the 
model is uncommitted as to their actual existence: hence, eg, in the case of the A proposi- 
tion there may or may not be Bs which are not As. (Johnson-Laird says that to obtain a 
Boolean interpretation of universal quantification, with no existential import, one can sim- 
ply make all the A terms optional - see (b), 38.) The identity links in the model simply 
indicate that connected tokens 'refer', in some sense, to the same real world individual (or 
perhaps I should say set of arbitrary real world individuals), which is asserted to belong to 
both sets mentioned in the proposition. Links of denied identity show the existence of 
individuals which do not belong to both sets. We shall return in subsequent chapters to the 
many problematical aspects of this suggestion. 
Both (a) and (b) assume that the first premise is represented with one of these 
models, and that the information contained in the second is then added in some way. 
There is a question as to whether this proceeds by separately modelling both premises and 
combining the results, or by 'adding in' the second premise's information to the model of 
the first. In (a) the answer to this is left obscure, but in (b) it is held to be immaterial (40). 
However, a crucial point is the importance of the 'middle term'. Suppose we have the 
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syllogism (1AI): 
All A are B 
Some B are C 
then the model is (initially) 
a = b = c 
a = b (C) 
(b) 
This result is due to the assumption that model-construction is guided by a heuristic, which 
is essentially the same in both versions of the theory: 
(a) 'there is a heuristic bias toward forming thoroughgoing connections between all the 
classes, that is, a bias toward linking up end items by way of middle items' (78) 
(b) '... reasoners are guided by the heuristic of trying to maximise the greatest number 
of different roles on the fewest number of individuals' (46). 
Of course, this heuristic is not the logically 'best' one, and hence leads to a charac- 
teristic class of possible errors, as will be discussed. The arguments in its favour depend 
largely on the ubiquitous dogma of 'parsimony', and the fact that it seems to fit the experi- 
mental data. 
(2) A putative conclusion is formulated on the basis of 'the model. Given some combined 
representation as described, the task of the reasoner is to draw from it a conclusion to the 
syllogism. This must link the 'end items' (from the sets A and C), and for preference 
should be in the correct propositional form - there is a simple algorithm available for doing 
this, which is exploited in both versions of the theory. (It has a slightly different form in 
(b) due to the different notational devices used in that paper, but it's essentially 
equivalent.) The rules are: where a 'path' is a series of 'positive' (identity) or 'negative' 
(non-identity with identity or null) links from an A token to a C token, if the model con- 
tains (i) at least one negative path, then the conclusion is of form 0, unless (ii) there are 
only negative paths, when it is E. If there is at least one positive path, the conclusion is I 
unless all paths are positive, when it is A. If there are only indeterminate (null or positive 
with null) paths, there is no valid conclusion of the required sort. It's assumed (there's no 
model-based explanation for it) that people naturally try to establish relationships between 
the end terms here, and that thus 'the middle term tends not to be referred to ...' ((b), 
46). (This tendency is certain to be influenced by the instruction 'to restrict their answers 
to one of the four moods or else to state that no valid conclusion followed from the prem- 
ises' ((a), 71), since an earlier experiment without, the instruction had produced a few 
responses involving the middle term; we are not told of such an instruction in (b), but the 
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nature of the data makes it hard to doubt that there was one.) 
Since the representation initially constructed (on the basis of the heuristic) is not 
necessarily optimal, the conclusion 'read off in this fashion may not, in fact, be valid. It 
is valid only if it can be read off any possible representation of the premises. Johnson- 
Laird's models have the useful property of, themselves, each representing a large number 
of possible 'states of affairs' in which the premises are true (by virtue of the items in 
brackets); but not always all of these, and so alternatives must be sought. 
(3) The conclusion is 'tested against other possible models. In this phase of the pro- 
cedure, the differences between (a) and (b) become greater, but the essential process is the 
progressive deformation of the initial model, in various ways, it always being understood 
that the model must remain consistent with the premises. Links can be broken, new links 
established, items added or removed, so long as this cardinal principle is observed. At 
each stage a new conclusion is read off: in (a), the system is so arranged that further defor- 
mation (by the procedures provided) rapidly becomes impossible, and the final model 
always yields the correct conclusion (be it only that there is no valid conclusion); in (b), 
one has to keep track of the intermediate conclusions, the correct one being any which is 
valid in all the stages, else 'no valid conclusion'. It turns out in both cases that the 
number of deforming steps a model can undergo before it reaches a stage where further 
modification by the rules is impossible, is very small. There are at most three of these 
'alternative models' to be considered. 
8.2 Some Theoretical Details 
(a) The theory of Johnson-Laird and Steedman, 1978, is highly precise and con- 
strained. Models are formed with arrows (or `stopped arrows') as the links, which are 
supposed to indicate a directional bias in reading off conclusions (this is to explain the 

















The model-construction procedure always constructs the same model, in all details, given 
the same premises, so we have a clear set of 'initial representation conclusions' (IRCs) for 
each syllogism, as determined by the algorithm outlined above. Testing then proceeds by 
attempting either to break positive links, or to establish new ones past existing negative 
links, if this can be done consistently. 
Some cases are interesting: consider, eg, 31E (depicted above) which initially suggests 
`No A are C' or 'No C are A'. This can be tested in two ways, one equivalent to testing 
the first conclusion mentioned, the other to testing the other 
(i) a (a) (a) 
b (b) 
(cf. Johnson-Laird and Steedman 1978 81,94). This shows that, after testing, the 
conclusion-forming algorithm is abandoned, since there are paths in (i) which clearly sug- 
gest an A conclusion. What happens is that if the IRC is impugned by testing, the correct 
conclusion is 'no valid conclusion' unless further or other testing establishes one: hence 
only the testing shown as (ii) leads to the correct, valid conclusion in this case. What's 
important is that the procedure has 'forked' along two distinct paths, and there is no route 
back once one has been taken. Which path is chosen depends, apparently, on which way 
the IRC is read off the model (A-C or C-A), although this is not explained in any detail 
(see Johnson-Laird and Steedman 1978, 94). 
Detailed exposition of these processes for each of the 64 possible syllogistic forms 
produces a set of conclusions within which it is predicted that subjects' responses will fall, 
in the experimental task. Agreement with the data is in fact remarkable, and will be con- 
sidered later. 
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(b) The more recent (and allegedly 'final') version of the theory is substantially 
different, at least in emphasis. Now, instead of having one model which is gradually 
altered, we have an account in terms of up to three separate models which can be con- 
structed for any pair of premises. A slightly earlier statement (Johnson-Laird 1983, ch. 5) 
leaves it obscure as to whether these must be constructed in a determinate order (although 
it strongly suggests so, and indicates that they could be derived from one initial model by 
stepwise distortions), but the final form has it that, as we have seen, there is a fixed heuris- 
tic guiding construction of the initial model, and that the testing process `is based on an 
initial model' (49). This process also consists in the attempt 'either to break positive iden- 
tities or to bypass negative barriers' (loc. cit.): it is thus highly similar in actual effect to 
the procedure in (a). 
The models are in this account notationally different, being set out as: 














where for any token `Ot' represents an optional token (as the brackets in (a)), and the line 
represents the impossibility of forming paths between things it separates, analogously to the 
stopped arrows. If one of these 'negative barriers' has tokens of the same kind (optional 
or not) on either side, then it is said to be 'penetrable', eg. as in the 0 case illustrated. 
The conclusion-forming algorithm exploits this: if there are not both As and Cs on the 
same side of a barrier, the conclusion is 0 if the barrier is penetrable, else E. 
Testing proceeds via 5 procedures, variously applicable: 
(i) Breaking of positive links 
(ii) Shifting of optional tokens of end terms round negative barriers 
(iii) Adding more optional end-tokens of already existing types 
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(iv) Swapping optional and non-optional middle terms round a barrier 
(iv) Where there are 2 barriers, shifting tokens of one end term round to the same side as 
those of the other. 
These procedures yield at most 3 models for any syllogism, and conclusions are read off 
these by the same algorithm. As already remarked, a valid conclusion is one derivable 
from all the models (but note here that, eg, an 0 conclusion is taken as valid in a model 
where the algorithm yields an E conclusion - the Lisp model does not implement this part 
of the procedure). The number of models predicted for each syllogism is what is said to 
be the crucial result here (Johnson-Laird and Bara `obviously ... do not wish to defend 
the psychological reality of these procedures' (52)): it predicts that the more there are, the 
more difficult the problem will be, given certain assumptions about memory and process- 
ing, some of which are considered in the following section. 
8.3 The Experimental Studies 
The two main studies I shall consider are those described in (a) Johnson-Laird and 
Steedman 1978, experiment 2, second test, and (b) Johnson-Laird and Bara 1983, experi- 
ment 3. These experiments are supposed to be very similar, indeed (b) seems to be a 
straightforward replication of (a). The results are rather different in various ways, but let 
us first consider how well each set of data corresponds with its accompanying theory. 
(a) The experiment reported in Johnson-Laird and Steedman 1978 (actually conducted 
in America by Janellen Huttenlocher, or one of her students) involved 20 students being 
asked to provide conclusions to all 64 possible pairs of syllogistic premises, constructed 
with different `sensible contents', presented one after the other on cards. The subjects' 
response latencies were timed by the experimenter (presumably, with a stopwatch). The 
subjects were told to frame their answers in correct propositional form, and apparently did 
so with few if any exceptions. The results are given as a set of tables in which each pair 
of premises determines a cell where there appear the computer-generated conclusions 
predicted by the theory, and the number of subjects (out of 20) offering each of these. A 
few unpredicted conclusions are mentioned, if these were given by at least two subjects 
either on the test in question, or on the previous one conducted almost identically on the 
same subjects a week earlier. The mean latency for the correct conclusion in each case is 
also given. 
The correspondence between the predictions and the results is in general astonishing; 
95% of all responses are within the predicted range. The theory also predicts certain 
`figural effects', the nature of which, as noted, is supposed to be captured by the arrows in 
the models. These arrows all point the same way in the first two of Johnson-Laird's syl- 
logistic figures, but not in the last two; this, he says, creates a bias towards a certain form 
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of conclusion, viz. A-C in the first figure, and C-A in the second. Hence 1AA (illustrated 
above) gives us 'All A are C', preferentially over 'All C are A'. One finds, indeed, that 
the 'antifigural' responses are rarely given, and Johnson-Laird argues persuasively that this 
helps to account for the difficulty (measured as rarity of correct responses) of premises 
such as lEI and 21E, where the correct conclusion is antifigural (72). 
Johnson-Laird also has another major prediction, which is that where his theory 
requires that a model be tested before the correct conclusion is reached, this will increase 
the difficulty of the problem. The more testing that is required, the more difficult (and 
time-consuming) the problem should be. He says: '...80.4% of responses to problems 
where a test leads to no modification were correct, whereas only 46.5% of responses where 
a test leads to a modified conclusion were correct; the difference was apparent in the 
results of all 20 subjects.' I confess myself unable to find in his data any basis for the 
figure he gives of 46.5% (although the other seems correct), but in any event I claim that 
this neglects a notable phenomenon in the data where the premises contain no A proposi- 
tion (ie 36 out of the 64 pairs). If there is no A premise, the conclusion invariably 
requires testing, is usually 'no valid conclusion' (unless the premises are El or IE), and is 
obtained by 81% of the subjects! Moreover, it is often obtained very swiftly; Johnson- 
Laird himself remarks that 'those premises which yielded many correct answers also 
yielded them rapidly' (76). This indicates that A premises are somehow a source of 
difficulty in testing, and I have dubbed this the A-effect (see next section). 
Johnson-Laird goes on (84) to produce some very detailed predictions about perfor- 
mance, which depend on factors such as the number of paths there are in the initial 
representation, and how hard it might be to break them during testing: I regard these as 
wholly speculative, and describe some of them in the next section. Worth mentioning, 
though, is Johnson-Laird's final suggestion that the apparent ease of certain syllogisms 
with two negative premises (eg. 100) might be due to some subjects' having 'learned to 
interpret two negative links in a path as indeterminate' - the theory itself giving no clue as 
to how such learning might take place. 
Little of value can be said about the latency figures provided. Even Johnson-Laird 
claims nothing except the quoted remark, and this is not, itself, particularly supportive of 
his theory, since a large number of the correct answers were the result of copious testing 
(cf. below). But questions ought to be asked, in any event, about how these figures were 
measured (at what points timing began and stopped, etc.) since the data are so incredible; 
to ask us to believe that the average subject solves the III syllogism (correctly!) in 1.9 
seconds (a full second faster than the 1AA) is far-fetched, and anyway adds nothing in 
plausibility to Johnson-Laird's theory's assertion that this result requires a testing step 
(whereas the 1AA case does not). Indeed, if they could be taken seriously, some of these 
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data would cast serious doubt on Johnson-Laird's whole model - but in fact I think no-one 
should be tempted to attach any importance to this. 
(b) Johnson-Laird and Bara (1983) contains reports of three experiments. The first 
of these is basically a replication of that just discussed, with the important difference that 
the subjects were only given 10 seconds in which to formulate their responses. The main 
result of this was a large increase in the number of incorrect 'no valid conclusion' 
responses observed, increasing over the 4 figures, and Johnson-Laird felt obliged by this to 
abandon the theoretical model of (a) on the grounds that the new results indicated 'that cer- 
tain figures make it difficult to construct a model in the first place' (29) and that this would 
offer a basis for a principled explanation of all the figural effects. ((a), of course, assumed 
no differences in difficulty in model-building.) The new theory accordingly states that the 
effects arise from 'the processes of integrating the information from the premises within 
working memory'. This indicates that the effects should arise in some form in asyllogistic 
cases, such as 3-term series problems. A second experiment demonstrates that this is 
indeed the case. It is thus seen to be necessary to formulate a new theory to account for 
the effects in syllogisms, in these terms. 
The notion that restrictions on working memory cause difficulties, is embodied in the 
theory in two places, viz. the construction of the models and the deciding of the final con- 
clusion. It is now supposed that when the information from the second premise has to be 
added to the model (or, as it might be, the two separate models have to be combined), this 
is facilitated if the models are oriented so that the occurrences of the tokens representing 
the 'middle term' of the syllogism are adjacent. (The idea comes from Hunter's (1957) 
story on 3-term series problems.) This is only naturally the case in the first figure; other- 
wise, various adjustments have to be made. In the second figure, the premises can simply 
be re-ordered (which is explained as holding the representation of the second premise in 
working memory while renewing that of the first) and in the 3rd and 4th figures, increas- 
ingly complex rearrangements are required. (These involve the 'switching round' of 
models, so that the tokens appear on the opposite side to their original one.) The result is 
that it becomes plausible to suppose that the task of model building (regarded as unprob- 
lematic in (a)) becomes more difficult through the figures. Interestingly, it is nowhere sug- 
gested that negation might have any effect on difficulty of modelling, despite obvious 
differences in the models, and well-known psycholinguistic problems in this area. 
Certain syllogisms, as already noted, give rise to more models than others, with a 
maximum of three, and since a valid conclusion to such a syllogism has to be one valid in 
all these models any restriction which makes it difficult to 'examine' several models simul- 
taneously (assuming this is in fact necessary - perhaps the intermediate conclusions are just 
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stored as strings, but Johnson-Laird doesn't consider this) will make for greater difficulty 
as the number of models increases. Hence the question of the abilities of working memory 
becomes crucial in Johnson-Laird's theory, and he claims experimental support (unpub- 
lished) in the form of a correlation between performance on syllogisms and on certain 
kinds of memory tests (64). 
The prediction of the original figural effect, as was supposed to be explained by the 
arrows in (a), is now based on a further assumption - that working memory takes the form 
of a 'queue', (as opposed to a stack) so that whatever order things go in, is the order in 
which they tend to come out. Hence, if syllogistic terms go in in the order A-B-B-C, 
they'll tend to re-emerge in the same order (or at least those that emerge at all will; in this 
case A and C, in that order). This 'first in, first out principle' (41), despite its centrality, is 
given little elucidation, and no real independent empirical support. It's doubtful, too, how 
well it fits with Johnson-Laird's claim (1983 71-2) that syllogisms, with detectable figural 
effects, occur often in daily life, since it seems likely that the surface syntax hiding the 
underlying propositional form will often distort this ordering - cf 'they also serve who 
only stand and wait' (an A proposition with term order reversed, cf. Cohen and Nagel, 
1972 37) - and if a 'simple' syllogism should appear in a very complex form requiring 
much preprocessing, it is unclear whether the final canonical form derived will predict the 
form of the conclusion or not. The other essential assumption, ie. that information in 
memory tends to 'fade away' for some reason, is of course common in the literature. 
The theory as it now appears thus makes certain predictions about the behaviour of 
subjects in the experimental task: some syllogisms should be more difficult than others, and 
there should be a general increase in the difficulty of otherwise similar syllogisms through 
the four figures. Johnson-Laird therefore proposes an experiment to test these predictions. 
This experiment (Experiment 3) is in all given details a straight replication of the one in (a) 
(with the exception noted above, that we are not told whether the subjects were asked to 
state their conclusions in normal propositional form). Since this is the case, I do not see 
why Johnson-Laird doesn't provide a reanalysis of the results obtained in (a), and point out 
whether or not the new theory's predictions are fulfilled there. Evidently, he thinks that a 
new experiment will provide further data, and that this will be more interesting, but the old 
data should show the same patterns nonetheless. 
In the event, Johnson-Laird finds that his predictions are all borne out. The figural 
effect as demonstrated in (a) is again massively present, and there is a substantial decline 
in the number of correct valid conclusions as the number of models increases and through 
the figures (with no apparent interaction between the two) (56). The percentage of errone- 
ous 'no valid conclusion' responses also increases through the figures and with larger 
numbers of models. Once again, there are problems with the latency data. These data are 
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in fact remarkable as compared with those from (a); we are not told of any difference in 
the manner of their collection, but they are generally much slower and more plausible. 
Since they are only given for correct conclusions, and these are comparatively rare, latency 
`cannot be used as a general measure', except in the one-model problems. I am not con- 
vinced, however, that the latencies are reliable enough to prove anything even here. 
An interesting further feature of Johnson-Laird's data emerges both in the first experi- 
ment of (b), and in the third. It is that 'where the conclusion is in the same mood as just 
one of the premises, the end term of the premise tends to play the same grammatical role 
in the conclusion as it did in the premise itself (27, 55); eg, with the premises 3AI, if the 
subjects drew an I conclusion, it was likely to be CiA. What is mainly interesting about it 
is that Johnson-Laird apparently regards it as inexplicable according to his theory. Now 
the same effect occurs in the first two figures, of course, but there it is simply the original 
figural effect, as discussed in (a). (If this seems obscure, consider that the grammatical- 
role-based definition just given always leads to an A-C bias in the first figure, and a C-A 
bias in the second.) Allegiance to 'parsimony' would suggest that the explanation should 
be essentially similar for the phenomenon in all figures, but Johnson-Laird holds out no 
hope that his working-memory story will be able to do the job (cf. (b), 60). Hence, either 
there is a major peculiarity in syllogistic reasoning such that two parts of essentially the 
same phenomenon have different explanations, or Johnson-Laird's explanation of the 
figural effect is wrong. I suspect that further investigation of this matter would expose a 
serious problem for the whole theory. 
Another interesting result is that in cases where there is an 0 premise one finds a 
number of conclusions of the I form. This is almost to be expected, given the way 0 pro- 
positions are interpreted in ordinary speech, but curiously it did not appear at all in the 
data for (a); in (b), however, the phenomenon accounts for 16.78% of all conclusions to 
premises of this kind. There is no obvious reason for this, and Johnson-Laird's model is 
constitutionally incapable of handling it (the conclusion-drawing algorithm cannot produce 
it): Johnson-Laird puts it down to some sort of 'Gricean implicature' (28). Indeed, Gricean 
principles do predict just the observed cases, and these go against the grammatical-role 
trend just discussed, in those syllogisms where I and 0 premises are combined. 
8.4 The Effect of `A' Premises in Syllogistic Reasoning 
In this section, I want to look in a little more detail at a certain aspect of Johnson- 
Laird's experimental results. To see properly the way Johnson-Laird's theory grows out of 
his empirical work, and is inextricably bound up with it, it is worthwhile to probe further 
the way it fits with the data, and the way in which gaps can appear. I shall claim that 
there exists at least one important phenomenon unaccounted for by his theory, offer a 
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conjecture as to how his theory could easily be made to handle it, and then suggest that 
this is not altogether without significance from the point of view of sustaining some of his 
logical claims. 
The phenomenon in question is best exposed by considering the role of the testing 
phase in the account of the solving of certain syllogisms. Most of the discussion here will 
assume the data found in Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978 op. cit.), since that is where 
it emerges most clearly, and hence for convenience I shall refer to the version of the pro- 
cessing model found there, which is already described above. I shall also again refer 
mainly to the data from the second experiment, second test. 
Take, for instance, the 1AI premise-pair: the 'initial representation' (IR) for this, on 
Johnson-Laird's theory, immediately suggests the conclusion 'Some A are C'. In fact, in 
this example, the suggested conclusion is invalid - there is no valid conclusion, given these 
premises - but this result can only be arrived at through the 'testing' process. Johnson- 
Laird's model, therefore, suggests the following spread of likely conclusions to these prem- 
ises: 
Some A are C 
(Some C are A) 
No valid conclusion 
(here, the dotted line shows the point results below which have required testing - see 
Johnson-Laird and Steedman 1978, Appendix, 95). The salient quantitative prediction is 
that the bracketted conclusion will be comparatively rare, due to the `figural effect'. But 
now consider the III syllogism, viz. 
Some A are B 
Some B are C 
which differs only in the propositional form of the first premise. Here the model is 
and its predictions are identical; also, there is no valid conclusion. We have little reason, 
then, to suspect that the performances of subjects will differ much on 1AI and III prem- 
ises. But they do. According to Johnson-Laird and Steedman's data (op. cit. 95) 16 out of 
20 get the latter syllogism right (ie. they see that there is no valid conclusion), while 12 
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out of 20 get the former wrong. This suggests that the IAI is much more difficult than the 
III. Another such anomaly occurs between the lAO and 110 syllogisms: here 16 again 
get the second correct, but only 5 get the first, while 14 get it wrong. Why might this be? 
Johnson-Laird suggests that 'erroneous responses may occur if there is a failure to 
test exhaustively' (64), and in these cases he is clearly right: what happens, if his model is 
correct, is that in the 1AI and lAO cases the IR is not tested, and the conclusions given 
are just those which the model says this will yield, complete with figural effect. But in the 
III and NO cases this generally does not happen; the model is tested; we do get the fre- 
quent response that there is no valid conclusion. While, in a few cases (3 and 4 respec- 
tively), subjects in fact give the wrong answer, and it is then consonant with the IR and the 
figural effect, the vast majority do not. 
Further analysis of Johnson-Laird and Steedman's data shows that conclusions which 
on Johnson-Laird's theory involve such failure, overwhelmingly occur (a) in the first two 
figures and (b) when there is an A premise. If both of these conditions are satisfied, 75% 
of subjects produce a conclusion which appears in the IR, whereas if (b) is not, only 
13.5% do so. 
Here, there is an interaction between the formal characteristics of syllogisms in gen- 
eral, and the data. It so happens that no syllogism has a valid conclusion which could be 
read off the IR, unless it has an A premise (see Table 2 in Appendix). All other syllo- 
gisms have no valid conclusion, or (if they have EI or IE premises) the conclusion is an 0 
proposition; in either case, reaching the 'correct' conclusion requires testing of the model. 
Strikingly, the majority (76%) of subjects succeed in doing this. The El and IE syllogisms 
are a good deal more difficult than the others, on this showing, especially in the first two 
figures (which is plausibly explained by the figural effect - see Johnson-Laird and Steed- 
man op. cit. 72, for a discussion; interestingly, the incorrect answers here are generally not 
those suggested by the IR.) For syllogisms other than these, and without A premises, 81% 
of subjects succeed; ie, such syllogisms are very easy (cf. op. cit. Table 5). However, what 
the data show is that where there is an A premise in the first two figures, subjects tend to 
give an IR conclusion whether it is valid or not; of the 75% who give such a conclusion, 
only about half (38%) have produced a valid one. This is what I call the 'A-premise 
effect' (or just 'A-effect' - see Table 1). It is much more marked in the first two figures. 
In the second two only 60% of subjects give an IR conclusion, and this derives more from 
the fourth figure than the third. Oddly, there are fewer syllogisms in the first two figures, 
which yield valid conclusions from the IR, than in the second two. 
What is required is a theory which accounts for these results. There can be no ques- 
tion that Johnson-Laird's theory, as it stands, offers an elegant explanation of the figural 
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effect; but can it account for these other phenomena? Johnson-Laird and Steedman offer 
three main kinds of predictions in order to evaluate the theory. 
1. Firstly, there is the prediction that the need for testing increases difficulty. However, 
the figures, already quoted above, are misleading in that the number of problems with 
correct IRs is small (14 out of 64) and for a large, nonarbitrarily delineable subset of the 
rest (viz. those without A premises and not El or IE), 81% of responses were correct 
despite having required testing. 
2. There are differences in accuracy predictable 'within the set of problems that are 
unmodified by logical testing', ie. where the IR yields a correct conclusion, due to the 
effect of figural bias. Where there is no valid conclusion, the existence of bias is supposed 
to make the problem more difficult because the easier it is to form paths, the harder it will 
be to appreciate that there is no valid conclusion' (84). 
3. It is claimed that it should be easier to destroy an erroneous initial representation when 
there are fewer paths to be broken, that is, when premises are particular rather than univer- 
sal' (84). This appears well borne out in the data. It fits well, of course, with the A- 
effect, since A-premises are affirmative and universal. The question is whether it suffices 
to explain the A-effect. 
It looks as though, if we accept the form of Johnson-Laird's model thus far, some- 
thing must inhibit the testing of the IR when an A premise is present. (This is also sug- 
gested by the latency data, as noted above.) What is ponderable, perhaps, is whether the 
simple consideration of the number of paths in the IR is powerful enough to account for 
the scale of the differences in the data. Does one extra link explain the differences 
between responses to these problems? We have also the question why the effect of an E 
premise is much less significant than that of an A, while they are equally universal: the 
presence of an E premise in a problem does little to raise the number of IR conclusions 
tendered. Furthermore, this approach ought surely to predict the greatest number of IR 
conclusions for problems with two A or two E premises, or some combination of these, ie. 
those where both premises are universal. However, in all the EE cases, and both the AA 
problems where the IR is incorrect, less than 50% of subjects give IR conclusions; also, 
the 4EA and 4AE cases are two of the five problems with A premises where less than 50% 
IR conclusions are given. 
Johnson-Laird and Steedman fail to consider these points because they put their main 
emphasis on the question of accuracy. Indeed, for example, fairly few give the correct 
response to the AA case where there is no valid conclusion (viz. 3AA - 40%, see 84) but 
also few give the IR conclusion, the difference being accounted for by the presence of two 
levels of testing before the correct result is reached. This naturally means a greater spread 
of conclusions, but I cannot see that a reason is thereby generated to expect fewer IR con- 
clusions if the difficulty of IR testing is much affected by the number of paths, which here 
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is maximal. In any event, Johnson-Laird and Steedman ought to anticipate much greater 
difficulty in the EE cases than in fact is found; these are more difficult, in general, than the 
surrounding problems on Table 2, but only marginally. 
A possibility one might canvass is that the matter is complicated by the presence of 
negative links in the model: are they easier to break than positive links? This could 
explain why there is no 'E-effect' comparable to the A-effect, although it still fails to 
explain why we don't then have a massive IR response to the 3AA problem, when in fact 
it's the same as in, eg, the lEE case. (But here it might be held that any explanation for 
the A-effect is going to have trouble with cases like this.) Evidently, the interactions 
between particularity and negativity in the premises are rather complex here, and may 
account for some of the phenomena in the data for problems lacking A premises. How- 
ever, it seems implausible on the whole to try thus to account for the overall A-effect. 
Let us now offer a speculative solution to this problem. An interesting fact about the 
IR conclusions predicted by Johnson-Laird's model, is that for any pair of premises, one of 
which is of the A form, the form of the putative conclusion is that of the other premise. 
So, eg, the IR for a 2AE syllogism suggests an E conclusion, that for a 31A suggests an I 
conclusion, and so on. This is consistent with a certain sort of illicit conversion, or 
misrepresentation, of the A premise. Suppose that 'All A are B' is sometimes represented 
in such a way as to identify As and Bs. (This is suggested by Chapman and Chapman 
1959, and explicitly adopted by Erickson, 1974; see Johnson-Laird and Steedman 1978 
88,90.) Now consider, eg, the syllogism 2AI 
All B are A 
Some C are B 
in this case, if B and A are represented as coextensive, it will be logically correct thereafter 
to conclude 'Some C are A'. In effect, A can just be substituted for B in the I premise; 
hence, this policy of 'illicit conflation' of the extensions of the terms in the A premise, will 
invariably yield a result in the mood of the other premise, exactly as do Johnson-Laird's IR 
conclusions. 
As noted earlier, in Johnson-Laird's terms, the A-effect is describable as consisting in 
some sort of inhibition applying to the 'testing' process of IRs containing A premises. In 
general, the illicit conflation presented above provides just such an inhibitor. Given the 




The 'b' in brackets is omitted; no non-A Bs are recognised. But now this deprives the 
testing mechanism of the wherewithal for falsification: any IR built up using the structure 
thus arrived at, will yield a logically unfalsifiable conclusion, the nature of which depends 
on the rest of the structure (ie. the other premise). Whenever there is an A premise, the 
possibility of testing depends crucially on the presence of 'the "b" in brackets'. So we 
might suppose that, in many cases, it is simply omitted. 
Johnson-Laird and Steedman in fact consider this hypothesis (op. cit. 89), but reject it 
for obscure reasons. They allude to previous work on conversions, saying 
the fact that subjects will accept the converse of an A or 0 premise as valid 
provides no direct evidence for a process of conversion, licit or illicit, in syl- 
logistic inference 
- which is true; but perhaps the A-effect does provide such evidence. They seem to 
believe that 'if such a process readily occurred, it would eliminate the figural effect'. 
However, this is clearly not a consequence of the present idea, and seems to depend on 
their taking it as part and parcel of a whole system of conversions, dropping optional ele- 
ments indiscriminately, which then indeed yields results not justified by the data. But if 
we suggest that it is only A premises which are commonly converted on a large scale, this 
leads only to the A-effect. A major problem with the suggestion as it stands is that it 
offers no account of why A premises are singled out in such a fashion, and fails to explain 
its occurrence being greatest in the first two figures. This might become a topic of interest 
if Johnson-Laird's theory were to be established as a strong paradigm in the field of syllo- 
gism research. Incidentally, perhaps, if one supposes a side-effect of the conflation to be a 
collapse of the directional influence of the arrows in the part of the model representing the 
affected premise, one can derive the 'grammatical role' results described near the end of 
the last section, at least for A premises, even in the last two figures. 
In any event, if the suggestion can be pressed, it serves to question Johnson-Laird's 
assumption that reasoning proceeds on the grounds of properly-understood premises being 
used in a completely rational, if resource-limited way. This would potentially cause con- 
siderable trouble for Johnson-Laird's integrated account of competence, rationality and pro- 
cessing, which in the chapters now following we shall proceed to examine in detail. 
9 
Johnson-Laird's theory of Internal Representation 
The central point of the structure of Johnson-Laird's theory is that, in his view, it 
allows us to see the process of reasoning as being semantically driven. There is no 'men- 
tal logic', he says, whereby people translate syllogisms and like problems into some kind 
of internal notation and then operate upon them with rules such as those of the predicate 
calculus. What happens, rather, is that people understand what the premises mean and use 
this understanding to generate their implications. The major part of our overall task, then, 
is to investigate how we can see the quasi-mechanical theory just outlined as a plausible 
instantiation of this sort of procedure. This chapter will begin that task by examining what 
is perhaps most fundamental: the interpretation of the diagrams illustrating the `models'. 
9.1 The Syllogistic Models 
We have, as noted above, structures such as 
(in which particular case, 'All A are B'). It's fairly obvious how Johnson-Laird wants us 
to envisage these structures as models. We have here a situation in which there are two As, 
both of which are identical to a B; slightly less naturally, we have a 'possible B' - we 
reserve judgement on the question whether or not there are non-A Bs. Johnson-Laird gives 
us an intuitive explanation of this, as follows: 
Suppose you want to draw a conclusion from the premises: 
All the artists are beekeepers 
All the beekeepers are chemists 
without relying on Euler circles or Venn diagrams. One way in which to 
- 110 - 
proceed is to employ a group of actors to construct a 'tableau' in which some 
of them act as artists, some as beekeepers and some as chemists. To represent 
the first premise, every person acting as an artist is also instructed to play the 
part of a beekeeper, and, since the first premise is consistent with there being 
beekeepers who are not artists, that role is assigned to other actors, who are told 
that it is uncertain whether or not they exist. In short, a tableau of the follow- 
ing sort is set up: 
artist = beekeeper 
artist = beekeeper 
artist = beekeeper 
(beekeeper) 
(beekeeper) 
There are three actors playing the joint roles, and two actors taking the pan of 
the beekeepers who are not artists - the parentheses designate a directorial dev- 
ice establishing that the latter may or may not exist. Obviously, the number of 
actors playing the different roles is entirely arbitrary (Johnson-Laird, 1983 94- 
5). 
(Operations like this, somehow straightforwardly 'internalised', are essentially what 
Johnson-Laird supposes reasoning to consist in.) This suggests the following interpretation. 
Each line in the model (ie, each actor) corresponds to a single entity in the modelled situa- 
tion. Hence the tokens in the model stand, not for entities, but for instantiated properties 
(or instances of properties) of entities. The '=' signs indicate that the linked tokens stand 
for properties which are co-instantiated by one real entity. 
This interpretation, it has to be said, is not one which everything written by Johnson- 
Laird encourages us to adopt. Sometimes, he speaks more as if each token is to be 
regarded as a separate 'actor' in the tableau, and thus as if one has a plurality of actors 
representing each actual entity. This kind of thing occurs particularly in his earlier 
accounts of how the mechanisms he envisaged for operating with these models were able 
to carry out certain of their operations (see, eg: Johnson-Laird, 1975; Johnson-Laird and 
Steedman, 1978). It is suggested, indeed, by the notion, mentioned above, that we have 
objects related in certain ways, and in these cases (as it happens) related by identity. This, 
however, entails a curious doctrine about identity and its representation, and one which 
plays no role elsewhere in Johnson-Laird's theory; hence, I believe that if some serious 
problems are to be avoided, it is best to cleave to the more recent accounts. We shall see 
that there are difficulties enough even there, and find independent reasons, anyway, for 
supposing that relations other than identity require a more complex treatment than 
Johnson-Laird proposes. 
It should be made clear that the interpretation suggested is not one which Johnson- 
Laird anywhere explicitly lays down. In particular, the notion that each line in the model 
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tells us about a certain entity is inconsistent with his usage. For example, he draws the 
model for 'Some A are B' like this: 
a = b 
(a) (b) 
whereas on my account one would expect: 
or something similar. This is frequently unproblematic, if we acknowledge Johnson- 
Laird's tacit convention that tokens refer to the same entity only if explicitly linked. How- 
ever (and this is something to be taken up later) an added complication is that, often, he 
seems to treat unlinked items on a single line as being, as it were, 'potentially' linked - 
somehow more obviously so that those on separate lines - a matter which will be 
significant in the discussion of the procedures he proposes as operating upon these models. 
Johnson-Laird's assertion that the numbers of tokens (actors) in the model (tableau) 
are 'obviously... entirely arbitrary', will not have escaped notice. This is a crucial part of 
his story, which is that somehow a model (or tableau), of the sort described, can be 
regarded as representing in some sense the content of 'All A are B'. The point is that it is 
a feature of all states of affairs, or situations, in which all A are in fact B, that every A in 
that situation is identical to some B - no matter how many As there are, nor whether there 
are non-A Bs. Johnson-Laird holds that we can use an arbitrary number of exemplars of a 
set to stand for the entire set; thus the three artists in the quotation above represent all 
artists, and the fact that each is linked to a beekeeper indicates that any artist one might 
find is a beekeeper. On the other hand, one might find (apart from those whom we know 
must be artists) beekeepers who are not artists. Johnson-Laird is also concerned, however, 
to maintain that a model of the sort in question also represents a particular situation, and 
that in some circumstances the exact cardinality of the numbers of tokens could be impor- 
tant (eg. if the premise were 'Three artists are beekeepers'). To accommodate these fac- 
tors, it is necessary to develop an account of how models can be used in different ways, to 
model different propositions; I shall therefore now try to explain the basis of Johnson- 
Laird's views about this, which will inevitably draw in some of his views on language- 
understanding in general. This will be a fairly free interpretation of Johnson-Laird, who is 
unclear or inexplicit about many of the points covered. Page references in parentheses 
indicate places in Johnson-Laird 1983, where support can be found for the statements I 
make. 
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9.2 Models and Representation 
In the widest sense, Johnson-Laird's theory is based on the idea that organisms (or 
other systems) whose behaviour is above a certain level of complexity, have to be seen as 
carrying about with them a model (here in some very loose characterisation) of the 
environment in which they exist, which model helps them to produce behaviour 'appropri- 
ate' to that environment (4000). There are many complex difficulties about this view, 
many of which are well-known and none of which I propose to discuss here; let us merely 
note that whatever it is within the organism that constitutes this model, it does so in virtue 
of its functional role in the production (or control) of behaviour (403). The model can be 
seen as representational, therefore, just insofar as it has some coherent such role. If, for 
instance, there is some (neural) structure which operates in such a fashion as to render the 
behaviour of the organism 'appropriate' to some particular environmental contingency, then 
(modulo some of the difficulties just explicitly ignored) it can be said to constitute, for the 
organism, a representation of that contingency - or, if you like, that 'situation'. The level 
of detail in such a representation, is left rather arbitrary. 
If the account of such a mechanism involves a particular sort of (representational) 
structure, it must also specify the arrangements whereby this structure is able to fulfill the 
necessary controlling functions. This is the familiar 'representation-process' point (cf. 
Anderson, 1978); the representational structure has to be seen as being 'used in a certain 
way. Any biological/psychological structure can be said to represent something for the 
organism (or system) only if it can be shown to play the right sort of role - be used with 
appropriate sorts of processes - in the functioning of the organism. 
Let us, then, consider linguistic cases. We can suppose, as does Johnson-Laird, that 
such phenomena as language-understanding are related to the evaluation, in some sense, of 
sentences against a representation of (some relevant part of) the world (156, 245f`). We 
can also suppose that the understanding of any declarative sentence involves the construc- 
tion of a representation of what it is taken to assert; of a state of affairs in which it's true. 
A traditional idea, of course, is that to know what a sentence means (ie, I here suppose, to 
be able to understand it) is to know its truth conditions - in what kinds of circumstances it 
would be true, and in what kinds it wouldn't - in other words, to have the capacity to dis- 
tinguish between situations where it is true, and those where it is not. Johnson-Laird takes 
this capacity to be coupled with the ability to construct models of possible situations in 
which the sentence is true, and to say of any such models whether they are models of 
situations in which it actually is true. A model is therefore a structure the use of which, 
within suitable mechanisms, allows the organism (in this case, the human) to 'pick out' 
situations of one sort, as compared with those of another, it can thus be said to represent 
the sort of situation picked out. What is crucial, however, is that the model is not 
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constrained to be used only in conjunction with one specific type of mechanism, and hence 
it can be used to represent more than one kind of situation: all that can be said (for reasons 
which will emerge), is that there is some situation which is simultaneously of every kind 
that a particular model can be used to represent. Hence the import of a given model in 
itself is somewhat indeterminate, unless one knows what are the circumstances of its 
current use. (Familiar remark: the content captured in a model is a function of both the 
model and the processes which construct and evaluate it.) 
Johnson-Laird's story is that when communication takes place, the object is that the 
hearer should reconstruct in his mind a model identical to that from which the speaker pro- 
duces the discourse (162-5, 264, 370). This would be best done by a non-deterministic 
device which always selected the right model from the beginning, but since this is an 
unreasonable assumption, Johnson-Laird supposes people construct some arbitrary model 
consistent with the speaker's pronouncements, and later revise it as necessary (assuming 
for simplicity in the account that the speaker remains consistent in his utterances) (408). 
He says that when a sentence is heard, one initially produces a propositional representation 
of it, which serves to disambiguate the surface structure and perform other psycholinguisi- 
cally necessary functions. This now forms the basis for the model-building processes 
(244). The representation of truth-conditions is achieved by the resulting model together 
with these processes, and those which can 'revise and evaluate' the model. Suppose the 
sentence is 'All the artists are beekeepers', then a proposition of this form is constructed, 
and the processes produce a model of some situation, no doubt quite unreal, in which there 
are a number of beekeepers some or all of whom are also artists - and no other artists. 
(This ignores the question of the 'possible' non-artistic beekeepers, but we'll come back to 
them later.) There may well be other things in this model, but these are irrelevant details. 
What is vital is that (a) given this sentence, the processes always construct a model of the 
sort described, and (b) the processes can revise this model, in the light of information later 
in the discourse (eg. to the effect that there are exactly five artists in question) so as to 
make it closer to the one the speaker had in mind. In fact, the processes can produce, ori- 
ginally or by revision, a model representing any state of affairs in which the proposition 
would be true. Notice that what makes one of these models represent that sentence (rather 
than, say, `Five artists are beekeepers', or `Some beekeepers are artists', or 'Some bee- 
keepers are not artists') is the fact that it was constructed, and is liable to revision and 
interpretation, by just that particular set of processes, operating on the basis of that particu- 
lar proposition: more will be said later about the implications of this arrangement. In any 
event, it's easy to see that, even on Johnson-Laird's account, 'Two artists are beekeepers' 
might well lead to an identical original model, but with different possibilities for revision 
and interpretation. This is why he says: 
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A crucial point about mental models is that the system for constructing and 
interpreting them must embody the knowledge that the number of entities dep- 
icted is irrelevant to any syllogistic inference that is drawn. In the case of 
numerical or proportional inferences, however, the numbers or proportions will 
matter. The procedure must accordingly have an independent way of keeping 
track of which particular proposition is being modelled (98). 
If we want to be a little more formal about all this, what we might say is that, given 
any model, the processes which constructed and could currently revise it amount to an 
equivalence relation on the set of all possible situations (states of affairs, whatever). This 
is not supposed to have anything to do with Barwisean situation semantics, although it may 
be interpretable in that light (I shall certainly not attempt here to say how situations might 
be individuated!). The point is that this relation defines a partition of the set into those 
situations where a certain proposition is true, and those where it is not, and hence, respec- 
tively, into those represented by the model under these processes, and those not. Consider, 
for example, the model 
(1) a = b 
a = b 
(b) 
which has, as noted above, a variety of possible interpretations. What can be said straigh- 
taway is that it represents, in the sense just stated, a (any) situation in which there are two 
As which are Bs, and one B which is not an A (ignoring, again, the brackets). This is, as 
it were, a rather primitive aspect of its representation. There are two ways in which the 
story is more complex: the first, which we shall ignore for the time being, is that the model 
may contains all kinds of default 'world knowledge'-like information about the entities (eg. 
if they are artists, that they are male, cf. op. cit. 52-4); the second, here crucial, is that it 
can be used t o represent other c l a s s e s o situations. It might perhaps model 'There are two 
As and three Bs'; it contains, in a sense, too much information, but then it's hard to see 
how a model fails to represent these as being either linked by some arrangement of identi- 
ties, or as not being (although not being might be a better default). More clearly in 
Johnson-Laird's terms, however, there can be procedures which revise it into any otherwise 
similar model with arbitrary numbers of the same kinds of 'entity-types'. I shall be discuss- 
ing this matter in more detail shortly, but what it comes to is that the model can be made 
into any element of the following array (440 - I have added the first column, for con- 
sistency with what comes later): 
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(2) a=b a=b a=b a=b 
a= b a= b a= b 
a = b a = b 
a = b 
a= b a= b a= b a= b 
b a= b a= b a= b 
b a= b a= b 
b a = b 
b 
a = b a = b ... 
b a = b ... 
b b ... 
where the elements of this array are all models, just like (1), of particular situations. In 
this array we have, in effect, a model for every possible situation in which all A are B (for 
some particular A and B, sets of (instances of properties of) things in the world), and since 
the revision procedure just mentioned constitutes, if you like, an equivalence relation on 
this array (considered as a set of models), under which the models are all equivalent, it 
turns out that (1) is, in an important sense, equivalent to this entire array, so far as its 
representational ability in this context of use is concerned. Hence, since the models in this 
array pick out just those situations in which all A are B, we can treat (1) as representing 
'All A are B', and the ability to construct (2) as knowledge of its truth conditions. As Han 
Reichgelt (personal communication) has suggested, it is rather as if one were to treat, say, 
'4' as representing the integers, given the recursively applicable procedure 'add, or sub- 
tract, 1'; in the context of this procedure, '4' is an arbitrary choice. 
Every model, taken with a certain set of construction and revision procedures, thus 
serves to identify a class of possible situations, equivalent just in that they are so identified. 
Every model, given different procedures, will serve likewise to identify some different 
class of situations. As suggested above, (1) will pick out situations in which all A are B, 
or two A are B, or possibly other things. But (1) itself contains a sort of kernel of infor- 
mation which is common to some one situation in each of these classes, their singular 
intersection; in general it's evident that if (1) represents something under the (2)-generating 
procedure, then so does anything in (2). Johnson-Laird sometimes speaks of 'representa- 
tive' models, where the import seems to be models representative of a class of models, as 
(1) is representative of (2) (165, 190, 264, 439}). Evidently, given that they form an 
equivalence class, any member of (2) will be as representative of the whole set as any 
other, Johnson-Laird seems to mean, by this usage, just that any member of (2) is, in this 
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sense, representative of (2) (although, of course, they will differ in what else they are 
representative of). 
As noted above, in determining what a model represents, it is essential to be apprised 
of the currently operating procedures, or (what is effectively the same thing, in Johnson- 
Laird's theory) the original proposition being modelled. Without this knowledge, the 
model might be seen to represent any one of the related, yet disparate, kinds of states of 
affairs which it could possibly be used to model - and no doubt there can be a very large 
number of these. Notice, on the other hand, that if one is provided with a proposition, and 
asked whether a given model could model it, all one need do is look: for, what character- 
ises the equivalence of the states of affairs in the various classes picked out, is really just 
the truth therein of some proposition, and thus all of these are true in this one model (or 
the situation which it `most primitively' models), the nexus of those classes. This notion 
of 'truth-in-a-model' is just what is captured in the procedures which construct the model 
from the proposition, and which mediate the inverse operation; it will be used a good deal 
in what follows. 
As I warned, this has been my own, perhaps idiosyncratic, interpretation of the basis 
of Johnson-Laird's theory. However, I believe that he has implicitly committed himself at 
least to most of it. In any event, the assumption that it is conVect allows us to make sense 
of Johnson-Laird's algorithm for syllogisms, in an interesting way; also it provides, to my 
mind, the only hope of seeing that algorithm as `essentially semantic'. 
In the next chapter, I shall present an analysis of the algorithm, designed to uncover 
its logico-semantic structure, whereafter we will be in a better position to investigate these 
semantical claims. In the remainder of the present chapter, partly as helpful preparation for 
this analysis, I wish to say more about the notion, mentioned briefly above, of a 'represen- 
tative model', and its implications in the particular case of the algorithm for syllogisms. 
93 Representative Models 
It was mentioned that the notion is founded upon the idea that a model, eg. (1), can 
be `revised' into any member of a certain array of models (perhaps better thought of as 
simply a set of models, the arrangement of these being theoretically immaterial), eg. (2) 
being the array (or set) corresponding to (1). Let me call this array the `expansion' of the 
model, and note that in general any model will have some determinate expansion. The 
object of this apparatus is further to elucidate the way in which Johnson-Laird is able to 
claim that his models represent the content of a statement, in some helpful sense (in a 
given context of use). 
- 117- 
The expansion, of course, contains models of all possible states of affairs in which 
the original proposition is true (this much is clear from the above discussion). Hence, it 
seems not unreasonable to allow that the system, consisting of (1) together with the pro- 
cedures which expand it into (2), does indeed capture the content of 'All A are B'. We, in 
that event, accept the following principle: 
P: If a model in a particular system is supplemented with processes which allow it to be 
made equivalent (somehow isomorphic) to any arbitrary one of the possible states of 
affairs in which a statement is true, then it can be said, in that system, to represent or 
'stand for' all of those, and thus capture the truth-conditions and the logical content 
of that statement. 
Unfortunately, Johnson-Laird says that (1) is a 'representative sample' from (2) 
(440). This is plainly false. (1) does not occur anywhere within (2); at best one might 
want to regard it as some sort of disjunction of two of the elements. The problem here is 
the 'possible' B, discussion of which was deferred from some time ago; not only does it 
have the consequence just noted, but, of course, it also makes it very difficult to see how a 
model such as (1) can be regarded as modelling a particular situation when, it seems 
natural to say, it tries rather to sit on the fence between two which are quite distinct. 
There is, I think, only one way round this: we might suppose that (1) does in fact represent 
a particular situation, viz. 
(3) a = b 
a = b 
b 
and that (3) is itself quite capable of being expanded by some suitable procedures, which 
allow the omission of unlinked 'b's, into any member of (2). We then suppose that the 
brackets are there in (1) to 'remind' the procedures that they are allowed to do this. 
(Presumably also to remind us!) The procedures, that is, are sensitive to the presence of the 
brackets, which constitute a 'label' on the model of this particular situation that amounts to 
an instruction to treat it as being one of a certain kind - as expandable in a certain way. 
(Notice that if the optional B is left out, then there will be insufficient information for the 
procedures to construct the whole of (2) - cf. the discussion at the end of the last chapter). 
On this interpretation, then, the brackets in (1) have no semantic significance, so far as the 
specific situation modelled is concerned. Such a view, it has however to be admitted, is 
not encouraged by much that Johnson-Laird himself says. 
If we have accepted P. I contend that the way is open for us to see all of Johnson- 
Laird's models as being coherently representative of the content of utterances. Perhaps the 
most doubtful case is that of the representation for 'Some A are not B', the diagram for 
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which generally appears in its more recent form as 
(4) a 
a 
where we can see this as, in itself, being a model of a situation in which there are four 
objects - two As, an AB and a B. The 'barrier' is as irrelevant to this as are the brackets. 
Clearly it is true of this situation that some of the As are indeed not Bs, although of course 
all sorts of other things are true as well. The function of the brackets is to allow the 
expansion of this model into others in which there are no ABs (ie, ones where no A are 
B), and the function of the barrier, in capturing negation, is to prevent its expansion into 
any model wherein all A are B (by ensuring that some A, at least, can never be linked to 
any B). All other possible expansions, though, are permissible, including ones where, say, 
all B are A, etc., perhaps with the constraint that there have to be some Bs: For instance, 
the state of affairs (3) would then appear as part of the content of 'Some B are not A'. 
Hence, it seems reasonable, under P, to say that (4) captures the content of 'Some A are 
not B', given the appropriate expansion procedures. 
We can regard the foregoing as establishing two different kinds of expansion pro- 
cedure. Suppose we view a model, in the manner sketched above, as consisting of a set of 
entities, one to each line, of different 'types' (eg. 'a = b', 'b', etc.), then we can say that 
El: The number of entities of particular types can be changed independently and 
arbitrarily in the range 0 (if they have brackets) or 1, to infinity, and 
E2: The types can be changed (entities of other types can be constructed from those 
present) in certain specified ways (eg. link-making and -breaking). 
Evidently El suffices to generate the whole expansion of (1), viz. (2), but not to generate 
that of (4). In fact, I think (for reasons which will emerge) that this is an error on 
Johnson-Laird's part, and that (4) should be replaced by 
(5) a 
(a) = b 
(b) 
where expansion by El will suffice. (Notice here that the apparent type '(a)= b' is just an 
omissible 'a = b', and that the barrier now does no real work, since its function properly 
relates only to E2 and the drawing of conclusions. Also, the constraint may yet be desir- 
able that there must be at least one B. The reduction from two to one of the number of 
'a's above the barrier is of course immaterial, and is merely introduced for simplicity.) 
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9.4 Combining Models 
I want now to move on to the question of the combinations of syllogistic premises. 
When one has two premises and combines them, what presumably ought to result is a 
model which represents, in the sense under discussion, the truth-conditions of the conjunc- 
tion of those premises. What might give rise to difficulties is the fact that frequently one 
can construct, using Johnson-Laird's recommended methods, up to three different such 
models. (In terms of the discussion above, this is because one categorical sentence is sup- 
posed to 'pick out', by its truth-conditions, one particular kind of situation - those with 
models in the expansion of its normally related model, in fact - but the conjunction of two 
can pick out situations different even from those picked out by either of them.) On the 
view here advanced, this is not a problem. Provided that there exists for each combined 
model a set of procedures which maps it into the array (analogous to (2)) representing the 
truth-conditions of the conjunction, it is quite possible for each of these models to represent 
the content of the combined premises. This is guaranteed if P is correct. We might then 
call the models coexpansive under those procedures. 
Now, Johnson-Laird's idea is that the reasoner constructs a model to represent the 
conjunction of the premises of his syllogism, and then is able to 'read off a conclusion 
from it. This conclusion is always consistent with the premises, but it may not follow 
validly from them, so 'testing' has to be done, to see whether other models provide cases 
where the conclusion is not true. He says that only three (at most - usually less) different 
models have to be examined. This seems to indicate that examining three models is in 
some sense equivalent to checking the entire (2)-analogue array for the combined premises, 
to ensure that it contains no state of affairs in which the conclusion is false. Such would 
be the case if there were at most three sub-arrays, as it were, each equivalent to the expan- 
sion of one combined model, in each of which the question of what was true in all of its 
components could be decided by examination of a single model of which it was an expan- 
sion. 
The suggestion is, then, that there should be some natural procedure which can 
expand combined models into sub-arrays, but also some other which expands these models 
into each other, in the appropriate sorts of ways. It would be initially plausible to suggest 
El and E2 above, respectively, for these roles. 
The idea is that the models are interderivable by expansion under procedure E2 
above. What then needs to be shown is that the models thus produced suffice, when 
expanded under El, to generate the whole (2)-analogue array for the conjunction. (Alter- 
natively, we could see the effect as arising from construction rules governing how the two 
representations are combined: there should be at most three ways of doing this which do 
not yield models that expand equivalently under El.) Thus if we say that a model-class 
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consists of (a maximal set of) models interderivable by (ie, coexpansive under) El, it fol- 
lows that the claim here is: 
C: (i) The (2)-analogue arrays representing the contents of conjunctions of syllogistic 
premises, contain at most three distinct model-classes, and (ii) these correspond to 
Johnson-Laird's combined models. 
It will now be seen that the point of my amendment to (4) was just to ensure that each 
premise's single content contains only one model-class. One could then say that El 
defines an equivalence relation on the array, partitioning it into n (not more than 3) disjoint 
sub-arrays (El-interderivability equivalence-classes; model-classes). 
In the next chapter, I shall be arguing, among other things, for the truth of the first 
part of C; the second part seems more dubious, but will be considered also. For the 
present, I shall summarise the latest results of the discussion. 
9.5 Summary of the Theory 
If the argument is conTec t, it follows that a set of exemplars of the model-classes for 
a syllogism will constitute up to three models of different specific states of affairs, the 
summed expansions under El of which yield the content of the conjunction of the prem- 
ises, as does the expansion of any one of them under El and E2 combined. Imagining the 
models of each model-class arranged in vertical columns, El provides a way of moving 
vertically up and down these, while E2 allows one to move horizontally between columns. 
Thus, given both, one can move from any model to any other, the two together form an 
equivalence relation equating all the models in the (2)-analogue array. (Han Reichgelt sug- 
gested to me that this might seem clearer expressed as follows: suppose, where m is an 
arbitrary model, that El(m) yields sub-array A; E2(m) yields m'; El(m') is A': then the 
union of all A', A",..., thus obtainable, is equivalent to the whole array.) In one or other 
of these states of affairs, it will be found that any syllogistic proposition consistent with the 
premises is true (given a usual sort of interpretation function); moreover, if and only if any 
proposition is true in all the El-expansions of all of them, ('true in each model-class', one 
might say) then it's tare in every situation in the (2)-analogue of the conjunction, and 
hence is a logical consequence of the premises. Clearly, there will be propositions true in 
some, but not all, of these models (where there are more that one). Thus, in other words, 
models of wholly different situations can be used (by the system) with the right pro- 
cedures, to represent the same content; and, of course, the same situation can be used to 
represent different contents - cf these, for `Some A are B', and `Some A are not B', 
respectively: 
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(6) a = b a 
(a) 
(b) (a) = b 
(b) 
Knowledge of the procedures involved is essential, and is supposed to be to some extent 
conveyed by the brackets and barriers. 
This is how, in principle, Johnson-Laird is able to predict the drawing of different 
conclusions from different models, derived from the same premises, all of which might be 
seen to represent the same truth-conditions. The drawing of a conclusion (in his sense) is 
just the uttering of some particular statement which is true of the model it is based on: it is 
an attempt (partially) to describe that model, or a situation it is taken to represent. Clearly, 
such a statement may be true of no other model-class, and hence not implied by the prem- 
ises. 
We now have some idea of the sort of background against which Johnson-Laird's 
algorithm is to be examined. It is important to realise, however, that little of this is any- 
where made explicit by Johnson-Laird himself, which is why I have had to labour some of 
it, pethaps at seemingly excessive length. And I am afraid to say that we have by no 
means finished with it yet. There remains the problematic matter of accounting for which 
conclusions are actually drawn from which models. This evidently has to depend 
somehow on the distribution of tokens, brackets and barriers. Moreover, we need some 
explanation of how the `expansion' procedures, referred to above, can be seen to be 
relevant to Johnson-Laird's algorithm for syllogism-solving, which appears to involve no 
such apparatus. There's a clue to the connection of these, in the observation that one's 
conclusion drawn from a particular model has to be true in all the models of the appropri- 
ate model lass. In the following chapter, we shall try to arrive at an explanation of how 
Johnson-Laird's algorithm emerges from the present theory as an effective procedure for 
deriving valid conclusions to syllogistic premises. 
10 
An Approach to the Basis 
of Johnson-Laird's Algorithm 
In the last chapter, we derived a theory about models, according to which each can be 
regarded as representative of a certain subclass of all the models in which the premises are 
jointly true, and how it might then be shown that each successive model represents a 
different, disjoint such subclass, until the entire class has been covered by at most three 
such models. A claim 'C' was advanced, stating the main point of this theory, and also 
that the models involved correspond to those used by Johnson-Laird. We are now con- 
cerned mainly with the defence of that claim. 
A difficulty arises with matching the account given there to Johnson-Laird's models, 
because the combined models needed for the suggested procedure 'El', are not like his. 
Consider the case of the III syllogism 
Some A are B 
Some B are C 
Here we need, for El to generate one of the two model-classes, the following model: 
a = b = c 
(a) = b 
(a) = c 




whereas all Johnson-Laird has is 
a = b = c 
(a) (b) (c) 
which is useless to El. One might attempt to deal with this by proposing some additional 
expansion procedure which is capable of adding the three missing entity-types, but a better 
solution seems to me to be to direct attention to the fact that the interpretation of models is 
so crucial in determining what they represent. In syllogisms, this is essentially carried out 
by the set of conclusion-drawing procedures. We can define a model-class as that subset 
of models of the combined premises from which just the same conclusion(s) can be drawn. 
10.1 Model-classes and Conclusions 
In the story sketched above, the intuitively essential aspect of a model-class is that it 
contains only those models in which a particular proposition (the putative conclusion) is 
true simultaneously with the premises. But not necessarily all of these: a valid, multi- 
model syllogism must have a conclusion true in all models and, correlatively, a given 
model can support more than one putative conclusion. In the context of Johnson-Laird's 
theory, we think typically of there being two conclusions, one read in the A-C direction, 
and one in the C-A. In order to see that either conclusion is incorrect (fails to complete a 
valid syllogism) it is sufficient to show the existence of a model in which the premises are 
true but it is not; for it to be correct there must be no such model: however, the production 
of a new model-class, in itself, guarantees neither of these for both conclusions. On the 
other hand, a distinct new model-class must surely be such that at least one of the putative 
conclusions is not true in all of its models. This being the case, if we assume that the 
conclusion-drawing procedures will 'read off' a certain proposition only from a model in 
which it is true, the way is open for the definition of a model-class as 
D: a model-class is that set of models in which both premises are true (ie, models con- 
structable from the models of those premises), and which are indistinguishable from 
one another by the set of conclusion-drawing procedures (are equivalent in those pro- 
cedures' eyes). 
(This is a slightly more formal version of the implicit definition of a model-class suggested 
by Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1983, 49.) 
The essential components now required, therefore, are 
(a) some procedure(s) for constructing combined models of the premises, 
(b) some procedure(s) for reading off conclusions from these models, and 
(c) some procedure(s) for 'transforming' the models in ways which preserve the con- 
sistency of the models with the premises, but destroy their consistency with some conclu- 
sion which was or might have been offered by (b) - viz, at least one of the putative conclu- 
sions. 
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These components, of course, are just those which Johnson-Laird adumbrates. Clearly, the 
application of (b), if (c) does not essentially appeal to its actual output, is an optional 
action at all stages but the last. 
What has now to be shown, then, is that the procedures of the kinds (a), (b), and (c), 
offered by Johnson-Laird, are such as to suffice for the tasks allotted to them. It is not 
enough, remember, for the procedures merely to produce, even in all cases, the correct 
conclusions, if they do this in any sense 'by accident': they have to be seen to do it in the 
right sort of way. Since it is obvious that if a putative conclusion is false in any new 
model produced, then it must be rejected as a possibility, what really has to be shown is 
that model-classes as now defined can actually do the job of identifying valid conclusions, 
in a principled way. 
If we consider the last chapter's explanation in terms of 'expansion procedures', 
which seemed entirely coherent, it seems reasonable to proceed by showing that the 
model-classes defined in this new way coincide with those defined in that way. This 
obliges us to look at the conclusion-drawing procedures in some detail; they are defined 
thus (see Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1983, 46-7): 
The theory distinguishes four possible relations in a mental model between a 
token of one end term and a token of the other end term:- 
1. There are positive links between them ... 
2. They are completely separated by one or more 'impenetrable' negative bar- 
riers... 
3. A negative barrier separating the end terms may be 'penetrable' in that it has 
members of the same class (either an end term or the middle term) on both 
sides of it [otherwise it is 'impenetrable'] ... 
4. The end terms may be in an indeterminate relation, i.e. they are neither 
linked positively nor separated by a negative barrier. 
The principles underlying the formulation of conclusions are straightfor- 
ward. 
[1'(a)] If there is a positive link from each token of A to a token of C. the con- 
clusion has the form: 
All the Aare C. 
[1'(b)] Otherwise, if there is at least one positive link from a token of A to a 
token of C, the conclusion has the form: 
Some of the A are C. 
[2'] If all the tokens of A are separated by at least one impenetrable negative 
barrier from the tokens of C, the conclusion has the form: 
None of the A are C. 
[3] If the negative barrier is penetrable (as defined above), then the conclusion 
has the form: 
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Some of the A are not C. 
[4'] Finally, if there are only indeterminate relations between the end tokens, 
then there is no conclusion that can be drawn interrelating them. These princi- 
ples yield ... the maximally informative conclusions consistent with the 
models. 
These definitions are clearly related to what one might want to see as the 'natural' 
(certainly, traditional) way of interpreting syllogisms in terms of intersecting sets - and of 
course this is intentional The 'entity-types' mentioned in 1 are clearly indicative of an 
intersection between all three sets (and therefore between the two 'end' ones), 2 relates to 
a complete lack of any intersection between the extensions of the end terms, while 3 shows 
that one end set intersects both with the other set and with its complement, and in 4 there 
is no definite such information. It hence follows that the conclusions drawn as described 
on these bases are well-motivated. Let us then consider whether we have here sufficient 
for a proof that the procedure as a whole is an effective one for solving the domain of syl- 
logistic problems in which Johnson-Laird is interested. 
10.2 Johnson-Laird's Domain of Problems 
In order satisfactorily to address this question, we should first satisfy ourselves as to 
what Johnson-Laird's domain of syllogistic problems actually is. This is something which 
is commonly taken entirely for granted by psychologists, who cite some such basic work 
as Cohen and Nagel (1972) as providing a suitable account of the sort of problems they are 
dealing with, and say no more about it. In the context of demonstrating effectiveness for a 
solution procedure, this is clearly inadequate. 
In fact, Johnson-Laird is much clearer than most in specifying his problems. As a 
rough approximation, one can say that he is interested in the area of Aristotelian syllo- 
gisms, restricted to those which (a) are categorical, (b) have exactly two premises, (c) have 
both premises and the conclusion in the form of strictly AEIO propositions, (d) involve 
exactly three terms, one of which occurs twice in the premises, but not at all in the conclu- 
sion. That is, he says nothing about any inferences which might involve hypotheticals, or 
disjunction, etc.; he does not attempt to treat the cases of inference from only one premise 
(immediate inference), or from three or more (sorites); he says nothing about inferences 
which involve quantifiers other than the simple universal and existential, in combination 
with negation, nor about traditional contrapositives, obverses, etc.; and certain quite possi- 
ble inferences are ruled out of his system as simply ill-formed and beyond its scope. (For 
example, inferences such as 
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All B are A 
All B are C 
All B are A and C 
and 
All A are B 
No B are not C 
All A are C 
are not accounted for.) Therefore, his theory is restricted to traditional syllogisms like those 
of the Scholastics, a domain of precisely sixty-four kinds of problem, with no obvious and 
simple extensions. We noted at the outset that he does not treat these in the same way as 
the Scholastics - his choice of figures, for instance, is different from theirs - and of course 
there are four possible conclusions to each syllogism, giving a total of 256 configurations. 
A useful practice of Johnson-Laird's is to lay out these facts in some detail in each of his 
expositions of his theory. 
One can point out facts such as, for instance, that the second of the syllogisms just 
given is simply equivalent to one of Johnson-Laird's, under a straightforward transforma- 
tion of the second premise. However, insofar as the theory is a psychological one, and 
says nothing about how such a transformation might be realised, the omission is more 
significant than it would be in a purely logical theory. Johnson-Laird says elsewhere than 
in his detailed discussions of syllogisms, that he expects his general theory of mental- 
model usage to be extendible in like fashion to several of the other cases we have men- 
tioned - but he makes no concerted or detailed effort in this direction. In particular, the 
form of the mechanism under consideration clearly makes no attempt of any kind to extend 
at all, and we shall see that the idea of extending it runs into serious difficulties. 
A formal characterisation of Johnson-Laird's problem domain exists as a subset of 
the fomialisation of the Aristotelian syllogistic as a system of proof-sequences, provided by 
Smiley (1973). Smiley's system is rather general, in that it accommodates any number of 
premises, but of course two will fall out as a special case. Smiley accounts for the particu- 
lar set of syllogisms which arise in Aristotle's (and Johnson-Laird's) system, by introduc- 
ing the notion of a chain of formulae, as follows. 
Let Vab stand indifferently for any of the wffs Aab, Aba, Eab, Eba, lab, Iba, 
Oab, Oba. Then by a chain of wffs I intend primarily a sequence of the form 
<Vctc2, Vc2c3, ... , Vcn 1Cn> . . . Thus to say that a set of wffs is a chain 
linking a and b is to mean that either its members can be arranged in a 
sequence of the kind described, with a as ct and b as cn, or else that it is empty 
and a = b ... eg, the premises in Cesare form a chain Aab, Ecb linking the 
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terms a and c of the conclusion Eac. (Smiley, 1973, 144.) 
With this in hand, Smiley is able to proceed to the following crucial definition: 
X and Q belong to an Aristotelian mood if they can be derived by simultaneous 
substitution of terms from X1 and Q1 such that (i) X1 is a non-empty chain of 
wffs linking the terms of Q1, and (ii) no term occurs more than twice in X1, 
Q1. If in addition Q1 is a logical consequence of X1, the mood is valid. (Loc. 
cit.) 
Hence we have a more principled way of restricting the domain of problems to just 
those in which Johnson-Laird in fact interests himself. It is interesting, perhaps, that Smi- 
ley is forced by his fidelity to Aristotle to mirror many of Johnson-Laird's rather similar 
precepts; eg, the omission of the 'syllogisms of strict implication' (Smiley, op cit 139), 
which is the basis of the 'chain' theory - cf. Johnson-Laird's strictures about 'uninforma- 
tive' conclusions (eg. 1983 34f). It thus appears that we can rigorously specify the logi- 
cal nature of the domain of problems which Johnson-Laird's theory is supposed to address 
(without here asking whether the restrictions on it make any psychological sense). 
10.3 Syllogisms and Decidability 
It will be useful to employ a result stated on a different occasion by Smiley (1962). 
Here, he interprets syllogistic logic in terms of a many-sorted predicate logic, and is thus 
enabled to show that it is decidable in the 7-element domain, as follows. 
A wff containing letters (predicates or variables) of not more than n sorts is a 
theorem iff it is true under every interpretation in terms of the non-empty subc- 
lasses of a domain of 2"-1 individuals. The justification of this runs parallel to 
the justification of the corresponding decision procedure for the ordinary singu- 
lary predicate calculus [Church, 1956, **466]: in any interpretation we can class 
together those individuals which belong to the same selection of the n domains 
involved, and since every individual must belong to at least one domain there 
are at most 2"-1 classes to be formed in this way. Then we show that the indi- 
viduals in each class can be lumped together without affecting the truth-values 
which wff. receive under the interpretation. 
(Syllogisms, of course, have three terms, and so the relevant domain contains 7 individu- 
als.) This result shows that an effective procedure for solving syllogisms is at least some- 
thing it makes sense to look for. 
Smiley's method can be clearly related to the story in the last chapter. The 'individu- 
als which belong to the same selection' are just entities of the same 'type', as there 
defined; hence there are at most 7 entity-types in a syllogistic model. This is evident 
enough if one considers that an entity of a given type is just one which is contained within 
the extensions of a certain set of predicates, or has certain properties. Suppose we refor- 
mulate Johnson-Laird's models as simply sets of entity-types, which for present purposes is 
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all they are: they can then be generated by selective deletion from the set of seven possible 
types. A perspicuous notation for types might be such as to use, eg, '<A,B,C>', for an 
entity which has all three attributes at issue. But for compatibility with what has gone 
before, I shall persist in writing this as 'a = b = c'. We then have it that the set of seven 
possible entity-types is 
(1) (a = b = c, a = b, a = c, b = c, a, b, c). 
A pair of syllogistic premises will rule out zero or more of these. 'No A are B', for 
instance, rules out the first two; the III premise-pair rules out none at all; 1AA reduces 
them to 
(2) (a=b=c,b=c,c). 
This resultant, reduced set (call it the type-set for the syllogism) will generally contain 
some subsets (including itself) which are possible models of the premises. By a model, 
generally speaking, I mean simply any set of types (ie, any subset of (1)), but a model for 
a premise pair clearly has to be restricted to being a subset of the type-set for those prem- 
ises, with the additional constraint that each of the three attributes must be included in at 
least one entity-type (since the sets are assumed non-empty). Thus, something like 
(3) (a, b, c) 
is not a model for any syllogism containing an I premise, but is a potential candidate for 
some combination of E and 0 premises. The collection of models for a given premise- 
pair, I shall call the model-set for those premises. 
The model-set for the III case is clearly very large indeed, but in the more manage- 
able 1AA case, for instance, we have (other than the type-set itself) 
(4) (i) (a=b=c) 
(ii) (a=b=c,b=c) 
(iii) (a = b = c, c) 
but not just (b = c), or (c), of course. 
Let us now adopt the following convention. If a model in the model set contains a 
type the omission of which leaves that set equivalent to another member of the model set, 
that type can be 'marked' (eg. by enclosing it in brackets), and the smaller model 
thereafter ignored. (Such marking is not obligatory wherever it is possible, however.) It 
must therefore be possible to omit any or all of the marked types in a model, without 
thereby producing a non-model, but none of these actions shall be obligatory. A model 
with marked types can thus be regarded as an abbreviation for the set of models consisting 
of itself and those of its subsets obtained by restoring the possible omissions. 
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In the lAA case, then, we are left with the model set written as 
(5) (a=b=c,(b=c),(c)) 
which looks very familiar, and indeed it is natural now to suggest that Johnson-Laird's 
models are simply equivalent to such subsets of the model set for a given pair of premises, 
with appropnate application of this abbreviating convention. Notice that these models 
could be `expanded', by use of the procedure El, described in the last chapter, without pre- 
judice to their representational capacity, since they would still contain only the same 
entity-types; it would thus be reasonable to regard them (commensurately with the termi- 
nology for their components) as model-types. However, there are certain important points 
yet to be covered. 
10.4 Conclusion-drawing Reconsidered 
The contention is that the model-set for any syllogism can be partitioned into at most 
three subsets, the members of which are equivalent in that they are treated identically by 
the conclusion-drawing procedures. (They then count as model-classes, in the terms of the 
above discussion - see definition D.) To the end of showing this, I reformulate those pro- 
cedures (without, I think, doing violence to their original statement above), as follows, 
understanding that the entity-type 'a = c' is said to 'contain both A and C. 
1(a)" If all the entity-types in a model, which contain A, contain also C, then the conclu- 
sion is 'All A are C'. 
1(b)" Otherwise, if at least one type containing A contains also C then the conclusion is 
`Some A are C. (However, it will be noticed that here we may allow the reading off of 
this conclusion even in cases where both premises were negative; hence it is necessary to 
add the condition: iff there is no entity-t)pe 'a' in the model. This captures, in effect, a 
major function of Johnson-Laird's 'barrier'.) 
2" If A appears as contained in 'a' or 'a = b', then the conclusion is `Some A are not C', 
unless the antecedent of 3" holds. 
3" If A appears only in 'a' or 'a = b', then the conclusion is 'No A are C'. 
4" If none of these obtain, no conclusion can be read off. 
It will be noticed that the `marking' of types is irrelevant in all of these definitions. I hold 
it to be obvious on inspection that they are correct, in the sense that the conclusion will be 
true of the specified sort of model considered as a description of the relevant aspects of 
some 'situation' (see previous chapter). Obviously, too, one can rewrite these procedures 
to give appropriate conclusions going, as it were, the other way, eg. `All C are A'. 
We can now look at the example of the lEA syllogism. Here the type-set is 
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(6) {a=c,b=c,a,c} 
which generates the following model-set (types re-ordered for clarity) 
(7) (i) (a, b = c, (c) ) 
(ii) (a, a = c, b = c, (c)) 
(iii) (a = c, b = c, (c)). 
Given the marking convention, it might seem, all these could have been expressed simply 
as 
(8) ((a), (a = c), b = c, (c)), 
but it must be borne in mind that we have to have at least one of the first two types in 
every model (at least one type containing A). That is, we have one or the other, or both, 
which might be thought to explain the presence of just three models in (7). However, we 
could quite consistently reduce these three to two, and in one of two different ways, viz: 
(9) (i) { { a, (a = c), b = c, (c)), (a = c, b = c, (c)) ) 
(ii) { {(a), a = c, b = c, (c)), (a, b = c, (c)) ), 
but the three in (7) are chosen because they are the ones discriminated by the conclusion- 
drawing procedures. We have 'No A are C', 'Some A are not C', and 'All A are C' read 
off, respectively. Reading 'from C to A', we have 'Some C are not A' from all three, and 
hence it is the correct, valid conclusion. There are therefore exactly three definite model- 
classes for the lEA syllogism, the canvassing of which has in some sense involved some- 
thing equivalent to the canvassing of all possible combinations of the relevant entity-types. 
In the III case, our marking convention allows the model-set to be written as 
(10) { (a = b = c, (a = b), (b = c), (a = c), (a), (b), (c)}, 
(a = b, b = c, (a = c), (a), (b), (c)) ), 
which indicates that the members of the model-set must all contain as subsets either {a = b 
= c) or {a = b, b = c), or both. These two members given constitute the two distinct 
model-classes appropriate for this syllogism, and allow 'Some A are B' and no valid con- 
clusion, respectively, to be read off. But now consider this relatively impoverished-looking 
model-set for III: 
(11) (i) ((a = b = c, (a), (b), (c) ) 
(ii) (a = b, a = c, (a), (b), (c)). 
Here we have what Johnson-Laird actually produces, and the suggestion is that it is no less 
adequate than the version in (10). Recall that a model-class is defined, by D, as an 
equivalence-class, where, within a given syllogism, the equivalence relation amounts to 
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xRy: y yields the same conclusions as x under procedures 1-4". It seems clear enough 
that in this case the two versions of the III model-set contain exemplars of the same two 
equivalence-classes, the same two model-classes. It matters nought that (10) cannot easily 
be generated from (11); presumably, any model of a model-class will serve in these cir- 
cumstances as well as any other, from the logical point of view. (From the psychological 
point of view, of course, it all depends on the details of your theory.) 
10S The Theory in Relation to Johnson-Laird's 
If we accept the notion that each line of a Johnson-Laird model stands for a separate 
entity of a given type (and we have considered in the last chapter the extent to which this 
is a justifiable interpretation of Johnson-Laird's view), then we can see that those models 
are (apart from some factors which will be mentioned shortly) essentially equivalent to 
members of the model-set, and thus are exemplary model-types from the particular model- 
classes for the relevant premises. (There is in fact a striking similarity between the nota- 
tion I have used above, and the constructions produced by Johnson-Laird's unpublished 
LISP-80 computer program.) My use of the `marking' convention makes this clearer, since 
it corresponds to aspects of Johnson-Laird's notation, but it has no logically central func- 
tion in the argument. Since it seems clear on Smiley's evidence that the machinery intro- 
duced above provides a decision-procedure for a certain class of syllogistic problems, and 
since I think that Johnson-Laird's machinery is in principle much the same, I think his 
claim to possession of such a decision procedure is to that extent vindicated. It seems 
clear, moreover, that the relevant class of problems is just that delineated earlier in this 
chapter. Notice that the procedures for transforming models have played no part in all 
this: their role is purely psychological, and indeed Johnson-Laird's are merely heuristic, 
drawn from a wide range of possible alternatives. 
Regarding the 'representationality' of these `models', they can be regarded (in the 
fashion discussed above) as models of actual-world `states of affairs', or `situations', if it is 
accepted that a set of entity-types can be held to represent any of the class of situations 
containing those types, such that the given types specify all the combinations of the (three) 
terms in these situations. We have here yet another appeal to the notion of an 
equivalence-class, and presumably everything about the members of these classes (ie, the 
situations) which is not germane to the equivalence-relation, is simply irrelevant, and need 
not be specified. Armed with a set of types, and a suitable definition of situation- 
equivalence based on these, one has all that is necessary and sufficient to identify any 
situation in which the premises of a syllogism, say, are true; and each of the multiple 
models for a syllogism identifies a subclass of these situations. Since this is all laid down 
in terms of what types there are, with no reference to the actual number of these in any 
given situation, we automatically have the benefits obtained by the `expansion' procedures 
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of the last chapter, only in a somewhat more abstract guise. 
10.6 Rationalised Models 
At this point we can make several observations. In the first place, Johnson-Laird's 
actual expositions of the theory (principally Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird and Bara, 
1983) tend to incorporate various ad hoc adjustments to facilitate computer-implementation, 
data fitting, and similar non-logically-motivated aspects of the subject. Hence, for exam- 
ple, the models in (7) are altered, as are the conclusion-drawing procedures, so that we get 
as 'A-C' conclusions: (i) No A are C, (ii) Some A are not C, (iii) No Valid Conclusion - 
thus avoiding having to incorporate an explicit procedure which notes that 'All A are C' is 
incompatible with the other two. I have also had to play a similar game in my definition 
l(b)" above, which suppresses the reading-off of 'Some A are C' from (7)(ii). Johnson- 
Laird's intuitive idea is that people, imagining models of this kind, think to themselves: 
' Ah, some A might be C, so it can't be that no A are C after all. But, still some A are not 
C' - until they come to the third kind of situation in which even this is false. But they 
don't read off as a conclusion 'Some A are C', at any point. Why not? Presumably, 
because they see that this can't possibly be true in all the models, in particular the first. 
(On the other hand, I do not deny people the ability to see that 'No A are C' is false in a 
model without explicitly 'noticing', or 'realising', that 'Some A are C' therefore must be 
true. It must though, nonetheless, given the existential-import assumption on which these 
models are based.) 
Consider Johnson-Laird's actual diagrams here: 







b = c 
b = c 
(c) 
(c) 
b = c 
b = c 
(see Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1983, Table 9). It's hard to see these strictly in terms of my 
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discussion: they all contain just the same entity-types, and the first two even have the 
same numbers of them (hence, on my account, representing the same primitive states of 
affairs). Significant is the point mentioned some time ago, that tokens on the same line 
tend to be seen as in some sense 'potentially' linked; this occurs here because they are on 
the same side of the barrier, and hence are not debarred from being linked. This is 
obscure, however, and I propose that (12) be completely overhauled and rationalised, as: 
(13) 1. a 
a 
b = c 
b = c 
(c) 
2. a 
a = C 
b = c 






b = c 
b = c 
(C) 
These are rather obviously equivalent to the models in (7), modulo the barriers. (Cf. 
Johnson-Laird 1983, 96-7, where the models for 30 are much as I have just prescribed, 
albeit, so far as one can tell, more or less accidentally. Johnson-Laird commonly fiddles 
with the details of his machinery in no very principled fashion until the predicted conclu- 
sions come out right.) 
The discussion about (8) raises another point noted by Johnson-Laird, which is that if 
the conclusion-drawing procedures are specified differently, the number of models for each 
multi-model syllogism can be reduced by one (see Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1983, 62-3), or 
indeed otherwise adjusted. The way in which he does this is semantically horrifying (and 
his explanation of how difficulty-predictions still stand seems to me to be, psychologically, 
equally so), but it does go to show that the actual distinctions introduced above are often 
fairly arbitrary, and geared to the subject at hand. This, of course, does not diminish the 
coherence of the procedure, from the logical aspect, but suggests that the semantic story 
does little to constrain the predictive output of the theory as a whole. 
10.7 Conclusions 
On balance, then, I am urging that Johnson-Laird's theory presents a coherent algo- 
rithm embodying an effective decision procedure for his espoused set of problems. His 
expositions, and concessions to convenience, tend to marr this, however. He unwisely 
makes the numbers and positions of tokens (especially bracketted tokens) in his models, 
into a crucial consideration. This militates against his claims about arbitrariness, and 
threatens to undermine his semantical story; further, his assignment of numbers of models 
to premises comes to appear largely arbitrary. But I hope that my efforts at analysis and 
reconstruction have shown these drawbacks to be essentially surface phenomena; elimin- 
able warts. In the next chapter we must pause, before examining Johnson-Laird's claims 
to have avoided using `mental logic', to look at his claims about the detailed structure of 
his models, beyond their relatively abstract properties we have looked at here. 
11 
Comparison of Johnson-Laird's Theory 
with Others 
In this, somewhat shorter chapter, we look at how Johnson-Laird's theory compares 
with others that have preceded it. All these preceding theories are of course known to 
Johnson-Laird, and in a number of places he argues for the superiority of his own theory. 
We shall accordingly examine these arguments, and in so doing find them often rather less 
than compelling. It will be claimed, in particular, that Johnson-Laird's theory, in so far as 
it is clear, is in fact essentially equivalent to some of these other theories, and that where it 
may significantly differ it is hard to assess the extent or importance of the differences. 
This result is of importance for assessing claims about the `psychological reality' of these 
models, or in general any claims based on their detailed structure. In this chapter, we 
assume familiarity with the material presented in the last two chapters. 
11.1 Johnson-Laird's Critiques of his Predecessors 
(a) Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978 op. cit.) contains a long section devoted to 
criticising previous theories; those based on `atmosphere' or `illicit conversions' are 
rejected (for the most part justifiably) as insufficiently, even where at all, explanatory, and 
the notions of Erickson (1974) are retained as the sole serious contender. Erickson's 
theory depends on the idea that reasoners construct 'Euler circle' representations, and fall 
into error through missing the complexities of these. People are assumed to use only cer- 
tain of the (often) very many representations necessary for arriving at the correct conclu- 
sion, and assessing various probabilities in their selections can in principle account for 
most sorts of data. Considered as a cognitive model, this is certainly incomplete and in 
some respects unsatisfactory; Johnson-Laird criticises it for being unable to reproduce the 
proper range of 'no valid conclusion' responses observed, for having no 'heuristic' where- 
with to predict which conclusions should be most probable, and for being unable to cope 
with the figural effect at all. In this last regard, he has however to concede that if 
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augmented with assumptions about 'the importance of the grammatical subject' in syllogis- 
tic premises and conclusions, or about the detailed operation of 'working memory' (91), 
the theory could deal with the problem. Since Johnson-Laird has also to agree that a suit- 
able heuristic for drawing conclusions could easily be devised (he actually suggests a sim- 
ple one), he has to admit, as we shall shortly see, that apparently his 'analogical theory' 
could equally well be based on Euler circles. 
(b) Johnson-Laird and Bara (1983 op. cit.) contains an even larger section of invec- 
tive directed at substantially the same competitors (with the addition of Braine and 
O'Brien, 1983). Atmosphere and conversion being given even shorter shrift, the offensive 
returns to Erickson, and to other versions of the same theory (particularly Stemberg's 
(Guyote and Stemberg, 1978), which is attacked in some depth in Johnson-Laird, 1983 op. 
cit.). The criticisms above are reiterated, but with an additional objection to the impeach- 
ment of subjects' 'rationality'. Johnson-Laird holds that if no subject is allowed by the 
theory to arrive at the correct conclusion to any syllogism 'for the right reasons' (ie, in this 
case, having considered all the relevant Euler-circle combinations), then humans must be 
essentially irrational, and that this is contrary to manifest fact. Such an argument turns on 
highly controversial matters, as we have seen in Part I; this aside, however, Johnson- 
Laird's case in the earlier paper that his theory is intrinsically superior in its mode of 
representation is severely weakened by its being forced, in its latest guise, to rely on just 
those assumptions about working memory which, it was previously said, would allow 
Erickson's theory to explain the figural effect. In these circumstances, it is worth explor- 
ing a little the possibility that Johnson-Laird's theory could be fairly easily recast so as to 
employ Euler-type circles rather than individual tokens. 
11.2 Euler Circles 
In the Euler circle treatment, 'All A are B' has to have two different models, viz. 
where I is the case when the 'b in brackets' is present, and II is that when it's absent. (It's 
assumed in these representations, but not in Venn diagrams, that all areas are non-empty.) 
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'Some A are B' needs both of these, plus these: 
III IV 
but Johnson-Laird claims to combine all four of these in his representation: 
(ie, the cases when one or neither, or the other or both, of the optional elements are 
present). To deal with 'Some A are not B', the Euler circle system needs to consider three 
possibilities: III and IV above, and also: 
V 
Johnson-Laird, however, maintains that these are covered by 
a b 
(a) = b 
in which we understand that if the optional A is omitted, the linked B also drops out. 
In fact, though (as was drawn to my attention by Barry Richards), it's not obvious 
how this can be understood in the same way. For instance, in III it's clear that 'All B are 
A', and Johnson-Laird's model just given doesn't seem to capture that possibility. This 
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arises from the peculiarities of Johnson-Laird's handling of negation, in which cases it's 
especially clear that the form of the model depends importantly on the syntax, in a certain 
sense, of the proposition being modelled. In the account of (a), at least, it's evident that 'a 
* b' indicates the presence of an A equal to no B at all, and this is because (i) it's not 
equal to that particular B, and (ii) the model-handling procedures are such that it can never 
be made equal to any B. In the model under discussion, then, the first A cannot subse- 
quently be made to equal the last B. On the other hand, the first B could later be equated 
with some other A. Hence 'a * b' indicates an A which is not any B, but not necessarily 
vice versa. And thus the model could be 'recursively revised' so that all the Bs were in 
fact linked to some A, and therefore it is at least compatible with III. 
Here we have one reason for Johnson-Laird's recognition that 'the content captured 
in a model is therefore a function of both the model and the processes that can revise and 
evaluate it' ((b) 35 - but similar remarks occur in several other places throughout Johnson- 
Laird's work - cf chapter 9, above). We have already looked at this point in some detail, 
but we should pause here, as it were parenthetically, to note its relevance to the relation- 
ship of the theory in (a) to that in (b), as detailed in chapter 8, above. According to 
Johnson-Laird, these differ 'in several substantial ways' ((b) 6). Certainly, there are some 
detailed differences in the processes which are supposed to occur, and to some extent in 
the predictions which these yield (although not the major ones). However, I want to sug- 
gest that too much is made of some differences, particularly the accounts of model-building 
and the figural effect. It seems to me that (b) could be regarded as essentially just adding 
more detail to the account in (a), which really contains very little. We are told that the 
arrows show an 'asymmetry' in the representation (the mental model) used by the reasoner 
- but we know little of what this might mean. Is there any clear reason to deny that there 
is such an asymmetry in (b), bearing in mind the processes in working memory? The 
point is that Johnson-Laird often draws only a vague distinction between the representation 
and the mechanisms which manipulate it, and it isn't obvious that the effects of the arrows 
in (a) shouldn't anyway be ascribed to the latter. The issue is only confused by Johnson- 
Laird's comparisons (in Johnson-Laird, 1983, esp. ch. 7) of mental models with images, 
and the like, which are wholly inert, in a certain sense, and make it difficult to see how 
such a relatively active bias could be therein encoded. (Johnson-Laird's ideas about 'list- 
processing pointers' seem obscure, and too briefly mentioned to be helpful, even where 
they are introduced in a little more detail in 'Models of Deduction', 1975.) 
A major argument of Johnson-Laird's is that his models can each represent the con- 
tent of a statement, and that this is a significant advantage over the Euler Circle type of 
theory, where the number of representations needed for a whole syllogism can quickly get 
out of hand. But obviously one could decide to annotate one's circles in something like 
the usual Venn diagram fashion, to show whether or not they are filled, and even add a 
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symbol to indicate areas optionally filled. Hence 'Some A are not B' might appear as: 
which seems to say all that needs to be said. And, in a sense, it codifies negation quite as 
explicitly as Johnson-Laird does: this is built into the conventions determining how the 
model is read. 
No model is a model simply in virtue of its structure - what matters is how this 
determines the way it's used. Johnson-Laird's models could be used so as to represent any 
arbitrary thing, though it might have to be a very odd system which so used them. But 
what tells us how they're used must be a specification of (i) the features of the representa- 
tion, and (ii) how the system reacts to these. For a representation of a certain complexity, 
it seems that the complexity must be distributed between these two, with some sort of 
'labelling' system helping to decide how. Johnson-Laird (1983 101), for instance, says 
that a series of his models could be rolled all into one, so that for the 3AE syllogism we 
get: 
c (= a) 
c (= a) 
which carries the penalty that a 'new notational principle' is needed in the interpreting sys- 
tem to treat this as three models were previously treated. But, he says, 'such a device is 
merely a notational variation...'; what this suggests to me is that, eg, the representation for 





(and mutatis mutandis for all the others) and consequently there is no reason in principle 
for the Euler Circle theory to be regarded as inherently more complex. It's just a matter of 
where the complexity is located. Similarly, one could move the representation of negation 
from the models to the system, as indeed Robert Inder advocates (personal communica- 
tion). Thus, one has simpler, more 'natural' models, but a rather complicated arrangement 
would be needed to use them so as to achieve a complete representation of the meaning of 
a proposition. Of course, it can well be doubted that any such complete representation is 
ever made use of, as Erickson implicitly suggests. Johnson-Laird's grounds for rejecting 
this, based on notions of 'competence' and 'rationality', are suspect indeed, as we found in 
Part I. And at least as doubtful, perhaps, is the claim that the nature of the trade-off 
between models and processes can be empirically determined (cf. Anderson, 1978). In this 
case, the only important difference between the suggested view and Johnson-Laird's is that 
his employs discrete tokens rather than areas. We'll look at this point shortly. 
113 Venn Diagrams 
We have just been suggesting that there are few compelling reasons arising from 
psychological considerations, to suppose that Johnson-Laird's theory is superior to some 
kind of labelled Euler circle representation. The most obvious such representational system 
is that provided by Venn diagrams, and there have been theories which proposed cognitive 
models based on these. Johnson-Laird (1983, ch. 4) devotes particular attention to one 
offered by Allen Newell (1981), in which the diagrams are actually represented by strings 
of symbols. The symbols indicate the properties that entities can have, given some prem- 
ise, as eg. 'All A are B' leads to 
Nec A+ B+, Pos A- B+, Pos A- B- 
which says that something is necessarily both B and A, and that there are these two other 
possible combinations. The reader will observe the similarity between this and the 'model 
classes' described in the last chapter. 
Johnson-Laird goes on himself to suggest a simplification of Newell's scheme, in 
which a 'table of contingencies' can be constructed for premises concerning A, B, and C 
(not unlike a truth-table) as follows: 
`All that is needed to complete the theory', says Johnson-Laird, `is a procedure that estab- 
lishes the positive existence of certain contingencies' (92). Assuming that negated features 
can be treated simply by ignoring them (which allows us to ignore the entire last line of 
this table), entities falling into these contingencies are evidently just the same as the seven 
required for the use of Smiley's proof in the last chapter. What we then see is that if the 
argument of that chapter is correct, Johnson-Laird's theory appears as a system for operat- 
ing with these contingencies in just the sort of way needed `to complete the theory'. 
Johnson-Laird's criticisms of this approach boil down to two: he points to `the 
difficulty of mentally manipulating tables of contingencies', and claims that `Newell holds 
fast to logical power, but fails to explain systematic error' (93). On the account we have 
developed, however, he seems to have solved the first of these problems himself, if some- 
what indirectly. And in so doing, he has provided Newell with a means of reformulating a 
Venn diagram theory which explains all that needs to be explained. The point is that in all 
formal aspects, leaving aside what can reasonably be attributed to mere `notational varia- 
tion', Johnson-Laird's theory itself can be seen as precisely a Venn diagram theory, in 
which the notation is actually very similar in effect to Newell's, and in which the apparatus 
of forming the initial sets of contingencies (initial models) through a certain heuristic, pro- 
vides a simple way of reducing the complexity of the search through the contingency table. 
11.4 Natural Models 
The salient apparent difference between Johnson-Laird's models and the circle-based 
ones we have lately been considering, is that his depend on the use of individual tokens to 
represent entities which stand for a set, while the others notionally use an area (an infinite 
set of points). This difference, Johnson-Laird claims, gives his models the advantage of 
being natural in a way that the others are not, in so far as their structure `corresponds 
directly to the structure of the state of affairs that the discourse describes' (1983 125). 
This is because his models, like the situations they represent, contain finite sets of related 
individuals, whereas the others `map finite sets of individuals into infinities of points'. 
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There is, even prima facie, something curiously implausible about this idea. What is 
'unnatural' about picturing sets of entities, whatever their cardinality, as areas in a plane? 
Areas intuitively share the most important properties of sets (intersection, etc.) and present 
these in a way which is one simultaneously of striking clarity and obviously 'analogical'. 
This is much more obvious than is the same fact described in terms of infinite sets of 
points, and it is also much more true to the way in which Venn diagrams and the like 
work, since the alternative description of areas as sets of points plays no role at all in their 
use, as is reflected by the fact that areas are replaced in, eg., Newell's notation, by single 
tokens, not infinities of them. There's no obvious gain over this in Johnson-Laird's move 
of using arbitrary numbers of tokens (except possibly where numerical quantifiers and 
similar problematic items are involved, but we are presented with little real evidence that 
Johnson-Laird's system is in fact any better for these cases). For the domain of syllogisms 
as such, his argument therefore collapses. 
A significant factor here is the notion of representation that is at issue, and Johnson- 
Laird's ideas about how it works. He asserts that his models are more natural because 
their structure is more like ('corresponds directly to', he says) the structure of the situation 
modelled. But there is no clear criterion of 'directness', or resemblance, defined. We saw 
in chapter 9, above, that modelling depends on the identification of some equivalence rela- 
tion on situations, and another on models, and a mapping which associates equivalent 
models with some set of equivalent situations. This is a relatively complex arrangement, 
but it is nowhere hinted that one can grade these equivalence relations in some way along 
a scale of 'naturalness', and it is far from clear what the import of it would be if one 
could. Evidently Johnson-Laird's models can be seen as related to just the same classes of 
equivalent situations (those in which certain propositions hold true) as are certain Venn 
diagrams; in the one case, sets of model-tokens relate to sets of entities having some sortal 
property, in the other areas in a plane relate to the same sets; in both cases, there is a cer- 
tain well-defined structural relationship between the model and the world, but in neither 
case is there any way of assessing how 'direct' that relationship is. 
There is, perhaps, an intuitive tendency to hold that using, say, Johnson-Laird's 
models (or Venn diagrams) to represent something radically different from the usual, 
would be a much less natural way of using them. It might be less natural to use Johnson- 
Laird's standard model of 'All A are B' for that than for 'Two A are B', and so forth. 
This only seems compelling when the difference is truly radical, however, and even then it 
is less so if it is not so much a difference in the use of a certain type of model, as a 
difference between similar uses of different types of model. Venn diagrams are as natural 
a way to use circles as Johnson-Laird's models are to use tokens, and the nature of the 
choice between these is opaque. 
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If a natural model is not one which is differentiated in its formal character, what then 
is it? The distinction might be argued on psychological grounds, no doubt, but Johnson- 
Laird makes no attempt so to argue, other than by claiming empirical support for his 
theory as a whole. Even then, what evidence could establish that subjects were using 
tokens rather than areas in their models? Presumably, even for the cognitive psychologist, 
reliance on the introspective phenomenal reports of subjects would be a retrograde step. 
For what it is worth, however, my colleague Robert Inder (personal communication) once 
did some syllogistic reasoning experiments, after which subjects were asked what they 
could tell about how they performed the task. Many of them reported using some form of 
imagery involving circles! 
11.5 The Form and Substance of Models 
It appears, then, that if Johnson-Laird's theory can be recast as one which uses a 
quite different type of model (eg. circles), while continuing to work in essentially the same 
way as a solution procedure, there is no reason to suppose that it is any the less valid in 
that guise. I have claimed that it can be so recast, and that accordingly the question of 
what kind of representation reasoners use, if this question is intended to be answered with 
any psychological exactitude, is left by Johnson-Laird entirely moot. The contact which 
the theory makes with the evidence comes only through its predictions about the spread of 
conclusions, the figural effects, and relative difficulties. These predictions can remain 
unchanged through quite severe redescriptions of the models involved in the theory. 
I am inclined to put this point by suggesting that what counts is the form of the 
models, rather than their content. What I mean here is that if a procedure involving any 
kind of model whatever, whether based on tokens, circles or something quite different, can 
be analysed formally in the above terms of identifying equivalence-classes of situations (ie, 
if it can be mapped in some way onto the theory described in the previous two chapters), 
then it is an instantiation of Johnson-Laird's theory considered as a solution-procedure. 
The latter therefore in an important sense says nothing about the kind of model involved, 
about those aspects of its structure that do not affect the required mapping. 
This criticism is actually even more damaging than it might seem at first sight, since 
if it is true it shows that Johnson-Laird's theory boils down to the following. The domain 
of syllogisms can be analysed formally as a set of problems about the relationships of 
objects falling under three predicates, the complexity of which is expressible in terms of 
the number of distinct ways there are of representing the premises of a problem in any sys- 
tem having these properties: 
(i) all predicates are represented as having non-empty extensions; 
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(ii) intersections known to be empty are not represented at all; 
(iii) other intersections are represented as possibly empty. 
The relative difficulty and spread of conclusions can be predicted from the complexity thus 
measured of each problem, while the figural effects and other less major features of reason- 
ing performance can be derived from assumptions concerning the operation of whatever 
system constructs and manipulates the representations. (In general, there is little reason to 
suppose that these assumptions cannot be fairly common to all such systems). 
Clearly, Johnson-Laird's own models constitute a representational system of this type, 
but so do the 'labelled Euler circles' discussed above. Classical Euler circles and Venn 
diagrams default in various ways from the specified requirements, but this defect can be 
overcome by adjusting the construction and manipulation procedures, in much the sort of 
way mentioned by Johnson-Laird when he observed that in principle all problems could be 
made one-model problems (loc. cit.). There are, indeed, many different ways of alterna- 
tively characterising essentially the same measure of complexity in syllogisms, any of 
which would serve as well from the point of view of making the predictions. 
11.6 Conclusions 
It is certainly a considerable advance on Johnson-Laird's part to have discovered that 
the psychological difficulty of syllogisms can be predicted on the basis of their formal 
complexity as just outlined. We can appreciate the way in which this substantially tran- 
scends the sort of results obtained by previous investigators, who tended to treat the experi- 
mental results as brute facts having no apparent explanation with any real relation to the 
logic of the problem. And on the other hand, logically-based theories like Newell's are by 
and large much more remote from experimental data than Johnson-Laird's. There is also 
much psychological interest in his discussions of the assumptions necessary to account for 
the figural and other effects. However, we have claimed that Johnson-Laird's theory can- 
not be supported when it goes further and attempts to found detailed speculation about the 
nature and structure of 'mental models'. 
All this, of course, has been discussed within the context of the domain of syllo- 
gisms. Johnson-Laird is entitled to retort that our criticisms are substantially defused when 
placed against the wider background of his general theory of mental models, which may 
find much greater support for his detailed suggestions from application of the theory in 
other domains. In the next chapter, we shall find, among other things, reasons for doubt- 
ing that this is in fact the case. 
12 
Models, Logics and Semantics 
In this chapter, we shall look at Johnson-Laird's claims for the semantic role of his 
models, and his criticisms of the role often identified for logic and similar formalisms in 
other accounts of mental processing. There is much in Johnson-Laird's theory with which 
I have no quarrel, sharing several of the intuitions upon which it is apparently based. 
Many of his criticisms of others are sound, but there are many doubtful aspects to what he 
intends to put in their place. We shall examine these difficulties and afterwards relate them 
to the preoccupation of the preceding chapters. 
12.1 Language Understanding and Representation 
Johnson-Laird's main underlying article of faith about theories of linguistic abilities, 
is that they have to take into account, and explain, the mental representation of the mean- 
ings of expressions. Moreover, he insists, 'unless a theory relates language to the world, 
or to a model of it, it is not a complete theory of meaning' (Johnson-Laird 1983, 230). 
Presumably, the course of using a model as an intermediary step is only acceptable if the 
theory relates the model in its turn to the world. 
Several chapters of the book, Mental Models, seem to constitute a kind of distillation 
of the struggles in an earlier paper (Johnson-Laird 1982), where many topics in the philo- 
sophy of language and psychology are embraced in the hope of arriving at a synthesis 
advanced beyond the previous results of either discipline. Johnson-Laird rejects, in a par- 
ticularly penetrating discussion (1983 op. cit 191-195), the Kripke-Putnam view that 
`meaning just ain't in the head' (which rests on a position of exaggerated Realism), while 
similarly disdaining the excesses of Psychologism. His conclusion is that language may be 
related to the world in a substantial variety of ways, reflecting the variety of ways in which 
it is used, but that these all depend crucially on human cognitive capacity. In fact, it does 
not really emerge that there is anything identifiable in general as the meaning of an expres- 
sion. One might put this in a Wittgensteinian way, and say that there are ultimately only 
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the circumstances of an expression's uses, but that such usage is precisely what has to be 
accounted for by a psychological theory of linguistic activity. In keeping with the tenor of 
this characterisation, Johnson-Laird normally puts all his emphasis on internal representa- 
tions which are not of anything essentially linguistic, but rather of (parts or aspects of) the 
world. 
We have already seen this feature of his account in our discussion of his syllogistic 
theory (chapter 9, above). The models in the array representing what we called the 'expan- 
sion' of a given model, are supposed directly to represent states of affairs. Hence 
Johnson-Laird notes (op. cit. 440) that his models are representations, at most, of the 
extensions of expressions. In order to capture the intension of an expression, one must 
look to the processes which construct, revise and evaluate the model, processes which are 
indeed an indispensable feature of its representative power. In fact, as we have seen, one 
has to do this even to show how a model represents the complete extension of, eg, a 
universally quantified expression. This observation somewhat attenuates the role of the 
model itself in representation - a point we shall return to. 
The position here obviously is not unlike that with ordinary first-order model struc- 
tures in model-theoretic semantics, and in fact Johnson-Laird says that his intention is to 
elaborate an account whereby he can be seen as explaining how the mind can come to 
compute what model-theoretic semantics says it must compute (Johnson-Laird 1983 167). 
He remarks that `mental models are analogous to model structures, but ... there are 
important differences between them.' One such difference is held to be in the way basic 
lexical items are handled. The standard theory says essentially nothing about these, being 
concerned only with the `logical content' of an expression. Devices such as `meaning pos- 
tulates' are freely employed to respect relations such as synonymy between basic terms, 
with no attempt to explain these relations. Johnson-Laird notes that in elaborating a theory 
of mental models, one will have to specify procedures that construct and evaluate models 
containing entities satisfying particular predicates, and the `body' of these functions is 
bound to contain important semantic information about the meanings of basic terms (181). 
It will be a significant piece of evidence that his models might in fact capture the semantics 
of expressions, however, if it can be argued that these functions, when specified in a 
psychological theory, are fulfilling inter alia the role picked out in a relatively abstract way 
by the semanticist's idea of meaning postulates. 
The latter are not intended as a psychological theory, and Johnson-Laird is quite 
justified and highly plausible in his criticisms of psychological theories which have tried 
simply to adopt them as a mechanism, inasmuch as he argues convincingly that any such 
approach will either be baroque in its degree of complication, or fail to capture the range 
of phenomena exhibited in natural language. This in itself does nothing to reduce the 
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significance of model-theory as a formal account of the semantics of natural language. If, 
on the other hand, Johnson-Laird is claiming that nothing so inflexible could account for 
these phenomena, the situation becomes more fraught. Having presented himself as 
accounting for the how of computing the what which is delineated by formal semantics, he 
can hardly escape the fact that if meaning postulates will work in specifying the results, 
they will produce those results computationally if directly implemented (unless thay are not 
computable), extravagant though it might be to do this. The 'thesis of the autonomy of 
intensions', as Johnson-Laird characterises these meaning-postulate oriented accounts, does 
not seem to be in any sense incoherent. Rather, the principal argument is that it is empiri- 
cally indefensible. Another objection Johnson-Laird has to it is that it is by its nature 
unable to account for the relationship of language to the world (op. cit. 241), but it is 
unclear that it might not yet do this if its processing model were sufficiently elaborated. 
We are therefore to regard Johnson-Laird's models as in some sense formally 
equivalent to first-order models. Given that the required sense is suitably wide, this is not 
difficult in the case of his syllogistic models (although there may emerge substantial 
difficulties in domains of greater logical richness). We have already done it, in effect, in 
chapter 10. It can be seen from the above, though, that it always involves a major 
simplification of his underlying theory. Models are models of entities satisfying particular 
predicates, and it is clear from the context in which this remark arises that it has substantial 
significance. In particular, it has inferential significance. This, indeed, is how it may be 
possible on Johnson-Laird's account to explain text and discourse phenomena, and default 
reasoning. What seems unclear is its likely further role in processes such as syllogistic 
reasoning. The models we have looked at were impoverished to the point where the satis- 
faction of a particular predicate was achieved simply by using a specific character to act as 
the token, but in a fuller exposition of the theory we might expect to see some rich and 
complex informational structure, which would encode much 'background knowledge' about 
entities of that kind (although there seems to me then to arise the threat of trouble from 
what is known in the field of Artificial Intelligence as the 'frame problem', which typically 
appears when revising a detailed representation of some situation). 
In a more general explanation of his position (1983, ch. 15), Johnson-Laird says that 
he is actually proposing a range of different types of model. He distinguishes in particular 
two as it were genera of mental models, the physical and the conceptual. The former, 
relatively close to the products of perception, are supposed to represent various aspects of 
some perceptible situation in the physical world, whereas the latter abstract from these, 
principally through the mechanisms of recursive revision, but also through various rota- 
tional devices intended to handle problems such as negation. The models deployed in the 
-148- 
account of syllogistic reasoning are particularly abstract 'monadic' models (425). Monadic 
models are ones that represent 'assertions about individuals, their properties, and identities 
between them', being restricted to handling one-place predicates (identified by the token- 
character) along with these identities. They appear to be a subclass of 'relational' models, 
which introduce relations between the tokens in a monadic model, such relations being 
indicated by lines, arrows, etc. 
There are other, still more abstract models, such as 'set-theoretic' models, where the 
tokens represent sets, and there can also be representations for the abstract properties of, 
and relations between, sets. It seems clear that these models could be used for solving syl- 
logisms at least as successfully, and perhaps as easily, as monadic models. Presumably, if 
disposed to argue against this claim, Johnson-Laird might suggest that their use would be 
less 'natural', in some sense; which looks like a fair point. But equally fair, perhaps, is to 
suppose that monadic models themselves, as abstract, conceptual models, are still 'unna- 
tural', and that their use might well be a learned skill, not to be expected of subjects unac- 
customed to formal reasoning. Johnson-Laird on several occasions alludes to the propen- 
sity of reasoners to involve all kinds of real-world default knowledge in their reasoning 
processes (cf. his 'Bambi' story, op. cit. 52, and his arguments against 'mental logic', op. 
cit. ch. 3, discussed below), and the only apparent reason for failing to involve it in syllo- 
gisms is that he has tried to control out all such content effects in his syllogistic experi- 
ments. Is there, though, any ground for the assumption that naive reasoners, when not 
offered meaningful content, employ a sophisticatedly abstract system otherwise quite 
foreign to them? 
We lately observed that a fuller version of Johnson-Laird's theory might well encom- 
pass models containing much more information. Such an elaboration might go some way 
to accounting for those features of syllogistic reasoning in less well-constrained cir- 
cumstances than those provided for Johnson-Laird's subjects, in which there seems to be a 
marked effect of the content of the terms in the premises. Evans' (1982 105-111) 
comprehensive survey of research into this effect reveals an ambivalence in views about its 
nature, but it is evidently something that requires an explanation. The trouble is, of course, 
that attempting to explain it reduces the clarity of the logical structure of the syllogistic 
problem. Various kinds of inferential processes will have to be introduced, other than 
those specified in Johnson-Laird's algorithm as we have seen it, and these are bound to 
interact in complex ways with the ones already there. To get round this, it could be argued 
that the experimental subjects in fact do use richer models like these but that, since there is 
no effective content, any content they have in their models has no effect; hence their 
models are equivalent to more abstract ones. In this case, though, there may well be rea- 
son to suppose that Johnson-Laird's proffered 'typology' of models is a false one, for what 
really changes is not the model, but rather the way in which it is used. 
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Thus to diminish the role of the model, in comparison to the processes that operate 
with it, is a dangerous course. For it can come to make the model seem peripheral, even 
epiphenomenal, in the course of events constituting cognition. If a model can represent 
almost anything, if only used properly, then it explains the representation of almost noth- 
ing. Explanation will clearly reside rather with the procedures. But Johnson-Laird con- 
sistently says very little about these, beyond a brief indication of what they ought to do; he 
even describes them as 'ineffable' (op. cit. 446). Construed like this, therefore, the whole 
theory of mental models comes desperately close to being what it so earnestly strives not 
to be, viz. a mere specification of what has to be computed, that sheds no light on how it 
might be done. The question is begged, of how language is related to the world, because it 
depends wholly on an account of how language is turned into models, and how the models 
in their turn are related to the world, neither of which steps is helpfully clarified if nothing 
very substantial can be said about the nature of the models involved, nor about the 
processes that subserve their use. 
What we are left with is the idea of a mental model, as opposed to some other kind 
of internal representation (for instance, one using explicitly sentential logic). If doubt is 
cast on the value of the detail of the model theory, perhaps there is yet a distinction here 
that can significantly illuminate the nature of reasoning processes. To examine this ques- 
tion, we should turn our attention to Johnson-Laird's criticism of 'mental logic' theories, 
and the reasons he finds for erecting the apparatus of mental models in their place. 
12.2 Logics in the Mind 
We have looked already at the argument about internal-sentence accounts of represen- 
tation for the general question of understanding language. This is closely related to an 
argument about reasoning, and whether it requires, or in any event actually uses, some set 
of explicit logical operations (applications of rules of inference) in conjunction with essen- 
tially sentential expressions. Johnson-Laird characterises this latter view as 'postulating 
that there is a logic in the mind', and as an example of an extreme view quotes Inhelder 
and Piaget's 'reasoning is nothing more than the propositional calculus itself' Johnson- 
Laird 1983, 24). The argument about this view is, it seems to me, somewhat confused, 
and deserving of effort in its unravelling. Johnson-Laird declares that 
some version of the doctrine appears to have been held by every psychologist 
who has considered that human beings are capable of rational thought. It is 
also embroiled in the nineteenth-century claim that the laws of thought are noth- 
ing else but the laws of logic. (loc. cit ) 
He goes on to analyse the defects of the theory, of which he says the most serious is its 
treatment of reasoning error. Error should not occur, if guided by a logic, and indeed 
many theorists have supposed that it does not occur in the reasoning, but rather in various 
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ancillary procedures. 
This, of course, is one of the issues we discussed in Part I of this thesis. It is always 
possible to adjust parts of one's theory in order to keep another part unchanged, while 
accounting for discrepant data; but often only at some cost in plausibility. Johnson-Laird 
suggests that this cost for mental logic theories is so severe as to have bankrupted them. 
There are many respects, however, in which his own theory rests on similar assumptions. 
He criticises Henle (1978), on the grounds that 
She suggests that mistakes arise because people misunderstand or forget prem- 
ises, and because they import additional and unwarranted factual assumptions 
into their reasoning. They fail to stick to pure logic, though they are capable of 
it.... I believe that this defence is mistaken. (op. cit. 25.) 
It is true enough that Johnson-Laird assumes correct understanding of premises, and in his 
syllogism theory (though not elsewhere) ignores factual influences, but he nonetheless 
insists that people are capable of sticking to pure logic. It is an article of his faith that rea- 
soning has always the potential for arriving at a valid conclusion - and for the right rea- 
sons. Error on his theory is attributed to faulty reasoning no more than it is on Henle's; it 
is put down to limitations on short-term memory, and its interaction with other unprinci- 
pled impedances. He certainly does not propose that people use some specific logic, in the 
sense that they mechanically apply some kind of explicit mental implementation of its rules 
of inference to explicitly represented sentential premises, but then it isn't clear that Henle 
does. It is even less clear that most previous psychologists interested in reasoning thought 
so, nor the 19th century 'laws of thought' camp. Indeed, Johnson-Laird seems to be in 
spirit firmly among the latter. 
There is a good deal of obscurity about what is meant by the notion of 'a logic in the 
mind'. Johnson-Laird starts off by using this phrase with a rather wide interpretation, but 
gradually narrows it quite substantially, until it entails a particular kind of cognitive theory. 
There is obviously a sense in which his theory involves a logic in the mind: he might 
prefer (say) 'a logic of the mind', but then I would argue that this is a better way to 
present many previous views on the matter. Few indeed of these views have made any 
real claims about mental processing, or even representation. Even Piaget, who certainly 
has been more outspoken than most, is usually vague about this sort of thing. Johnson- 
Laird quotes the following, as an example of something to which one is undesirably com- 
mitted by the doctrine of mental logic: 
the subject will ask himself two kinds of questions: (a) whether fact x implies 
fact y ... To verify it, he will look in this case to see whether or not there is a 
counterexample x and non-y. (b) He will also ask whether it is really x which 
implies y or whether, on the contrary, it is y which implies x ... (op. cit. 34; 
from Beth and Piaget 1966.) 
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This, however, says nothing about the processing that realises these internal self- 
interrogations. It says nothing about the application of rules of inference; it might just as 
well depend on a grasp of the truth-conditions of the relevant expressions. The description 
of case (a), in particular, even seems quite a plausible candidate for something done by 
examining a mental model! Certainly, Piaget apparently leaves room here neither for error 
nor for the effects of content, but he may be taken to be describing the ideal case. (In sub- 
sequent writings, he seems in fact to have taken the matter of content explicitly into 
account, rather disconcertingly for some of his critics. See Evans, 1982 op. cit. 221). 
Given his own emphasis on competence and rationality, Johnson-Laird will have to agree 
that in ideal cases subjects must be able to seek these kinds of counterexamples; but then 
where is the inconsistency with Piaget? 
If the reasoning competence of an individual is describable by a logic, then in an 
important respect it follows that whatever kind of processing realises the relevant behaviour 
somehow embodies that logic. Johnson-Laird points out that there is a question as to 
which logic is the logic in question, when discussing mental logic theories, but largely 
disregards this when formulating his own account of competence. In fact, the notion of 
valid inference, upon which he bases his own account, cannot be divorced in this way from 
particular logics; which logic you choose may depend, say, on whether you view the dis- 
junctive syllogism as valid. It is clear enough that Johnson-Laird is a classicist, in that 
classical logic can be most easily used to characterise the competence he ascribes to rea- 
soners; he also rejects the intuitionistic treatment of the law of excluded middle, for 
instance (op. cit. 188,445). To realise this competence, one might indeed postulate that 
computational processes exist which in a straightforward way implement some formalisa- 
tion of classical logic, eg. as axiomatised in a particular way, or as a natural deduction sys- 
tem. (Johnson-Laird speaks as though it makes sense to seek an empirical answer to 
which of these might be psychologically 'correct'; even if it does, I certainly share his 
view that none is likely to emerge.) Many of the previous theories he discusses, however, 
do not address the issue in such a way as clearly to make this kind of assumption; they are 
implementation-neutral, one might say, and to that extent do not compete with his own 
account of implementation. These are such as Piaget and even, I claim, Mary Henle. 
Henle (1962 op. cit.) does speak in suggestive ways, enquiring whether 'the rules of 
the syllogism describe processes that the mind follows in deductive reasoning' (368); but 
the terms of her paper invite one to read this as entailing only that the rules parallel the 
processes in so far as they generate the same conclusions for a given syllogism, or in effect 
simply that there exist processes of some kind realising the competence described by the 
rules. In the more recent computational vein, though, one does find examples of theories 
making just the sorts of claims described above (eg. Braine 1978, Rips 1982), and 
Johnson-Laird's psychological arguments are fairly telling against these, although in ways 
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that sometimes appear ambivalent to his own position. On the question of how logic is 
formulated in the mind, he observes that 'it is difficult to obtain direct empirical evidence 
relevant to this issue' (1983 op. cit. 39; my italics) - but relevant evidence surely includes 
any that would tend to show it not to be formulated at all. What this suggests is that when 
it comes to describing how a particular competence is realised, one can offer a large range 
of different possible processing models, some of which can be distinguished on the basis 
of their detailed behavioural predictions, but that it will remain questionable how far these 
can be further distinguished on logical grounds. The ways in which accounts can be 
divided up empirically may not be helpfully correlated with the ways they divide up logi- 
cally; it then becomes unclear how one might find a basis for saying anything at all in 
detail about the nature of the logic (or lack of it) involved. 
Even considered as a 'straw man', the doctrine of mental logic does its job for 
Johnson-Laird, in showing itself to be psychologically problematic. The question then is 
whether he has solid ground on which to found his replacement for it. The argument goes 
that mental logic is unworkable primarily because of its dependence on syntactic rules and 
representations - because it fails to capture or employ the semantics of these things. Much 
as in the argument about language understanding in the large, Johnson-Laird insists that it 
is only by building up a description (however abstract) of the situation at issue in the rea- 
soning problem, that the sorts of solutions people come up with, at least, can be accounted 
for. We'll now look at this part of his theory. 
12.3 Semantics and Reasoning 
Johnson-Laird's reasons for supposing that mental processing should in some sense 
make essential use of semantics, are a complex mixture of his dissatisfaction with mental 
logic theories, as we have just seen it, along with an intuitive conviction that mental 
models are a much more psychologically compelling approach and are essentially semantic, 
and a view that there is a problem in accounting for people's tendency to draw only certain 
of the logically valid conclusions to particular premises. We have already come across this 
last argument in Part I (chapter 4), where we saw Johnson-Laird attack the idea of com- 
petence that apparently comes out of a simplistically logic-based approach. He proposes 
an algorithm that purportedly uses only the truth-conditions of propositions in drawing a 
conclusion from a set of premises, and which only draws conclusions that contain more 
'semantic information' than the premises, and/or express it more 'parsimoniously' 
(Johnson-Laird 1983 op cit, ch. 3 passim). The sense in which this actually involves 
semantics seems merely to be confusing, however, since it consists solely in the 
procedure's employing a certain symbol, true, at a particular stage in a stepwise sequence 
of rule-applications. As Barry Richards (1986) has pointed out, this symbol could easily 
be replaced by another, eg. 'p or not p', which looks much less semantic and much more 
- 153 - 
'logical', without affecting the algorithm. If this were done, we should have an algorithm 
obviously operating with purely syntactic logical resources, which nonetheless only drew 
conclusions from the subset defined by Johnson-Laird as appropriate. That this should be 
possible does not seem surprising, since rules of inference in standard logics have more of 
a normative intention than a generative one, and there can be many ways of operating in 
accordance with them, without going through all the combinations they might sanction. 
It is not at all clear what Johnson-Laird intends by remarking that the process 
involves no 'formal rules of inference'. The point seems to be that the algorithm does not 
invoke explicit representations of logical rules, in the usual sense of modus ponens, dis- 
junctive syllogism, etc.; it does not have the surface appearance of a proof-theoretic opera- 
tion. In this respect, it is certainly distinguishable from the systems of those such as 
Braine (1978 op. cit) who propose a very explicit representation of a particular logic in 
their processing. However, this is not enough to make it non-logical, nor in any excep- 
tional sense semantic. In fact, it is not even clear that the surface appearance is of any 
crucial importance, for assessing these properties. Johnson-Laird describes the algorithm 
in semantically-loaded terms ('the procedure depends on a knowledge of the truth- 
conditions of the connectives'), but its operation is equally describable in quite different 
terms. It is, of course, possible to describe a valid inference in both semantic and proof- 
theoretic terms (provided it belongs to a system which is complete, ie. in which all valid 
consequences are deducible). But also, when Johnson-Laird's algorithm reduces the prem- 
ises 
if por gthen r 
p 
to 
if true or q then r 
it is only doing essentially what the resolution-based 'logic-programming' language Prolog 
(Clocksin and Mellish, 1981) would do with the same problem. And one does not nor- 
mally encounter claims that resolution theorem-provers, or Prolog, are somehow especially 
semantic; more likely, resolution will be held to be a rule of inference. 
If this is what it does, does it matter how it does it? Would it matter, for instance, if 
Johnson-Laird's program used resolution? This seems to be one of those questions about 
the level at which one chooses to describe something. In analysing the behaviour of an 
actual computer, for instance, there are always many ways it can be described. If it's run- 
ning a Prolog program, then one can describe that, or one can describe it in terms of the 
activity of the Prolog interpreter, or one can talk about the execution of assembly or 
machine code. These things are all equivalent, in the sense that they describe the same 
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process, but very different in how they do so, and they are all appropriate for some kinds 
of interests, but not others. We might analogise Johnson-Laird's project in these terms as 
attempting to discover the best (most interesting, useful, predictive, etc.) account of mental 
processing, represented as a `program' suitably adjusted for application to the brain. In 
that case, he might be saying that, whereas there may be a syntactic description of what is 
going on, it is not as good as a semantic one. 
There are places where he produces arguments of this kind (see especially 1983 op. 
cit. 149-154), in maintaining that the computability of mental models, which entails the 
describability in Turing machine terms of any system using them, does not entail that a 
semantic description of them might not be most appropriate. One could envisage bending 
much the same argument to the task of showing at a higher level that it may be more 
profitable to depict what could in principle be completely described as a syntactic-logic 
system, as a mental-model system. But this is not typically what Johnson-Laird overtly 
suggests. He more often seems to imply that the behaviour of human reasoners cannot be 
accounted for as using `mental logic'; the latter is somehow inadequate to the task. In fact, 
the claim that emerges is that human reasoning is too rich for ordinary logic, that the range 
of inferences can only be explained on a semantic basis (op cit 140-141). But if this is 
his claim, it has, as we shall now see, some serious consequences. 
12.4 Semantics and Computability 
Barry Richards (op. cit.) has suggested a particularly difficult problem that arises here 
for Johnson-Laird, related to one we also noticed earlier (in chapter 4). The problem 
appears just because Johnson-Laird insists that there is a role for semantics in cognition, 
which could not otherwise be fulfilled by logic, and simultaneously holds the strong posi- 
tion we have seen with respect to rational competence and computability. A theory, he 
says, is bound a priori to be or somehow embody a computable characterisation of some 
set of valid inferences. But any such theory is bound equally to be, as Richards makes 
clear, `susceptible of a complete proof-theoretic formulation'. There can be no independent 
role for semantics save in those cases where a logic can be shown to be formulable only in 
semantic terms. This occurs whenever there are `semantically valid' arguments (ie, those 
whose premises, when true, lead only to true conclusions) in the system, which lie outside 
the set of `syntactically valid' (ie, provable) arguments. Logics with this characteristic are 
known as incomplete: many such cases can be defined, but naturally they are always non- 
computable. 
It looks, therefore, as though Johnson-Laird will have to give something up. He has 
forced himself into a comer of his own making; the only way out is to dismantle one of 
his own walls. One course would be to yield on the mental logic issue. He could concede 
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that any acceptable theory always might be formulated as a logic, but that doing so would 
be too counterintuitive and inevitably baroque. The alternative seems to be to surrender 
computability. If mental models were not, after all, constrained to be computable, then 
there would be room for a semantic characterisation of them which indeed could not be 
encompassed by any proof-theoretic system; and this characterisation could even still be 
seen as specifying the competence of the reasoner, with all the consequences for rationality 
that Johnson-Laird wants to draw from this. 
Johnson-Laird appears to have so much invested in his commitment to computability, 
that the wall on that side must have become far too massive a structure for him to tear 
down; but can mental-model theory survive a weakening of its opposition to proof theory? 
In fact, I think the proposed dilemma is to some extent a false one: Johnson-Laird should 
retreat on both fronts, but give up neither. He can do this, the suggestion is, mainly by 
retracting his excessive pronouncements about competence. If competence is treated more 
in the sort of way we suggested in Part I, one comes not to expect a given competence 
theory to extend beyond some particular domain. The way is then opened for one to main- 
tain a view which claims that reasoning behaviour within a particular domain can be 
explained on a mental-model based account, and that this might be constrained to be com- 
putable, even if its mimicability in principle by a logic-based account is thereby entailed. 
Mental models might yet be able, though, to capture regularities across domains, which 
were forever denied to the purely syntactic (or fully computational) theory. It would, on 
this view, be conceded that human cognition is not necessarily all explicable in terms of 
algorithms - a possibility that Johnson-Laird himself several times alludes to. Creating a 
theory, however, would involve trying to capture small parts of that behaviour within com- 
putational models. 
What would be, in a sense, the real work in psychology, would then come in trying 
to fit these fragmentary models together into a general account of cognition. This might 
well involve several - perhaps many - different accounts of reasoning, even on similar 
problems, within different domains; it would certainly involve much that could scarcely be 
called 'reasoning' at all. It would mean pursuing Johnson-Laird's own objective of 
integrating accounts of reasoning into a more general conception which involves other 
processes at different levels, such as the processes which resolve anaphoric phenomena and 
the like in one's reasoning premises, and on the other hand those processes which 
somehow enable the reflective, conscious, construction of explicit arguments in defence of 
a conclusion. If Johnson-Laird's account of explanation is right, however, it would also 
mean abandoning the idea that cognition is ultimately explicable at all. 
12.5 Computability and Explanation 
In view of this unfortunate prospect, it is worthwhile to offer a few remarks in 
defence of the idea that an explanatory psychological theory need not be through-and- 
through computational. Johnson-Laird insists that it should be, that any theory not capable 
of being cast into the form of an 'effective procedure' for deriving predictions cannot be 
scientifically explanatory. We do not wish at this point to become embroiled in a technical 
discussion of the notion of explanation, of the sort with which the philosophy of science 
literature is replete; we shall be satisfied with a few relatively intuitive remarks such as 
those offered by Johnson-Laird. His claim (Johnson-Laird 1983, ch. 1) is slightly confus- 
ing since, while for the most part he holds that explanation is impossible without an 
effective characterisation, he asserts at one point that the 'whole theory' need not be thus 
stated, and that 'formulating a large-scale theory in this way may require too many ad hoc 
decisions to be worth the effort' (8). It seems unclear whether this means that explanation 
may occur only on a small scale, or that it may sometimes occur in the absence of an 
effective statement: if the latter, then perhaps Johnson-Laird's view converges on the one I 
am offering, but this interpretation is denied plausibility by his rapidly following remark 
that the existence of human abilities not effectively characterisable would present a boun- 
dary to knowledge. 
What it seems reasonable to me to hold is that a theory can exist, and can make pred- 
ictions without there being an effective way to derive these predictions, and can still be of 
scientific value. Whether it counts as explanatory is somewhat moot, since explanation is 
generally to be assessed relatively to the interests of whoever is seeking it. The contention 
here can be seen as analogous to perceiving value in a logic which is undecidable, and 
therefore uncomputable. One can see that an argument is valid, and although one can 
compute no demonstration of this, one can persuade by appeal to the meanings of the 
expressions involved. Such, indeed, is precisely the method of argument advocated by 
Johnson-Laird; his error is only to suppose that in general there will be an algorithm for 
doing it. In scientific endeavours, we may often be in this position of having to rely on a 
more-or-less intuitive, but nonetheless fairly robust and 'objective' description of some- 
thing, from which we draw inferences that are by no means deductively impeccable, if that 
means subject to formal proof procedures. This might amount to saying there is a place 
for such 'magical' ingredients as human intuition, but it is nonetheless extreme to claim 
that it dooms theories based on it to being 'vague, confused, and, like mystical doctrines, 
only properly understood by their proponents' (loc cit.). An apparent merit of his mental 
model theory was that it might help to show how we are capable of this kind of theorising, 
but Johnson-Laird seems to be trying to strangle any such potential facility at birth. 
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Let us ask ourselves what, in fact, Johnson-Laird has gained by applying his criterion 
in creating his own theory. There are certain clearly algorithmic, because actually compu- 
tationally implemented, parts of it. We have, for example, the syllogistic inference 
mechanism, implemented in LISP-80, and a system that does a certain kind of spatial infer- 
ence, implemented in POP-11. The problem with these, regarded as explanations, is that 
they are far too simple, in the sense of incomplete. A very great deal of work is required 
to take either one of these programs and see it as in any way explanatory of a human 
psychological ability. A central part of the theory is, in each case, rendered utterly perspi- 
cuous, but it inheres in a supporting structure of such unplumbed complexity that it is often 
hard to know what to make of it. We have to take on trust, on its merit as assessed by the 
'magical' ingredient of our own intuition, the major part of the account. 
This is not intended as a criticism of Johnson-Laird's theory, but only of his pro- 
posed schema for evaluating it, by the light of which I am suggesting that it does not shine 
too brightly. The theory itself is highly interesting, provocative, perceptive, and certainly 
of scientific value; but in these respects it may be rivalled by others which evidently make 
no attempt to comply with the criterion of computability. Some of these are such as the 
great constructions of Piaget and Vygotsky, but consider, as a less well-known example, 
the theory of reasoning offered by Eugenio Rignano (1923). 
Rignano urges upon us the view that reasoning consists solely in the execution of a 
series of thought-experiments. His arguments are conducted entirely at the intuitive level. 
He provides an introspective protocol, near enough, of the processes involved in his rea- 
soning that 'in London, which possesses a population larger than the greatest total number 
of hairs a man can have, people are to be found who have just the same number of hairs' 
(Rignano 1923 72-3). He says that he imagined the inhabitants of London lined up in 
order of number of hairs borne until he arrived at one with the greatest number, but then 
there remained 'in the background', the 'doubles' of those who must have had the same 
number of hairs. Similarly, he rehearses Taine's proof of the sum of the internal angles of 
a polygon, indicating that all the steps of the reasoning are nothing but descriptions of ima- 
gined operations performed upon some arbitrary polygon. All this is by no means algo- 
rithmic, and there is certainly nothing like an effective procedure suggested for replicating 
the way in which people might perform these mental experiments. Still there remains this 
central and captivating idea: 
the logical process is nothing else than a series of experiments, all, theoretically 
at least, capable of being performed, but limited to thought only in order to 
economise time and energy. The logical process appears then to be identical 
with the perceptual reality itself, operated solely by means of the imagination 
instead of actually. (Rignano, op. cit. 83, original italics.) 
There are obvious respects in which this resembles Johnson-Laird's idea. Equally, it 
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emerges from a wholly different tradition of psychological thought, and is embedded 
within a theory of 'affectivities' that is quite foreign to modem cognitive psychology. 
Johnson-Laird's account does not have quite the phenomenological hullabaloo of 
Rignano's, although the tableau of actors is rather vividly recalled (cf. section 9.1, above). 
However, the point of citing the example was to play upon the similarities for a moment, 
and ask what, that is really explanatory, is gained by Johnson-Laird in casting his related 
notion in terms of algorithms and effective procedures. 
The principle gain is the ability better to relate certain applications of the theory to 
empirical investigations. Rignano appears to have been a stranger to the laboratory in any 
case, but it is clear enough that his theory would be very hard to design tests for. On the 
other hand, this seems no less true for much of Johnson-Laird's theory. Given a suitably 
circumscribed situation, with suitably chosen subjects, one can predict the conclusions they 
will give to a suitably circumscribed set of syllogistic premises, but the extension of this to 
any other situation depends on accepting a fair number of promissory notes. Mental 
models are supposed to cover propositional reasoning, reasoning with multiple quantifiers, 
reasoning in cases where there is significant content in the premises, and so forth. Natur- 
ally, no effective procedures are specified for making them do these things, but also curi- 
ously little seems either to depend on or to entail the necessity that they ever could be. 
The explicitly algorithmic parts of Johnson-Laird's theory are in fact rather isolated 
episodes, serving programmatically to illustrate a conception of how the whole might ulti- 
mately be, while elsewhere the argument is often as unclear in its implications as anything 
in Rignano. 
The human brain is obviously a highly complex object, which behaves in appropri- 
ately complex ways. We do not know whether it works in a wholly computational 
manner, and if we did, we could not expect to specify all the algorithms it uses. Still, we 
have found that computational models are of great utility in modelling highly complex 
processes, and it would surely be absurd not to attempt their application to this subject. 
We might succeed in limited prediction, as we succeed in limited prediction of the weather. 
But, much as we continue to explain the behaviour of the atmosphere in terms that do not 
yield readily to formalisation, do not appear recognisably in computational models (even 
though they can be in some sense constructed on the output of these), and do their work 
through suggestive appeal to our prior understanding of analogous terms from mostly unre- 
lated subject areas such as geography (eg. fronts, depressions, troughs, ridges, occlusions), 
so we may hope to advance in psychological explanation by means other than the invention 
of algorithms. We do not claim that only those parts of the phenomenon of weather that 
are amenable to computational modelling, can be explained at all. 
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The concept of a mental model is a superb example of such a suggestive, analogistic 
notion, that we can use entirely because of our pre-existing grasp of what it is likely to be, 
and not because of an explicit formal definition of how it works, which, even were it to be 
provided, we could barely hope usefully to comprehend. Such is the complexity of the 
mind that, even if it is in itself computational, we will never have more than comparatively 
crude models which attempt to express the gross features of its processing. These will, it 
is surely plausible to suggest, never be explanatory in virtue of their resemblance to the 
actual processes they are trying to capture. They will be explanatory, if at all, because we 
can understand them, and there is no evidence that, computational devices though we may 
be, our understanding of computable explanations is any better than our understanding of 
other kinds. 
12.6 Summary 
The arguments in this chapter have been involved and perhaps sometimes unclear. 
This is rather in the nature of the subject matter, where the issues of semantics, logic, com- 
putation and explanation are all so closely interwoven that separation, where achieved, 
seems always artificial and lacking in respect for the complexity of the problems. On this 
score, my criticisms of Johnson-Laird are probably as open to criticism themselves, but the 
intention has been to elucidate some of the issues here. There are a few points that should 
manifest themselves. 
The main question was how far Johnson-Laird is justified in making the claims he 
does about the role of semantics in his theory. The answer was that some of these claims 
appear to be in conflict with one another, and with other claims he makes. Centrally, there 
emerges the combination of Johnson-Laird's view that the role of semantics is irreducible 
to 'mental logic', with his view that reasoning competence has to be equivalent to some 
(probably classical) normative logic, and his view that all mental processing is computa- 
tional. There is an apparently irreconcilable clash between that which is irreducibly seman- 
tic and that which is wholly computational. The problem with competence would be 
apparently of no consequence, if one simply supposed competence to be characterised by a 
proof-theoretically incomplete logic, except that this also clashes with the condition of 
computability. 
Our suggested way out of Johnson-Laird's dilemma was to adopt a less astringent 
policy with respect to computability. The value of having effectively derivable predictions 
from a theory is granted, but one cannot expect this to extend beyond a small, localised 
region of interest such as, paradigmatically, syllogistic reasoning. In general, a theory will 
at best consist of many such domain-specific explanations linked together into a whole 
which is far from clearly amenable to algorithmic characterisation. This does not mean 
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that it cannot be an explanatory theory, nor that it will be forever unsatisfactory from a 
scientific point of view. 
On the way to finding these fundamental difficulties, we noted the extent to which the 
major explanatory elements in Johnson-Laird's theory are actually located in the 'ineffable' 
processes that construct and manipulate models. This is really something which has been a 
recurrent theme throughout our discussion of his theory, and indeed is something to which 
he himself often refers. A model can represent almost anything, if used correctly; but we 
never really know what it is so to use it, nor how such use is facilitated. In these cir- 
cumstances, the resemblance between Johnson-Laird's theory and others making lesser 
claims to explicitness (such as Rignano's) is accentuated. 
This concludes our detailed investigation into Johnson-Laird's recent work, and the 
remaining task of the thesis is to try to say something a little more general about the prob- 
lems that have arisen, and about how they relate to the issues raised in Part I. 
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13 
Synoptic Conclusion 
It is now time for a brief summing-up of the discussions in this thesis, and an attempt 
to draw some general conclusions. The thesis falls into two distinct parts, which in fact it 
might be feasible to treat as quite separate, but which are yet kept together by strong simi- 
larities of interest. It is appropriate here to dwell on these and see what has emerged from 
the consideration, in the second part, of how the more abstract concerns of the first part 
appear in a particular theory. 
13.1 Algorithms, Competence and Rationality 
We began by adopting a certain attitude to cognitive psychology, assuming a strongly 
computational paradigm. This is not merely arbitrary, of course, since many recent 
psychological theories have adopted a similar attitude, but it is in any event of particular 
relevance to Johnson-Laird's approach. In an attempt to make sense of the claims often 
laid, by psychologists, to recognition for making statements of some importance to logical 
theory, we developed a view on which reasoning norms and empirical theory exist in a 
relationship of reciprocal influence and determination. We proposed that reasoning theories 
grow in an environment of a priori logical conditions influencing their emerging account of 
reasoning competence. It is decided by the theorist that people must be capable of certain 
kinds of inferences, and these abilities become a cornerstone of his account, often main- 
tained even in the face of recalcitrant observations. There is a limit, however, to how far 
empirical divergence from the predictions of ideal behaviour can be ignored; it eventually 
destroys the plausibility of the account as a whole. Hence, the psychologist is brought to a 
different description of the abilities of reasoners. But the state of imbalance between the 
psychological and the normative which thus appears leads to a pressure upon the latter. 
The pervasive doctrine that 'ought implies can' comes into effect, and results in a tendency 
for logical theory to converge towards the predictions of the empirical investigator. 
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Where a theory is computational, there should be some account of how, in reasoning, 
particular premises lead to computational processes resulting in particular sorts of conclu- 
sions. In the ideal case, the conclusions will be valid. This is just what happens in 
Johnson-Laird's theory of syllogistic reasoning. One problem with the idea is that it 
appears to depend on the deduction in question belonging to a logic with a computable 
proof system, and this in turn requires that the logic is at least complete (ie, all its valid 
conclusions are provable m it). Some logics (eg. first-order classical predicate logic) have 
this property, but others (eg. second-order classical logic) do not. In cases of the latter 
kind, the logic can be described only semantically; why conclusions follow from premises 
has to be grasped from an appreciation of their meanings, since no purely formal proof is 
guaranteed to be available. Even where a logic is complete, it may be undecidable, in the 
sense that there is no effective procedure for deciding whether a given statement is one of 
its theorems. First-order logic is a case in point, where although it is possible to prove any 
valid argument computationally, there is no guarantee that a procedure searching a coun- 
terexample to an invalid one will ever terminate. Here, one is likely to have to resort to 
semantic methods to evaluate a given argument. 
A promise Johnson-Laird seemed to hold out was that mental models could be used 
to handle cases of this kind, being of their nature semantic representations not unlike the 
models logicians standardly use, for instance in determining counterexamples. Unfor- 
tunately this ambition is discovered to founder on his simultaneous insistence on computa- 
bility. Starting with the assumption of fully logical competence, Johnson-Laird is commit- 
ted to his models somehow instantiating a computation of a function from premises to 
valid conclusions in an appropriate logic. As we have noted, familiar metalogical results 
from the theory of recursive functions entail that such a thing can exist only for certain 
constrained types of logical system, which exclude the ones we had hoped for progress on. 
It is of no avail to argue that the computation in question is somehow at a `higher level' 
semantic, and that it should not be read in terms of logical rule-application. These features 
are of no consequence; if, say, a theory is undecidable, then it can be proved that there is 
no computational procedure for deciding the validity of an argument stated in it. 
What might appear a possible escape from this trap is to suppose that there is a pro- 
cedure which somehow accidentally or coincidentally just happens to compute (perhaps 
among other things) the required function, although there is no proof to be had that it will 
do so. One has a description of it in terms of models, their creation and their manipula- 
tion, and it simply emerges from this that valid results are computed. This is related to an 
idea explored by Dermett (1978, ch. 13), in refuting the by now well-known argument ori- 
ginating with J. R. Lucas, which purported to show, on the basis of Goedel's theorem, that 
people cannot be Turing machines because if they were they could prove their own Goedel 
sentences, and this is a reductio ad absurdum. Dermett's answer is that people can be 
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interpreted as Turing machines, and as any number of Turing machines simultaneously, in 
such a way that for a given such interpretation there is always another that circumvents the 
Goedelian limitations on the first. Nothing is, in and of itself, a realisation of some 
specific Turing machine rather than another. A similar approach applied to Johnson- 
Laird's problem would indicate that perhaps, in principle, a computational device could be 
seen as, say, a Turing machine computing the theorems of some logic, which would have 
to have a computable proof system, but from some other perspective could be seen as a 
different Turing machine computing something else which, as it turns out, includes all the 
theorems of a non-computable logic. A crucial point about this idea, though, is that when 
seen from the perspective of the non-computable logic, the device could not be interpreted 
as computing its theorems, just as Dennett's device, when seen as a particular Turing 
machine, cannot be regarded as capable of computing that machine's Goedel sentence. 
Accordingly, even if it is possible that a machine should produce the required theorems, it 
is impossible that one should have a computational characterisation of it which shows that 
it will do so. 
Johnson-Laird is debarred from exploiting the defence just suggested, by his 
insistence on the notion of a rational procedure. One might empirically discover of a pro- 
cedure that it is behaving in a logical manner, but his procedure, he says, has to be seen to 
arrive at its conclusion for given premises for the right reasons, and this evidently entails, 
if among other things, that the procedure can be proved to compute just some function 
describing only valid arguments. Nor can solace be gained from Johnson-Laird's intention 
to curb the productivity of this kind of computational system by restricting it to produce 
only a subclass of valid conclusions, viz. those identified by his criteria as appropriately 
informative. He could only appeal usefully to this feature of his system, if it were shown 
that the criterion isolates a decidable, or at least complete, sublogic; but this is unlikely to 
begin with, and anyway several of his remarks (in Johnson-Laird 1983, ch. 6) indicate that 
he would not find it an acceptable restriction. Johnson-Laird's theory is thus crippled by 
exactly the feature of formal systems which he held to be 'a final and decisive blow to the 
doctrine of mental logic' (ibid. 141). Any logic so powerful that 'it cannot be completely 
encompassed by formal rules of inference' is also so powerful that it cannot be demonstr- 
ably encompassed by any purely algorithmic system. 
In these circumstances, we indicated that Johnson-Laird ought to withdraw certain of 
his proposals. In particular, he should take account of our view in Part I, that reasoning 
theories in general, and their associated accounts of competence, are only feasible within 
carefully defined 'domains'. Within a domain, it may be that one finds the predictive value 
of a computational theory to be such that it is worth submitting to the constraints it 
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imposes. One's focus is narrowed to, perhaps, a specific type of task. The possibility 
seems to be left open, here, of characterising a wider, if vaguer, view of competence across 
a number of related domains, so as to arrive at something which is not restricted to a par- 
ticular kind of logical system, but correlatively is not completely describable in computa- 
tional terms. We advanced, in partial defence of this idea, some remarks directed against 
Johnson-Laird's charge that no such theory can be properly explanatory of cognitive 
phenomena. What is needed is roughly what has been proposed (and what Johnson-Laird 
goes some way in the direction of providing), which is an account that is highly explicit at 
certain crucial points, but elsewhere depends on a more-or-less intuitive grasp of the 
cogency of the supposed relations between these. 
In thus withdrawing from some of his more exposed ground, Johnson-Laird should 
not be thought to be sacrificing anything of value. His belief that only processes such as 
he suggests could account for the rationality of mankind, for our ability, for instance, to 
invent formal logic, is surely mistaken. That we are rational in the sense basic to inten- 
tional description is, we urged in part I, certain in advance of psychology. Rationality in 
this sense, though, does not entail some in-principle infallibility in making inferences. 
Rather, it founds the whole system of interactive behaviour, including most importantly in 
this context linguistic behaviour, that permits us to engage in activites such as logical 
theorising. These are reflective activities, in which we build upon our observations and 
experiences of our own and others' reasoning behaviour. There is no good reason to sup- 
pose that the cognitive processing involved in these activities is more than remotely related 
to the processing involved in naively, though howsoever selfconsciously, performing tasks 
like solving syllogisms (cf. chapter 2). There might be insights to be gained here about 
language-understanding, say, but considered specifically as reasoning tasks we might be 
arbitrarily bad at such things (and there's no shortage of evidence that we are), while at 
another level we can come to realise that this is the case, and understand in what ways. 
This is not to imply even that we can improve our normal behaviour, since in general there 
is not the opportunity to carry out a complex reflective analysis of a problem before solv- 
ing it, and the ways of doing so are anyway often vague or indeterminate. 
Logical theorising, on our account, is more strongly related to other kinds of theoris- 
ing than has often been supposed. Johnson-Laird, we noticed, criticises the 19th. century 
philosophers who regarded logic as a statement of the 'laws of thought', but then himself 
establishes logic in essentially that position. Our view is opposed to this, if by 'laws of 
thought' is meant eternally a priori rules according to which the mind operates. We accept 
a view of logic as in some sense aspiring to capture the gradually revealed natural laws of 
reasoning, but only insofar as we accept the idea that psychology, like other sciences, gra- 
dually reveals natural laws. We may then hope eventually to find natural laws about how 
we are able to find natural laws, but these will be far from imposing Johnson-Laird's 
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condition on reasoning theories, that they must allow the attaining, in ideal circumstances, 
of a valid conclusion in all cases, on all tasks. 
Naturally, we want to point to the significance of the claims made here, for the cogni- 
tive psychology of reasoning in general, and the major issues of Part I. In domains as rich 
as normal human situations are likely to be, one essentially cannot expect to have a useful 
computational account of reasoning which captures a logically-defined notion of rationality. 
If rationality is adherence to some set of logical laws, then people are at best contingently 
or accidentally rational, in that it has to be empirically discovered that their behaviour is 
thus characterisable, and there cannot then be an algorithm predicting it. A competence 
theory for a domain as rich as this cannot be expressed as the algorithmically-produced 
ideal behaviour of a reasoner, if the required competence can be part of such ideal 
behaviour, it cannot be described in the terms of the algorithmic account. 
This leads leads us to generalise the suggestion that competence should not be seen 
as a specification for an algorithm (cf. also chapter 4), but more as some sort of ideal to be 
aimed at by an account of behaviour which will not be computational overall, but which 
may involve computationally explicit sections directed at particular sets of data. These sec- 
tions are not then bound by any necessity to predict fully competent behaviour as an ideal 
for the relevant set of data. In cases where the logical account would be decidable (which 
holds for syllogisms, as a subset of monadic predicate calculus), one could without 
difficulty take such a goal on board; but one should not have to. If no subjects reach a 
particular conclusion on some problem, then there is no reason to build it a priori into 
one's account that they can. There may be good reasons to build it in nonetheless - eg. 
because it makes the theory as a whole simpler, more extendible, less ad hoc - but it is 
important to distinguish these reasons from the reason that one is striving to capture some 
notion of rational competence. That notion becomes more of a background, regulative 
notion, accrediting the aspirations of one's theory at a higher level, specifying the kinds of 
abilities one wants ultimately to predict. This seems in tune with its role as we saw it in 
its interaction with normative logical theory. 
13.2 Models and Representation 
It is also appropriate now to survey our more specific conclusions about Johnson- 
Laird's work, particularly his theory of mental models, the role it might play in cognitive 
explanation, and the problems that arise with it, other than those just summarised. 
In, initially, showing that Johnson-Laird's theory is in fact a theory of the kind dis- 
cussed in Part I, we engaged in a fairly extensive analysis of his algorithm for syllogistic 
reasoning. This was shown to be an effective procedure for deriving valid conclusions to 
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syllogistic problems (or discovering that there is none), by treating the models as sets of 
entities with properties, interpretable under some appropriate procedure as representative of 
particular equivalence classes of such sets of entities, in virtue of their capacity for being 
'expanded' into any equivalent set. The expansion procedures, however, while being cru- 
cial to the account of the models as semantic constructions, play no role in the algorithm, 
which instead invokes procedures for deriving propositions from models, as conclusions to 
syllogisms, in ways that can be interpreted as identifying the important relationships (eg. 
intersection, inclusion) shown to exist between the extensions of the predicates involved. 
In describing these structures and operations, we have, like Johnson-Laird, used 
thoroughly semantic terminology. We could as easily have used some neutral description 
of the sets as sets of symbols, and simply shown that the inputs and outputs can be inter- 
preted so as to correspond to syllogistic problems. The question therefore arises as to what 
lies behind Johnson-Laird's claim that these representations are somehow essentially 
semantic, rather than logical and syntactic. This brings us back briefly to the points made 
above about computable systems: if anything is computable, then there is a description of it 
that is couched in terms only of the activities of a simple mechanism, under which it is no 
more semantic (and no less) than any other computation. There's a good deal of discus- 
sion in the cognitive science literature about how far and in what ways these sorts of 
descriptions are semantic (good examples are Fodor, 1980, and Smith, 1982), but this is 
largely peripheral to the present question, which is what justifies a much higher-level 
description of a system. Can a particular description be somehow the 'right' or 'true' one? 
Our answer to this question is essentially that evaluation of such a description has to 
be on pragmatic grounds, depending on whether it best serves the interests of an explana- 
tory theory. Johnson-Laird might well be justified, for instance, in pointing to the 
superiority on this score of his theory over 'mental logic'. But there is no answer to the 
question of which is in some objective sense correct. This is not an application of 
Anderson's (1978) 'mimicry theorem'; rather, it depends on the view that any description 
of a natural computational system at a level above the purely physical, is entirely indeter- 
minate and depends on some essentially arbitrary interpretation of the operations of the 
system. The resemblance between this remark and Dennett's argument referred to above is 
not quite accidental; we concede that the view advocated is seriously infected with a Den- 
nettian instrumentalism. We make no apology for this, however. 
The way to proceed is, on almost any account, to use experimentally collected data 
on the behaviour of a system, to decide the plausibility of theories based on different pro- 
posed structures and processes within. We therefore investigated whether Johnson-Laird's 
proposed models gain anything in predictivity, etc., over certain others from which he has, 
often vigorously, dissociated himself, although they retain many of the properties seen as 
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desirable in his own models, such as an evidently semantic role and an 'analogical' struc- 
ture. We found that, in fact, the features of his models that are effective in his use of 
them, especially in the syllogistic algorithm, are ones shared by a large range of quite 
different kinds of models (and other representations), and that there is little reason to sup- 
pose that the remaining details are of great relevance to the experimental data. Hence there 
is no clear empirical foundation for his claims about these details, and nor did we find per- 
suasive his models' characterisation as somehow more 'natural' than the others. 
We also separately considered the internal role, in the theory, of the 'typology' of 
models that Johnson-Laird offers, in that we were interested in the question of how much 
information the models contain. What emerged here was the overwhelming importance of 
the procedures that construct and evaluate models. It appears that it is really these which 
distinguish between different types of model; it is more that there are different types of 
uses of models. Models themselves continue to have a highly abstract characterisation and 
role, which amounts mainly to a description of certain formal features of the information 
represented, which are supposed to be paramount in processing it. This is revealing, espe- 
cially from a logical point of view, but it places a considerable stress on the explanatory 
importance of an account of the procedures, and none is forthcoming. To describe them as 
'ineffable' seems to be to give up hope of a clear account of what is happening in cogni- 
tion; if it amounts to a recommendation to treat them as computationally primitive (part of 
what Pylyshyn would call the 'functional architecture' of the mind), in a wholly algo- 
rithmic explanation, then this seems rather worryingly to exhibit the potential poverty of 
the latter. Explanations in terms of algorithms running on extremely complex, but cogni- 
tively opaque, machines, seem to leave much to be desired. On the other hand, our 
suggestion has been that the idea is sensible in principle, so long as it is conceded that one 
can have cognitively explanatory, but non-algorithmic accounts of important features of the 
machine architecture. 
It would be a mistake to take these arguments as adding up to a dismissal of 
Johnson-Laird's theory. The idea of mental models, that cognition depends on representa- 
tions of aspects of the world inhabited by the mind, is one of great power and potential in 
cognitive science. We have dwelt rather upon the negative aspects of it, partly because our 
particular interest in reasoning led us to them, and partly because in a somewhat Popperian 
fashion we regard the best service one can do a theory as being the attempt to destroy it. 
We have not offered an explicit alternative because it seemed more important to go into the 
issues underlying the creation of any such theory. If, as argued, the bases of certain inade- 
quacies in this, one of the most recent of theories of reasoning, turn on fundamental con- 
siderations for the relation of logic to psychology, the best hope for a useful contribution is 
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to shed some light on these. This, we hope it will be felt we have done. If we have suc- 
ceeded in exposing serious difficulties in Johnson-Laird's formulation and defence of his 
ideas, the consequence should be repair and consolidation, rather than abandonment. 
13.3 Reasoning and Logic 
Our final message can essentially be summed up as the view that several of the ambi- 
tions people have had in relating psychology and logic, have been either misplaced or 
premature. Reasoning tasks are certainly characterisable in some sense as logical tasks, in 
which premises and conclusions can be discerned; the extent and nature of the relevance of 
this to the processing that realises reasoning behaviour is, however, a question of profound 
complexity. Psychologists have been too quick to latch onto ideas in logic, ideas about 
competence and rationality, and try to cast their theories in ways that offer insights into 
these matters. Sometimes, the relationship between the nature of the proposed processes 
(eg. as algorithmic), and the domain of logic, has been misunderstood. Sometimes, the 
presuppositions of the theories (eg. that competence must be describable precisely by some 
well-known logic) have been excessive. Sometimes, the interpretations of the data (eg. as 
showing that people are thoroughly and irrevocably irrational) have been extreme. Our 
conclusion is that, for one thing, several foundational questions about rationality and its 
relations both with logic and psychology need further clarification, and that, for another, 
there is a delicate balance to be achieved by any cognitive theory that aspires both to be 
explanatory about mental processing and at the same time carry serious consequences for 
logical issues. The latter of these goals demands a simplicity and clarity that seems hard to 
reconcile with the complex subtlety of the mind, while the former is in the opposite posi- 
tion. We do not yet know how, or if, these objectives can jointly be satisfied. 
Appendix 
Some Syllogistic Reasoning Data Re-Analysed 
The following two tables relate to the argument in section 8.4 of the main text. They 
present a re-analysis of some of the data which appear in Johnson-Laird and Steedman 
(1978), for the second experiment, second test. 
Table 1 
Each cell shows, for a given figure, the percentage of conclusions given which could 
have been read off the IR of a Johnson-Laird model. ('A' shows cases where there is an 
A premise, 'no A' where there is not.) Notice that this is always small if there is no A 
premise; and of course it is always also incorrect in such circumstances. Most incorrect IR 
conclusions occur in the first two figures. 
Figure of Premises 
1 2 3 4 
A no A A no A A no A A no A 
Overall 76 13 74 14 55 14 67 9 
Correct 40 0 36 0 35 0 52 0 
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